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This study has unfolded the U.S. policy toward the 
Middle East in general and the U.S. response to the 1990-
1991 Gulf crisis in particular. It has uncovered the fact 
that throughout different phases of history the U.S. policy 
in the Middle East was shaped by its national interests. 
U.S. interests in the Middle East, as elsewhere, are 
determined on the basis of strategic considerations and 
access to resources and markets. At a more specific level, 
however, U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East over the 
past several decades, until the 1990-1991 U.S.-led war in 
the Persian Gulf, were to: contain Soviet expansionism and 
influence in the region, ensuring a steady flow of the 
region's oil and petro-dollars to the west and Japan; defend 
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the security of Israel; secure a permanent U.S. military 
base in the region; and as a result of the collapse of the 
Cold War order in 1990, establish the U.S. as world leader. 
The United States has significantly achieved these goals. In 
fact, by defeating Iraq, the United States has further 
secured its national interests in the Middle East. The Gulf 
War was carried out to this end. 
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Statement of the Problem 
The emergence of the Middle East as an area of 
politico-economic and strategic importance to the United 
States is a fairly recent phenomenon. Before the Cold War, 
U.S. involvement in the Middle East was mainly limited to 
the defense of commercial interests, primarily oil. The 
circumstances in which the u.S. emerged as a superpower at 
the end of World War II changed the nature of its 
involvement. with the Middle East "from a distant political 
observer to one exercising prerogatives of a traditional 
imperial power protecting the status quo." 1 During the 
1940s, in preparation of the policy that eventually became 
the "containment" strategy against the Soviet Union, the 
U.S. diplomat, George Kennan had designated the Middle East 
as one of the most important areas to be protected within 
the American sphere of influence. 2 Later, the Eisenhower 
Doctrine (1957), the Nixon Doctrine (1969), and the Carter 
lSalim Mansur, "The (Persian) Gulf War: 
States and the Middle East," The Iranian 
International Affairs 3, no. 3 (Fall 1991). 
2See J. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment 






Doctrine (1980) committed the United States to responding 
directly or through local states if any threats were to 
occur, or if the U.S. were invited to respond through any 
state in the area. 
The Eisenhower Doctrine extended the containment policy 
from the northern tier states to the Middle East in general. 
Congress subsequently authorized the use of armed force to 
assist non-communist Middle Eastern nations threatened by 
armed aggression from any country controlled by 
"international communism." 
The Nixon Doctrine specified that the United States 
would furnish military and economic assistance to nations 
whose freedom was threatened but would expect those nations 
to defend themselves. The result of the policy review was 
the president's endorsement in November 1970 of what became 
known as the "twin-pillar" policy. Its rationale was that 
the United States had strategic interests in Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, which meant that U.S. support for either nation 
would alienate the other. Despite their mutual distrust, 
cooperation between the two nations was felt to be essential 
in the face of growing Arab radicalism. 
The 1973 OPEC's oil embargo contributed significantly 
to the increase of U.S. concern about the Middle East and, 
in fact, since then the region has been consistently an area 
of major preoccupation of the American foreign policy 
establishment. The Islamic revolution in Iran, in 1979, 
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appeared to be another blow for u. S. interests in the 
region. The overthrow of the Shah's regime showed the 
perils of policy based upon client regimes, lacking internal 
legi timacy and dependent on external support for their 
existence. Moreover, the Islamic revolution in 1979 posed an 
ideological threat to all Arab regimes, particularly to the 
Gulf monarchies. Thus Washington policy makers viewed its 
containment as necessary for both the survival of the client 
regimes and the protection of other u.S. interests in the 
region. 
In 1980 President Jimmy Carter responded to the turmoil 
in Iran and particularly to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan by promulgating a new doctrine which states that 
America's "vital interests" would compel it to resist any 
efforts by outside powers to control the area. 3 In short, 
during this time United States policy towards the Middle 
East was: 
1. to ensure access to adequate oil supplies at low 
prices, 
2. to contain expanding Soviet influence in the region, 
3. to promote stability in the region (by protecting 
the client regimes), and 
4. to advance the "Middle East peace process" while 
ensuring the continued security of the state of Israel. 
3U.S. State Department, Current Policy No. 132 (23 
January 1980), 2. 
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During the eight-year long Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), 
Iraq enjoyed sympathy and support from the u.s. and the 
conservative monarchs and emirs of the Middle East, all of 
whom helped to develop Iraq's defense build-up. But once the 
Iran-Iraq war stopped, Iraqi arms build-up became a matter 
of concern to and virtual obsession of the United States and 
Israel. Reports of Iraq's missile capabilities, of its 
nuclear program, of its chemical weapons arsenal, and of the 
smuggling of military technology frequently became headlines 
in the press. The Central Intelligence Agency reported that: 
"Saddam was bent on turning Iraq into an Arab superpower--a 
balance to the U.S., the Soviet Union, and Japan. "4 
Despite its external power projection, Iraq did not 
gain much from its 8-year long war with Iran. Rather, it had 
increased a huge debt. Moreover, the huge cost of the Iran-
Iraq War and the cost of post-war reconstruction placed 
Saddam's Iraq in a confrontational posture with his Arab 
backers like Kuwait and the other Gulf states. The dispute 
between Iraq and Kuwait over borders and the demands of Iraq 
to have rights to the Kuwaiti islands of warbah and Bubiyan 
on the mouth of Shatt-al Arab as deep water access to the 
(Persian) Gulf, the differences over oil pricing and 
production quota contributed to the uneasy relationship 
4Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1991), 237. 
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between Baghdad and Kuwait. 5 These disputes, however, were 
considered to be advantageous for U. S. and U. S. policy 
makers. They chalked out their strategy accordingly. In 
fact, in the post Iran-Iraq war period, Iraq was challenging 
the u.s. on the two matters of greatest importance to its 
Middle East strategy: its commi tment to ensure Israeli 
military superiority over any combination of Arab states, 
and its unhindered access to plentiful and relatively cheap 
sources of energy. 
It was thus no wonder that when Iraq and Kuwai t 
prepared to meet in Saudi Arabia at the end of July 1990 to 
negotiate their differences--over boundaries, shared oil 
fields and war debts--the U. S. encouraged Kuwait to be 
intransigent. 6 The inflexibility of the Kuwaiti leaders 
reflected confidence that the western powers and in 
particular the U.S., given the relationship established 
during the 1986-87 "tankers war" would not allow Kuwait to 
be militarily bullied or have its security undermined. 7 
On the other hand, the ambitions of Saddam exceeded the 
capabilities' of Iraq. Saddam misread the lessons of the war 
5See George Klay Kieh, Jr., "Western 
Middle East, The Case of the United 
Intervention in the Persian Gulf," Arab 
14, no. 1 (Winter 1992). 
Imperialism in the 
States I Military 
Studies Quarterly 
6See Muhammad Hallaj, 
Extra Mile for War," Arab 
(Winter/Spring 1991): 7. 
"u.S. Gulf Policy: Going the 
Studies Quarterly 13, no. 12 
7Ibid. 
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with Iran and failed to correctly assess the altered 
conditions of world politics in the context of the Soviet 
collapse as a superpower. Since the Islamic revolution in 
Iran, the U. S. had been watching the situation in the 
(Persian) Gulf and the Middle East with uneasiness. Its 
hegemonic influence was challenged by indigenous 
developments within the region. Hence a growing conviction 
was demonstrated during the Reagan administration for 
reasserting its place in the world through an unhesitating 
use of military force when deemed necessary or favorable. 8 
It is in this backdrop that Saddam Hussain invaded Kuwait on 
August 2, 1990. 
Once Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait, Washington moved 
vigorously. President Bush sent his Secretary of Defense 
Richard Cheney to Saudi Arabia. Secretary Cheney persuaded 
the Saudi king about the need for American military 
deployment in Saudi Arabia by saying that "the purpose of 
American military deployment would be strictly defensive. ,,9 
The U.S., Cheney told King Fahd, wanted to deal with Iraq 
through economic pressure, however it might "lash out" and 
the military presence was intended to deter it, "to prevent 
a war." With the agreement of the King, the deployment of 
American troops started in the desert land of Saudi Arabia. 




Arabia was explained as a defensive deployment for the 
protection of Saudi Arabia, the possibility of war was 
indicated very early by Bush when he declared, on August 
fifth, that the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait "will not 
stand. 1110 Later the decision to increase American troops to 
just under half a million in mid-November clearly 
demonstrated that the u.S. was going "the extra mile for the 
war option" rather than staying firmly with the policy of 
economic sanctions around which there exi sted a near 
unanimous international consensus. 
The U. S. decided to defeat Saddam Hussain on the 
battlefield. All its other moves--diplomatic and political-
-were meant only to buy time until history in the Middle 
East was set on a new course at 7:00 pm EST on January 16, 
1991. The decision of President Bush to wage war on Iraq is 
thus a case worth study and scrutiny. As Hooshang 
Amirahamadi, a perceptive analyst of the Middle Eastern 
affairs has mentioned, "The foreign policy of any nation is 
based on some real and changing national interests rather 
than any immutable abstract principles. There is often a big 
gap between propaganda and actual policy. 1111 
The United States is no exception here. Moreover, the 
most important fact about u.S. foreign policy is that it 
10See Elizabeth Drew, "Letter From Washington," New York 
Times, 4 February 1991. 
llHooshang Amirahmadi, ed., The United States and the 
Middle East: A Search for New Perspective (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1993), 10. 
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2. What were the primary factors that led the u.s. to 
fight the war in the Gulf? 
• was it fought for "oil"? 
• was it aimed at providing a lesson to potential 
aggressors elsewhere? 
• was the war aimed at curbing the power of an 
emerging regional power in the Middle East and 
thereby ensuring the security of Israel? 
• was it an attempt by the u.s. in the post-Cold 
War era to establish itself as the world leader? 
3. Was the war conducted in a manner to pursue certain 
foreign policy objectives? 
4. What were the short term and long term implications 
of the war for the United States? 
Organization of the Study 
The study will be divided into seven broad chapters. 
Chapter I. Introduction 
• Statement of the Problem 
• Purpose of the Study 
• Research Questions 
• Methodology 
• Significance of the Study 
• Organization of the Study 
• Literature Review 
Chapter II. Theoretical Framework and Key Concepts 
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Chapter III. The Middle East: A Geopolitical Overview 
Chapter IV. Evolution of the u.s. Concept of National 
Interest in the Middle East 
Chapter V. The 1990-1991 Gulf War 
• Background 
• Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait 
• u.s. Response to the Crisis 
Chapter VI. Conclusion 
Notes and References 
Bibliography 
Research Methodology 
This study will be based on the premise that U. S. 
foreign policy is rooted in the concept of national 
interest. Four exploratory hypotheses will be examined: 
1. The Oil Factor. 
2. The Israeli Factor. 
3. Containing Resurgent Islam: Preserving the Status 
Quo Politics in the Middle East and Finding a Permanent Base 
for the u.s. in the Region. 
4. Quest for World Leadership in Post Cold War Era. 
--------------- --
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Hypothesis One: The Oil Factor. 
Oil has been central to the United States' view of the 
Gulf and the role of oil must therefore be reconciled with 
U.S. behavior. For examining this hypothesis we would look 
into the following issues: 
1. a theoretical foundation in theories of imperialism, 
2. a specifiable and quantifiable interest of the U.S., 
i.e. western dependence on Middle Eastern oil 
3. an apparent threat to that interest, i. e. Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait 
4. evidence of U. S. perception of a threat to the 
interest (in the domestic U.s. debate). 
Hypothesis Two: The Israeli Factor. 
It was an important Israeli interest to see Iraq 
militarily weakened. The Israelis also actively sought the 
intervention of the United States. Published reports and 
documents show that in the months before Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait, Israel itself and its supporters in the U.S. sought 
to highlight Iraq as a threat, especially after Iraq 
acquired military capabilities and chemical weapons that 
were capable of reaching Israel. 
To explain the "Israeli" factor in the U. S. policy 
towards the Gulf War, the following issues would be studied: 
1. Israeli factor in the general theory explaining U.S. 
policy in the Middle East, 
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2. Substantial Israeli interests in seeing the 
destruction of Iraq's military establishment, 
3. a clearly stated preference by most advocates of a 
policy for the use of force against Iraq. 
Hypothesis Three: Securing Permanent Military Facilities 
~n the Middle East and Preserving the Status Quo Politics 
in the Region 
The u.S. intervened militarily in the Gulf crisis as it 
wanted to protect its client regimes in the gulf which were 
conduits for promoting its imperialist interests in the 
region. In other words, the United States was looking for an 
opportunity to secure its permanent military presence in the 
Middle East for preserving the status quo politics in the 
region (as represented by the pro-American conservative 
governments such as Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf 
sheikdoms) in the fear of the resurgent Islam. 
It is worth noting that during the Cold War era 
communism was considered by the u.S. government as the main 
threat to the Middle East, but there has been a change in 
this policy since the mid-1980s, particularly since 
President Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the former 
Soviet Union and the Islamic revolution took place in Iran. 
From then on the growth of Islamic movements began to 
replace the spread of communism in the Middle East as the 
main concern to the United States. 
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The major elements of this hypothesis that would be 
studied in this section are the following: 
1. u.s. response to the Islamic revolution In Iran. 
2. Iran-Iraq war and the policy of u.s. to the crisis. 
3. The nature of contemporary Islamic movements and how 
these cause concern to the United States. 
4. U.S. policy towards the pro American conservative 
gulf regimes, especially towards Saudi Arabia and other 
monarchies in the region. 
Hypothesis Four: U.S. Quest for World Leadership in Post 
Cold War Era 
With the decline of Soviet powers, the United States 
was determined to fulfill its objective of undisputed global 
hegemony. The gulf conflict provided the launchpad for the 
creation of a "new world order" in which the u.S. would lead 
and everyone else would follow. 
To substantiate this hypothesis we would posit the 
following observations: 
1. The Gulf war could have been avoided. 
2. The U.S. acted hastily without giving chance for a 
diplomatic solution. 
3. How the U.S. did not attempt to limit conflict but 
went beyond a limited effort to accomplish broader foreign 
policy goals such as permanent Middle East hegemony. 
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4. How the U.S. managed the United Nations to implement 
United States' own agenda. 
Sources of Data 
Both primary and secondary data will be used for the 
study. Primary sources will include: 
1. Official U.S. government pUblications: Department 
of State Bulletin Dispatch & Supplement. 
2. Weekly compilation of presidential documents. 
3. Public papers of the presidents of the United 
States. 
4. Autobiographies of General Colin Powell and General 
Norman Schwarzkopf. 
Secondary sources will include: 
1. Published books on the subject. 
2. Scholarly and journalistic articles. 
3. Newspaper reports, etc. 
The combination of the above-mentioned primary and 
secondary source materials would help to provide information 
on the problem of study. 
Significance of the Study 
This study is of enormous significance for an 
understanding of contemporary U.S. foreign policy, 
especially U.S. policy in the Middle East and the evolving 
global system. The study focuses upon U.S. policy toward the 
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East in general and during the Gulf War of 1990-1991 in 
particular. This topic is one of paramount importance, not 
only for the U. s. policy makers, academicians and the 
general public at large, but also for all the states, 
governments, peoples and students of international 
relations. Although many books and journal articles have 
been written on this area and much has been written on the 
Gulf War as well, no systematic study has been conducted so 
far on our chosen topic. The study thus would enrich the 
existing literature on the subject. The data and analysis of 
this study will be useful to students, scholars and policy 
makers, as well as those who are involved with developing 
and executing foreign policy, especially its policy to the 
turbulent Middle East region. 
CHAPTER II 
THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTEREST 
The term "national interest," as K. J. Holsti has 
pointed out, "Has been used (or abused) as a device for 
analyzing nations' (foreign policy) objectives."l The 
meaning and use of national interest thus, for obvious 
reasons, have been debated by the analysts, policy-makers 
and diplomats; however, no consensus has yet been achieved 
on the subject. Nevertheless, the term has clearly retained 
currency·· among practitioners of· foreign policy. Many have 
opined that national interest is the prime consideration in 
foreign policy.2 
Charles Beard, in his seminal work, The Idea of 
National Interest published in the early 1930s, traced the 
IK. J. Holsti, International Politics: Framework of 
Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 123. 
2As Alfred Mahan has put it: "Self-interest is not only 
a legitimate, but a fundamental cause for national policy, 
one which needs no cloak of hypocrisy ... it is vain to expect 
governments to act continuously on any other ground than 
national interest. They have no right to do so, being agents 
and not principals." The Interest in America in Sea Power--
Present and Future (Boston: Little & Brown, 1897), as quoted 
by Golam Mostafa, "National Interest and Foreign Policy: A 
Case Study of Bangladesh's Relations with the Former Soviet 
Union, 1980-1990" (Ph.D. diss., Carlton University), 20. 
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evolution of the concept from the ancient to the modern 
period through several stages. According to Beard, ancient 
Greeks, Persians, Egyptians and Romans also pursued the 
interests of their territorial/political entitiesj but these 
interests were defined either in religious or in dynastic 
terms. The "dynastic" interest meant "the desire of each 
monarch to maintain and if possible, extend his domain and 
his control over land and people. ,,3 With the increase of the 
groups within the domain who came to attach their specific 
interests to those of the monarch, the dynastic base gave 
way to the concept of raison d'etat, which became, in turn, 
intermingled with the idea of national honor. 4 
However, the concept of national interest differs from 
the concepts of "national honor" and "national prestige." 
According to Douglas Kinney: 
National Honor is less concrete than National 
Interest. National honor is most interesting 
as a political phenomenon and most important as a 
factor in decision-making when it tempers or 
contradicts concrete National Interests in favor 
of standing in the system. National 
Interests are the stuff of solutions, and 
National Honor the essence of problems. s 
3Charles Beard, The Idea of National Interest (New 
York: Macmillan, 1934), 21. 
4See Fred A. Sondermann, "The Concept of the National 
Interest," Orbis (Spring 1977): 122. 
SDouglass Kenney, National Interest/National Honor: The 
Diplomacy of the Falklands Crisis (London, New York: 
Praeger, 1989), 4-5. 
-----------------------------------------------~ 
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The difference between national interest and national 
prestige has been highlighted by Robert Gilpin. Gilpin 
explains national prestige through the prism of power and 
capabilities. According to him: 
Whereas power refers to the economic, military and 
related capabilities of a state, prestige refers 
primarily to the perception of other states with 
respect to a state's capabilities and its ability 
and unwillingness to exercise its power.6 
The use of the concept of "national interest" in a 
modern sense began with the emergence of European nation-
states in the 16th and 17th centuries. The date usually 
given is. that of the Westphalian state system that was 
established in 1648. 7 As Beard has mentioned: 
With the emergence of the national state system, 
the increase in influence of popular political 
control, and the great expansion of economic 
relations, the lines of a new formula--national 
interest--were being laid down. B 
The essence of national interest, however, remained the same 
before and after the 1648 divide, but in the modern context 
it has been explicitly linked to the concept of a nation-
6Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 31. 
7The Westphalian state system recognized equal 
sovereignty of European states, territorial integrity, 
neutrality as well as the right to preserve and promote 
their national interests. See Lynn H. Miller, Global Order: 
Values and Power in International Politics (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), 17-34, quoted in Golam 
Mostafa, National Interest and Foreign Policy (New Delhi: 
South Asia Publishers, 1995), 11. 
BBeard, 21. 
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state which had emerged as the supposed "natural" organizing 
principle of humanity.9 
Among the scholars who advanced the idea of national 
interest in the first half of this century in the academic 
files are E. H. Carr, George Kennan, Walter Lippmann and 
above all, Hans Morgenthau, all of whom had differing 
definitions and perceptions of the concept. 
Thus, defining national interest is problematic. Some 
scholars suggest that: 
The concept is too broad, too general, too vague, 
too all-inclusive to perform useful analytic 
functions, to serve as guideline for policy 
makers, as organizing concept for scholars, or as 
a criterion of judgment and evaluation for the 
cri terion .10 
Joseph Frankel also referred to it as a "singularly 
vague" concept and mentioned that there was no entry under 
the heading of "national interest" in the Oxford 
Dictionaries, the first edition of the International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, or the Dictionary of 
Social Sciences. ll 
Second, various criteria have been used to define 
national interests. For example, the realists view National 
Interests in terms solely of material gains--mili tary, 
9Mostafa, National Interest and Foreign Policy, 11. 
10Sondermann, 126-27. 
llJoseph Frankel, National Interest (London: Pall Mall, 
1970), 15. 
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political and economic (we will elaborate this view later). 
Others (for example James Billington) argue that national 
interest should be understood both in terms of material and 
non-material aspects.12 
National interest may also be pursued for both 
offensive and defensive purposes and may thus be defined in 
an expansionist as well as in defensive matrix. It has been 
used to justify expansion and promotion of political, 
economic and ideological objectives globally, as well as to 
secure the minimalist objectives of survival and the 
protection and preservation of a nation-states' sovereignty. 
In short, there is no consensus on precisely what 
constitutes national interest. Interpretations vary 
according to ideological and philosophical posi tions and 
preferences of the analysts. 
National Interest and Realism 
The realist perception of national interest has been 
propounded mainly by E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. Later 
the concept was developed and modified by other scholars 
like Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Kenneth Waltz, 
Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner and others. 
12For details see James H. Billington, "Reflections on 
the Nonmaterial Aspects of National Interests," in The 
National Interests of the United States, ed. Professor 
Gifford (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center for 
Scholars: University Press of America, 1981), 180-83. 
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The realist perception of a state is based on several 
premises; that the state is the best available type of 
political organization; that a state's drive for power is 
inherent and thus requires the maintenance of a capacity to 
defend itself, that states enjoy absolute power and 
authority in domestic politics, but in international arena, 
where they interact with others, they have to negotiate and 
compromise on national interests (except the core ones), 
that international order is anarchic and power is the 
determining feature of relations, and finally that states 
must acknowledge that their capaci ty to influence the 
international system depends on their power capabilities. 
Thus, in the international arena, states are assumed to 
behave rationally. 
For Morgenthau the national power of a state is assumed 
to be based on two sets of factors: stable (tangible) and 
unstable (intangible). The stable factors include geography, 
natural resources, industrial capacity, military prepared-
ness, population and national character. The unstable 
factors are national morale, quality of diplomacy and 
quality of government .13 Foreign policy is seen as an 
instrument at the disposition of state for safeguarding its 
national interests by means of its power (overt and covert) . 
13Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The 
Struggl e for Power and Peace (New York: Al fred A. Knopf, 
1985), 127-69. 
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Debate Between Realists and Neorealists 
Realists consider national interest to be the main 
basis and motive force by which political actions of states 
should viewed. To quote Morgenthau: 
It is not only a political necessity but also 
moral duty for a nation to follow in its dealings 
with other nations but one guiding star, one 
standard for thought, one rule of action: the 
national interest. 14 
Realists define national interests in terms of "high 
politics" (politics, military and security), not "low 
politics" (trade, finance, monetary-exchange and others). 
They are less interested in ideology, economy, morality or 
other aspects of national interest. As Morgenthau puts it, 
"It [the U.S.] should make a pact with the devil himself--if 
it is in the national interest to do so. "15 E. H. Carr also 
believed that "relations between states are governed solely 
by power, and that morality plays no part in it."16 
It is worth noting that classical realism dominated the 
study of foreign policy in the immediate post-World War II 
decade. By the late 1950s, the realist view of state-
centric analysis of international relations was challenged 
from within the same paradigm. Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, 
14Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defence of National Interest 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), 252. 
15Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 388. 
16E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years of Crisis 1919-1939: An 
Introduction to the Study of International Relations 
(London: Macmillan, 1942), 153. 
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Kindleberger and Krasner were among the scholars who 
challenged the classical realist perception and are known as 
"neorealists." 
Kenneth Waltz attempted to provide a structural 
explanation of international relations by differentiating 
between national and international poli tics. For him, 
national politics are hierarchic, vertical centralized, 
heterogeneous and directed. International politics, on the 
other hand, are anarchic, decentralized, horizontal, 
homogenous, undirected and mutually adaptive. He challenged 
the classical realist view of a state's capabilities to 
maximize its interests in the international arena, by 
arguing that the state's options at the international level 
are limited and conditioned by the system within which it 
interacts with others. l7 Thus, implications of a state's 
interactions cannot be known without the knowledge of the 
situation where these interactions occur. To quote Kenneth 
Waltz as he has narrated the debate: 
The neorealist's world looks different from the 
one that earlier realists had portrayed. For 
realists, the world addressed is one of 
interacting states. For neorealists, interacting 
states can be adequately studied only by 
distinguishing between structural and unit-level 
causes and effects. Structure becomes a new 
obj ect of inquiry, as well as an occasion for 
argument. In light of neorealist theory, means 
17See Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist 
Theory," in Controversies in International Relations Theory: 
Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, ed. Charles W. Kegley 
(New York: St. Martins Press, 1995), 74. 
and ends are differently viewed, as are the causes 
and effects. Realists think of causes running in 
one direction, from interacting states to the 
outcomes their acts and interactions produce. 
Neorealist theory (on the other hand) shows that 
causes run not in one direction, from interacting 
uni ts to outcomes produced but rather in two 
directions. One must believe that some causes of 
international outcomes are located at the level of 
the interacting units. Since variations in unit-
level causes do not correspond to variations in 
observed outcomes, one has to believe that some 
causes are located at the structural level of 
international politics as well. Realists cannot 
handle causation at a level above states because 
they fail to conceive of structure as a force that 
shapes and shoves the units, causes at the level 
of units interact with those at the level of the 
structure, and because they do so, explanation at 
the level of units alone is bound to mislead. If 
one I s theory allows for the operation of both 
unit-level and structure-level causes, then it can 
cope with both the changes and the continuities 
that occur in a system. 18 
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Robert Gilpin agrees with Waltz. However, he goes 
further by including economic and technological capabilities 
of states. Gilpin states that interests of nations change 
with the redistribution of power (which is a continuous 
process) caused by economic, technological and other 
developments. Thus the states that have gained more power 
seek to alter the system in favor of their national 
interests. Their pursuits are calculated in terms of 
balancing costs and benefits. 19 
In short, the neorealists generally analyze national 




by including economy and technology along with military and 
strategic factors. Like the realists, they also recognize 
the role of the state, but, for them, states are not the 
only actors in the international arena; states' roles and 
actions are influenced and dominated by the international 
structure wi thin which they interact. The neorealists 
usually used deductionist methodology and separate foreign 
policy (the domain of a state) from international relations 
(dominated by major powers) .20 
In an attempt to reduce the gap between the two 
approaches--realism and neorealism--Robert Cox suggests: 
International structure constitutes parameters of 
frameworks for action, and shapes and limits the 
functions of the actors, but the actors are also a 
product of history and their functions are 
condi t ioned by social, economic and mi Ii tary 
pressures of their environments. 21 
Stephen Krasner also emphasizes that in striving for 
national interests, states confront internal as well as 
external resistance. So national interest, Krasner argues, 
is not only determined by external factors, but also 
20"Realism's approach is primarily inductive, neorealism 
is more heavily deductive." See Waltz, 77. 
21Robert Cox, "Production, the State and Change in World 
Order," in Challenges: Approaches to World Politics, ed. 
James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto C'zempiel (Lexington, Toronto: 
Lexington Books, 1989), 39. 
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"depends upon the instruments of control that states can 
exercise over groups wi thin its own society." 22 
Defining National Interest 
What follows from the above discussion is that national 
interest can be described as the perceived needs and desires 
of a sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states 
that constitute its external environment. In other words, 
the pursuit of national interest can be defined as a policy 
or policies designed to promote and protect interests of a 
particular time, as contested with differentiated interests 
of individuals, groups, or sub-groups, or the interests of 
mankind as a whole. 23 National interests are reflected both 
in domestic and external policies. Shifts and changes in 
domestic coali tions and in international relations may 
require a redefinition of national interests by a nation-
state. Political, economic and technological changes also 
redistribute power both at domestic and international 
levels, which may likewise compel nation-states to redefine 
their national interests. 
Donald E. Nuechterlein has identified four basic 
interests of nation-states and four levels of interest and 
22Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw 
Materials Investments and U. S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), 11. 
23Mostafa, National Interest and Foreign Policy, 14. 
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suggested that those national needs form the underpinning of 
national foreign policies. The four fundamental interests 
are: (1) Defense interest, (2) Economic interest, (3) World-
order interest and (4) Ideological interest. 
Defense Interest. The protection of the nation-state 
and its citizens from the threat of physical violence by 
another country, and/or protection from an externally 
inspired threat to the national political system. 
Economic Interest. The enhancement of the nation-
state's economic well-being in relations with other states. 
World-order Interest. The maintenance of an inter-
national political and economic system in which the nation-
state can feel secure and in which its citizens and commerce 
can operate peacefully outside their own borders. 
Ideological Interest. The protection and furtherance of 
a set of values which the citizens of a nation-state share 
and believe to be universally good. 24 
Some explanation of the relationship among these four 
basic interests is in order (see Table 1). First, the order 
in which they have been placed does not suggest any priority 
of one over another. Unless a nation-state is able to defend 
its territory and citizens--either through a strong defense 
24Donald E. Nuechterlein, "The Concept of National 
Interest: A Time for New Approaches," Orbi s 23, no. 1 
(Spring 1979): 76. 
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force or in alliance with a major power, or both--none of 
the other three interests is likely to matter. 
TABLE 1 
NATIONAL INTEREST MATRIX 
Basic Interest at Stake Intensity of Interest 
Survival Vital Major Peripheral 
Defense of Homeland 
Economic Well-being 
Favorable World Order 
Promotion of Values 
Source: Donald E. Nuechterlein, "The Concept of National 
Interest: A Time for New Approaches," Orbis 23, 
no. 1 (Spring 1979): 75. 
Second, it is obvious that the four interests are not 
mutually exclusive and that policy makers must accept trade-
offs among them. For example, the economic interests of 
certain industries within a state may be sacrificed at times 
to enhance a world order interest involving another country 
whose friendship and cooperation are needed to enhance 
stabili ty in an important part of the world. Third, a 
nation's ideology forms an important part of its national 
interest. This ideology is important in determining how the 
government reacts to international issues. 
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Another point worth mentioning is that the defense 
interest as described here entails only the protection of 
the homeland, the citizens and the political system of the 
nation-state. It does not include alliances with other 
states, but may include strategic bases whose primary 
function is the protection of the homeland of a close ally. 
The world-order interest deals with a multitude of 
international issues, many of which are handled through 
international organizations. As far as political issues are 
involved, a prime objective of a world-order interest is to 
maintain a balance of power favorable to one's own feeling 
of security. 
Identification of the basic national interests involved 
in foreign crisis 
foreign policy, 










correctly the intensity of that interest, on the stakes that 
the political leadership of a country believes are involved. 
In order to analyze better the differing degrees of 
interest that a government perceives to be involved in given 
international events, Nuechterlein has categorized four 
intensities as follows. 
Survival issues. The very existence of the nation-state 
is in jeopardy, either as a result of overt military attack 
on its own territory, or from the imminent threat of attack 
should an enemy's demands be rejected. The key to whether an 
issue is a survival issue or vital issue, based on a scale 
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of priorities, is the degree to which there is an immediate 
credible threat of massive physical harm by one state on 
another. By this definition, there probably are no economic 
world-order or ideological interests that qualify. Only a 
defense interest, as defined above, would ever reach that 
level of intensity. 
Vital issues. Serious harm will likely come to the 
state unless strong measures, including the use of 
conventional mili tary force, are employed to counter an 
adverse action by another state or to deter it from 
undertaking a serious provocation. A vital issue usually 
provides a government with sufficient time to seek help from 
allies, bargain with the antagonist, or take aggressive 
countermeasures to warn the enemy that he will pay a high 
price if the political, economic or military pressure is not 
withdrawn. Unlike survival issues, vital issues may involve 
not only defense interests but also economic, world-order 
and, in some cases, ideological interests. 
Major issues. The political, economic and ideological 
well-being of the state may be adversely affected by events 
and trends in the international environment that thus 
require corrective action in' order to prevent them from 
becoming serious threats (vi tal issues). Most issues in 
international relations fall into this category and are 
usually resolved through diplomatic negotiation. When 
diplomacy fails, governments then reconsider how deeply 
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their interests are affected by the event or trend in 
question. If, in the final analysis, a government is 
unwilling or unable to compromise on what it considers to be 
a fundamental question, it has implicitly ascertained that 
the issue is a vital one. On the other hand, if negotiation 
and compromise are deemed to be the best course of action, 
then the issue probably is a major one. Most economic 
problems between states are major, not vital issues. The 
same is true of ideological problems, although states 
sometimes cloak other problems in ideological garb in an 
effort to mobilize public opinion at home and abroad. 
Peripheral issues. The well-being of the state is not 
adversely affected by events or trends abroad, but when the 
interests of private citizens and companies operating in 
foreign countries are endangered. Obviously, the large and 
powerful multinational corporations are usually given a 
higher priority by the parent country since their earnings 
and taxes have become a significant effect on the economic 
well-being of the home state. Each nation-state makes its 
own determination on how greatly it values commercial 
enterprises operating abroad. For some, these companies 
consti tute maj or issues of national interest; for others, 
they are only of peripheral importance. 25 
25Ibid., 79-80. 
Applying a National-Interest Matrix 
to Foreign Policy Analysis 
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To clarify how the national-interest matrix can be used 
as a research tool, Donald Nuechterlein uses the Suez crisis 
of 1956, a crisis with not dissimilar characteristics to the 
Gulf War of 1991. During that crisis the Eden government in 
Britain decided to use force against Egypt after President 
Nasser's abrupt nationalization of the Suez Canal. 
The Eden government decided that Britain's economic 
interests were so endangered by the potential closure of the 
canal that it could not compromise with Nasser. Therefore, 
the British economic interest in the canal was, in Eden's 
view, so great that the issue was a vital one that had to be 
met with force since Nasser refused to negotiate suitable 
guarantees on use of the canal. Other British interests were 
also involved. Nasser was seen as a threat to Western-
oriented governments in the Middle East (world order 
interest), and he was clearly moving his country into a 
closer relationship with the Soviet Union and following an 
anti-democratic course at home (ideological interest). Eden 
probably saw the world-order interest as vi tal and the 
ideological interest as major, at least, and he therefore 
decided against any compromise with Nasser and for the use 
of force. Thus we can illustrate the national-interest 
matrix (in Table 2 as follows) how Britain viewed its 
33 
interests in October 1956 and can conclude that force was a 
likely course of action. 26 
TABLE 2 
BRITAIN AND THE 1956 SUEZ CRISIS 
Basic Interest at Stake Intensity of Interest 
Survival Vital Major Peripheral 
Defense of Homeland x 
Economic Well-being x 
Favorable World Order x 
Promotion of Values x 
Source: Donald E. Nuechterlein, "The Concept of National 
Interest: A Time for New Approaches," Orbis 23, 
no. 1 (Spring 1979): 80. 
Conclusion 
Nuechterlein and others agree that the concept of 
national interest is of powerful significance in foreign 
policy analysis. The concept has received wide acceptability 
among the observers and analysts of the international 
political scene also because it infuses rational order into 
the subject matter of politics. It makes foreign policy 
decisions of a nation-state intelligible and understandable. 
26Ibid., 80-81. 
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It is true that the realist school of international 
politics tends to disregard the interplay of emotions or 
moral values as a guide in foreign policy decisions. To 
establish the concept of national interest as a useful tool 
for understanding state behavior, one should add an 
ideological dimension as well. Moreover, we must recognize 
that "states do not have a single national interest, 
ordained by some philosopher king, but many interests, which 
are determined through the political processes of their 
respect i ve systems." 27 Policy makers also look at the 
potential costs of actions they might take to counter an 
unfavorable event or trend in another country. In other 
words, the degree of interest which the United States or any 
power has in a specific international issue results from a 
process of thinking through the value-and-cost question that 
the leadership perceives. 
The national-interest matrix suggested by Nuechterlein 
provides a systematic means for analyzing and weighing the 
relative importance of the basic interests involved in all 
international issues, both for one's country and for others. 
The matrix does not provide definitive answers concerning 
policies governments will adopt in a crisis. It can be said 
that the foregoing elaboration of the concept of national 
interest will help understand the behavior pattern and 
27Ibid., 91. 
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foreign policy response of a country to any particular 
international crisis. The matrix will also allow more 
realistic judgments by foreign policy makers with regard to 
ends and means in national security policies. It is for this 
reason that in the present study we have chosen the 
Nuechterlein's national-interest matrix as a tool for 
analyzing u. S. policy towards the Middle East, and in 
particular, Washington's mili tary response to the Gulf 
Crisis during 1990-1991. Before the theoretical framework 
is applied to the case study, an overview of the broad 
setting in which the Gulf War was set will be provided. 
CHAPTER III 
MIDDLE EAST: A GEO-POLITICAL OVERVIEW 
Throughout history the Middle East has been a rich and 
diverse region of enormous cultural significance. It is home 
to three of the world's great religions--Christianity, Islam 
and Judaism--and has provided many other contributions to 
civilization. In the twentieth century the discovery of the 
largest petroleum deposits in the world made the Middle East 
vital to the international economy.l 
The region is so strategically important because of its 
oil assets and its location at the cross roads of three 
continents. At the same time, the Middle East has been 
afflicted wi th conflicts that seem to defy solution. 
Disputes between Arabs and Israelis, Iranians and Iraqis, 
Iraqis and Kuwaitis and other antagonists have gone beyond 
disagreements over territory or fears concerning conflicting 
geo-political and economic goals. Middle East combatants 
have often hated each other because of decades of mutual 
hostilities and ethnic, religious and cultural prejudices. 2 
lDaniel C. Diller, ed., The Middle East, 8th edition 




The main objectives of this chapter are to review first the 
geographic location and composition of the Middle East, more 
specifically defining Middle East, its land, people, 
languages, and religions and second, the political overview, 
especially, the crises over the Middle East. 
Defining the Middle East 
There is no universal acceptance of the term "Middle 
East," or universal agreement as to its boundaries. The term 
"Near East" is often used in both popular and scholarly 
contexts instead of Middle East. 3 
The term Middle East has been traced back with 
certainty only to 1900. It may have been in use in 
Britain's India Office since the mid-nineteenth century. It 
first carne into prominence when used by the American naval 
historian Alfred Thayer Mahan in 1902 to describe the region 
around the Gul f . The commonly accepted definition of the 
Middle East now encompasses a greater area than that defined 
by Mahan. The geostrategic overtones of the term linger on. 4 
The term Middle East carne into popular usage during World 
War II with the establishment of the British Middle East 
command and the Allied Middle East Supply Center. Both 
3See Ken Matthews, The Gulf Conflict and International 
Relation (London: Routledge, 1993), 12-14. 
4Alasdair Drysdale and Gerald H. Blake, The Middle East 
and North Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 
10-11. 
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served the North African and Asian countries west of India. 
Since then, the term Middle East has become increasingly 
more popular than that of Near East. However, the terms 
Middle East and Near East are sometimes used 
interchangeably, or the Near East may refer only to the 
Balkans or to the Balkans and Egypt plus those lands near to 
and east of the Mediterranean, including Southwestern Asia. 
Similarly, the Middle East has been variously defined 
broadly as the area from Morocco on the Atlantic Coast to 
Pakistan in Asia and from Turkey to Sudan. The narrowest 
definition concedes only the Arab countries on the eastern 
Mediterranean, plus Turkey, Iran, and Israel. 5 The Middle 
East became familiar in the United States and Europe in 
World War II when both the British and the Allied 
headquarters in Cairo-Egypt known as H.Q. Middle East, 
covering large parts of northern and eastern Africa as well 
as Iran, Turkey, and all the Arab states east of the Suez 
Canal. 6 
The confusion caused by using both terms, Middle East 
and Near East, to describe and locate countries in each 
region became apparent when one examined the u.S. 
government I S use of the terms Middle East and Near East. 
5Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacquel ine S. Ismael, ed., 
Politics and Government in the Middle East and North Africa 
(Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991), 1-2. 
6Drysdale, 11. 
39 
Tareq Y. Ismael, Secretary of State John Foster, in his 
statement in the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957, defined the 
Middle East as the area extending from Libya in the West to 
Pakistan in the east, from Turkey in the north to the 
Arabian Peninsula in the South. He also indicated that the 
terms Middle East and Near East are interchangeable. A year 
later, President Eisenhower, in his 1958 address to the 
United Nations General Assembly, used the term Near East but 
did not mention the Middle East. The State Department also 
indicated that the terms are reciprocal but that they 
included only the countries of Egypt, Syria, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Gulf Emirates of Abu 
Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaymah, Umm al-Qaiwain, 
Ajman, and Fujairah, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait. The 
Secretary of State and the State Department each defined the 
Middle East quite differently. In 1959 a geographer in the 
State Department concluded that the Middle East could not be 
defined? because there is no standard definition of the 
Middle East and the confusion of the proper use of the term, 
different views have been held in the literature to describe 
the era in question. According to Tareq Y. Ismael, the 
Middle East is: 
That area centered on the Fertile Crescent 
(including the states of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, 
Israel, Jordan), the northern belt (Turkey and 
Iran), the Nile Valley (Egypt and Sudan), the 
?Ismael and Ismael, 2. 
Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia, 
Gul f States), and North Africa 






This division, like any other, is rather arbitrary, but 
takes into account the major characteristics shared by the 
included states. Although Alasdair Drysdale describes the 
Middle East as follows: Turkey, Iran, Israel, and the Arab 
States east of the Suez together with Egypt and Libya. 
Sudan and Cyprus are sometimes included, less often Morocco, 
Algeria, and Tunisia. According to Drysdale, the Middle 
East in certain areas extends far beyond the outer limits of 
some of the states of the region, whereas in other areas--as 
in Southern Sudan--different cultural regions impinge on it. 
The geopolitical influence of the Middle East and North 
Africa extends into Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Indian 
Ocean as well as into the Sahara and the Horn of Africa. No 
grouping of states can claim to belong to so many 
geopolitical realms. The coastal states of North Africa are 
African, Mediterranean, Islamic, and Arab, all influenced 
politically and economically by nearness to Europe. Most of 
the states of the Middle East are in Asia, but they have 
strong ties with the Euro-Mediterranean world or the Afro-
Indian Ocean world, or both. All but Cyprus and Israel are 





For an operational defini tion here, the term Middle 
East will be used to cover the views most commonly held in 
the literature which include all Arab states, including 
North Africa (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia), the 
Nile Valley (Egypt and Sudan), and non-Arab states including 
Iran, Israel, and Turkey. The total area of the Middle East 
delimi ted in this fashion is about 14,243,684 sq. km. Its 
population approaches to nearly 397,143,884 million.lO 
Geographically, the Middle East is an area of contrasting 
geographical features that range from swampy regions, where 
coal beds are formed, to steep cli ffs and jagged peaks. 
Most of Arabia is slanted coastal block that climbs 
gradually from sea level in the northeast to 12,000 feet in 
the southwest until it reaches Yemen, where a sharp drop 
occurs and the land rushes down into the troughs and rifts 
that constitute the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The 
southern plateaus, other than the break at Yemen, continue 
into North Africa without much change or disturbance in the 
landscape, creating a region of seemingly endless, 
relatively flat, sand-covered surfaces. Central Turkey and 
Central Iran are also elevated plateaus that sometimes reach 
lOTotal area of the combined countries of the Middle 
East including all Arab states and Iran, Israel--including 
the occupied territories of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and 
the Golan Heights--and Turkey are added up for all countries 
together. Population also added up for all countries in the 
region. See The Europa World Yearbook, Vols. 1 and 2 
(London: Europa Publication Limited, 1998). 
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a height of 8,000 feet. The various systems of rugged 
mountains wi th their formidable peaks, deep valleys, and 
sheer drops to narrow coastal lowlands that vividly command 
the Middle Eastern scene. 11 The Middle East may be roughly 
classified in three zones: the Plains of North Africa and 
Arabia, the Fertile Crescent, and the Northern Tier. The 
vast deserts of the Sahara in north Africa and the Rub al-
Khali in Arabia cover over 95 percent of this region. The 
Qattara Depression, over 4,000 square miles in size, is 
located near the Mediterranean in Egypt's portion of the 
eastern Sahara. The remaining 5 percent of the Plains of 
North Africa and Arabia include two distinct areas. These 
areas consist of a transitional territory described as 
desert scrub country and rich Mediterranean coastal zone 
that stretches from the wide Delta westward for most of the 
length of North Africa and the Atlantic Coast of Morocco as 
far south as Casablanca. 12 The Fertile Crescent includes a 
narrow coastal zone flanked by the sea on one side and a 
rather low coastal range of mountains running north to south 
on the other. Along the southern border of Turkey, the 
Fertile Crescent arches eastward through a gap in the 
IIIsmael and Ismael, 8. 
I2Joseph Weatherby, "The Middle East and North Africa," 
in The Other World: Issues and Politics in the Third World, 
ed. Weatherby, Long, Alexander, Walsh, Cruikshanks, Gooden, 
Kranzdorf, Huff and Culver (New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company, 1987), 220-21. 
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mountains to include the desert scrub lands of Syria and 
Iraq before joining the rich river basins of the Tigris and 
Euphrates. The region terminates at the northern end of the 
Persian Gulf. The Northern Tier is an area of mountains and 
plateaus that is linked to a mountainous system stretching 
from the Alps in the west to the Himalayas in the east. 
Both Turkey and Iran are located on high plateaus surrounded 
by mountains. 13 
The importance of the position of the Middle East came 
from its location as a corridor of East-West communication. 
The value of its waterways--the Turkish Straites, the Suez 
Canal, the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandeb, the Straits of 
Hormuz, and the Gulf--for communication, travel, and trade 
is illustrated by the difficulties to outside powers caused 
by the 1956 and 1967-75 blockades of the Suez Canal and the 
"tanker war" in the Gulf in the late 1980s. 14 
The People, Language and Religion 
There are three major linguistic groups in the Middle 
East: Semitic, Persian, and Turkish. Of the Semitic-
speaking population, the Arabs are the most numerous. 
Although there are many dialects, there is only one written 
Arabic, and it is understood by educated Arabs everywhere. 
13Ibid., 223. 
14Ismael and Ismael, 3. 
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Arabic is spoken from the Atlantic coast of Morocco to the 
shores of the Persian Gulf.15 Small groups continue to speak 
Aramaic or Syrian, which was the Semitic lingua franca of 
the area at the time of Christ. Hebrew, which at one time 
virtually disappeared as a living language, was revived and 
modernized by Zionist settlers in Palestine. It is now the 
official language of Israel. 16 
Iranian languages, after being eclipsed by Arabic for 
several centuries, were revived around the 11th century. 
Persian is the language of the largest number of Iranian 
speakers and is the official language of Iran. 17 Turkish-
speaking people of modern Turkey came to the Anatolian 
Peninsula in the 11th and 12th centuries from central Asia. 
They have lived in a single identifiable state since the 
Turkish Republic was created with the breakup of the Ottoman 
Empire following World War I. Finally, it should be pointed 
out that there are numerous isolated peoples who speak 
various languages, including among others, Kurds, Armenians, 
and Greeks. 18 
People in the Middle East can be divided into three 
majors groups--Arab, Turkish, and Persian--and a number of 
15Weatherby, 226. 
16Peter Avery, Modern Iran (Pareger, 1965), 7. 
17Standard J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and 
Modern Turkey, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1976), 13. 
18Weatherby, 226. 
smaller groups--Kurdish, Berber, and Assyrian. 
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Arabs 
constitute the single largest majority, numbering about 200 
million, or two-thirds of the region's population. Turkish 
inhabitants make up the second largest group. Persians rank 
as the third largest group in the region. 19 According to 
Tareq Y. Ismael, in order to understand the political 
dynamics of the Middle East, it is as essential to discern 
the distinctions between groups as it is necessary to 
recognize the similarities among them. For instance, Arabs 
may be Christian, Jewish, Muslim, or some other fai thj 
generally what determines ethnic identification is language. 
On the other hand, what determines religious identification 
is declaration of belief. Muslims mayor may not be Arabsj 
and so too Christians, Jews (or any of the other religions 
extant in the Middle East). Thus, Kurds are Muslims but not 
Arabsj Christians mayor may not be Arabs or Kurds, and so 
on. 20 
The Middle East is the birthplace of Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam. With more than 200 million Muslims 
in the Middle East, Islam is the most influential religion 
in the region. Islam has been the dominant religion in the 
Middle East for almost 1400 years. Today less than 10 
19Ismael and Ismael, 11. 
20 Ibid . 
46 
percent of the population of the region is non-Muslim. 21 
Christianity and Judaism also originated in the Middle East 
and there are a significant number of Christians and Jews 
living there today. Jewish communities can be found in most 
Middle Eastern states, but since 1948 the largest 
concentrations have, of course, been found in Israel. The 
creation of Israel in 1948 may be viewed as a product of the 
politicization of Judaism in the form of national movement. 22 
Table 3 shows the countries, area, population, and economic 
characteristics of the Middle East and North Africa, as part 
of the Arab states. As mentioned before, there is no agreed 
defini tion to the extent of the Middle East. There is, 
however, a wide consensus that Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Egypt, and the Arabian Peninsula 
States must be included by all definitions. North African 
Arab States and Sudan--the Nile Valley--have been associated 
with other Middle Eastern States and they are part of the 
political reality of the region. See the Middle East map 
(Figure 1). 
The Middle East and North Africa may be divided into 
three distinct regions. These regions include the Plains of 
North Africa and Arabia, the Fertile Crescent, and the 
Northern Tier. The Middle East is an area of contrast 
2lWeatherby, 228. 
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TABLE 3 
STATES OF THE REGION 
List Area Population GDP GDP by Sector (1996) Inflation Total External 
of Countries (thou sq mi (mill. in 1996) (1996) a.agriculture% (consumer price Debt 1996 
in 1996) a.growth b.industry% index 1996) (US$ bill 1996) 
b.per capita c.services 
ALGERIA 2,381,740 29,830,370 a. 4% a. 12% 19.8% $ 32 
b. $4,000 b. 50% 
c. 38% 
(1995 est) 
BAHRAIN 620 603,318 a. 3% a. 1% 0% $ 3.2 
b. $13,000 b. 38% (1995 est) 
c. 61% 
EGYPT 1,001,450 64,824,466 a. 4.9% a. 16% 7.3% $ 31 
b. $2,900 b. 34% 
c. 50% 
(1995 est) 
IRAN 1,648 67,540,002 a. 3.6% a. 21% 23% $ 30 
b. $5,200 b. 37% 
c. 42% 
(1994 est) 
IRAQ 437,072 22,219,289 a. 0% a. N/A% N/A very heavy 
b. $2,000 b. N/A% (since 1991 relative to 
c. N/A% Gulf War) GDP (unknown) 
(since 1991 Gulf War) 
ISRAEL 20,770 5,534,672 a. 4.6% a. 3.5% 11. 3% $ 25.7 
*includes Arabs b. $16,400 b. 22% 
in the West Bank, c. 75.5% 




Table 3 continued 
List Area Population GOP GOP by Sector (1996) Inflation Total External 
of Countries (thou sq mi (mill. in 1996) (1996) a.agriculture% (consumer price Debt 1996 
in 1996) a.growth b. industry% index 1996) (US$ bill 1996) 
b.per capita c.services 
JORDAN 89,213 4,324,638 a. 5.9% a. 6% 4.5% $ 7.3 
b. %5,000 b .. 28% 
c. 66% 
KUWAIT 17,820 2,076,805 a. 3% a. 0% 4.5% $ 8 
b. $16,700 b. 42% (1995 est) 
c. 58% 
(1994 est) 
LEBANON 10,400 3,449,578 a. 3.5% a. 13% 10% $ 3 
b. $3,400 b. 28% 
c. 59% 
LIBYA 1,759,540 5,648,359 a. 2.2% a. 5% 25% $ 2.6 
b. $6,570 b. 55% (1995 est) (1995 est) 
c. 40% 
MOROCCO 446,550 30,391,423 a. 9% a. 21% 5% $ 23.4 
b. $3,260 b. 30% 
c. 49% 
(1994 est) 
OMAN 212,460 2,264,590 a. 6.5% a. 3% 0.5% $ 2.7 
b. $ 9,500 b. 55% (1995 est) 
c. 42% 
QATAR 11,437 670,274 a. 2.5% a. 1% 1.2% $ 5.7 
b. $21,300 b. 45% 
c. 54% 
(1993 est) 
SAUDI ARABIA 1.960,582 20,087,965 a. 6% a. 9% 1% $ NIA 
b. $10,600 b. 50% II::-
c. 41% 1.0 
Table 3 continued 
List Area Population GDP GDP by Sector (1996) Inflation Total External 
of Countries (thou sq mi (mill. in 1996) (1996) a.agricu1ture% (consumer price Debt 1996 
in 1996) a.growth b. indus try% index 1996) (US$ bill 1996) 
b.per capita c.services 
SUDAN 2,505,810 32,594,128 a. 4% a. 33% 133% $ 18.5 
b. $860 b. 17% 
c. 50% 
SYRIA 185,180 16,137,899 a. 5.2% a. 28% 20% $ 22 
b. %6,300 b. 18% 
c. 54% 
(1994 est) 
TUNISIA 163,610 9,183,097 a. 7.1% a. 13 .5% 6% % 9.6 
b. $4,800 b. 33.8% 
c. 52.7% 
TURKEY 780,580 63,528,225 a. 7% a. 15% 80% $ 75.8 
b. $6,100 b. 33% 
c. 52% 
(1993 est) 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 867 2,262,309 a. 1. 4% a. 2% 5.2% $ 14 
b. $23,800 b. 43% 
c. 55% 
(1994 est) 
YEMEN 527,970 13,972,477 a. 2.8% a. 14% 85% $ 8 
b. $2,900 c. 35% 
c. 51% 
Source: CIA, The World Factbook (Washington, D.C., 1997). Also see The Europa World Yearbook, 





including some of the world's most famous deserts mountain 
ranges, and rivers. Oil is the most important natural 
resource of the region. A scarcity of water under 
agricultural development throughout most of the Middle East. 
The monotheistic religion--Judaism, Christianity and Islam--
have developed in the Middle East. Today Islam is the 
professed religion of 90 percent of the population in the 
Middle East. Most political activities in the Middle East 
today ~s affected by religion, although, nationalism is 
another feature of Middle Eastern politics. Various forms 
of nationalism have developed in Turkey, Arab nationalism in 
Egypt, Iran, and Israel. Finally, the main political 
feature of the Middle East is the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
sometimes referred to as the Middle East Problem. 23 
Oil and the Middle East 
Oil is the great natural resource of the region. 
Although accurate production figures are sometimes hard to 
obtain, the Middle East petroleum exports to Europe, Japan 
and the United States amount to about two-thirds of the 
world's total petroleum exports. 24 About 66 percent of the 
world's known recoverable oil reserves are located in the 
Middle East, the Persian Gulf region. 
23Weatherby, 247 -48. 
24Ibid., 227. 
Only 2.6 percent are 
52 
found in the United States and 1.9 percent in Western 
Europe. The big five Gulf producers together have enough oil 
in the ground, once developed, to supply the market for at 
least another century at current rates of production. 
Persian Gulf producers account for almost all the world's 
post-Gulf crisis excess production capacity--most of this in 
Saudi Arabia. 25 However, Middle Eastern oil is not equally 
distributed throughout the area. Some oil is found in 
Turkey, Egypt, Syria, and Israel, but the large countries 
are located in Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, and along the Gulf in 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Sheikdoms. Kuwait accounts for 
about 18 percent of the world's reserves, while Saudi Arabia 
accounts for 25 percent. The Arab world's oil reserves 
accounts for 56 percent of the world's total. 26 
The maj or Middle East oil producing countries and 
Venezuela formed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) to increase their bargaining power against 
the uni fied posi tions adopted by the maj or companies. 
OPEC's increasing importance confirm that its control over 
two-thirds of the world's proven reserves of oil. The 
Persian Gulf members of OPEC are especially important, 
because they control over 80 percent of OPEC's reserves, 
25William C. Ramsay, "Oil in the 19908: The Gulf 
Dominant," in Riding the Tiger: The Middle East Challenge 
After the Cold War, ed. Phase Marr and William Lewis 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 40. 
26Ismael and Ismael, 16. 
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with Saudi Arabia alone accounting for more than a third. 27 
Although J.n 1980 OPEC provided over 45 percent of the 
world's oil production, in 1989, 38 percent of the world's 
oil came from OPEC. By contrast, the 1990s are likely to 
see market power in the hand of five or six OPEC producers. 
Only Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, 
Venezuela, and possibly Iran will be left within a few years 
with either excess capacity.28 
It should be pointed out that the 1970s was the golden 
decade for the producer nations. The decade opened with the 
government of the producer nations--their bargaining power 
considerably enhanced through OPEC-demanding higher prices 
for their resources, greater overall control over production 
and pricing, and larger shares in the revenues generated 
from export. This has been achieved by the Tehran agreement 
of February 1971, along with similar concessions already 
gained by Libya, marked the beginning of a rapid end to 
dominant roles previously played by western multinationals 
in the world oil market. 29 During the 1970s Saudi Arabia saw 
the emergence of oil as a potential weapon for the Arab 
cause against Israel. This was clear during the 1973 Arab-
27Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World 
Politics: Trends and Transformation (New York: St. Martin's 
Press Inc., 1989), 332. 
28Ramsay, 40. 
29Amitav Acharya, u.s. Military Strategy ~n the Gulf 
(Routledge, London and New York, 1989), 9. 
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Israeli War when a group of Arab producers, led by Saudi 
Arabia, successfully deployed the oil weapon-embargo 
protesting u.S. support for Israel during the 1973 war. The 
embargo, which involved a decision by the participants to 
cease all exports to the United States and Netherlands, 
accompanied by a 5 to 10 percent cut in their oil 
production, had grave economic consequences for the 
consuming nations. Accordingly, the producer states raised 
oil prices from about $3 a barrel in September 1973 to $11 
per barrel by January 1974. 30 In addition, some OPEC 
producers maintained their right to determine the final 
destination of their oil. The oil revenues for Middle 
Eastern governments jumped approximately from $20 billion in 
1973 to almost $90 billion in 1976, and are consistently 
rising. 31 However, despite the increasing influence of OPEC 
during the 1970s, in which some have described it as the 
OPEC decade, Charles W. Kegley has pointed out that whether 
OPEC as an organization will be able to regain the cohesion 
necessary to act as a potent political and economic force in 
directing the world energy market is, however, problematic. 
The members of the already fragile organization differ 
widely in their financial needs, oil reserves, political 
regimes, foreign policy 
30Ibid. 
31Diller, 10. 
objectives, and political 
55 
aspirations. They are also geographically and politically 
distant, with widely disparate sociocultural systems, 
population sizes, levels of income, internal problems, and 
external challenges. Increasingly, however, the six Persian 
Gulf members of the thirteen-member organization will be the 
only ones that matter. One factor that will enhance the 
position of the Persian Gulf states is the rapid growth in 
recent years of the demand for energy in Third World 
countries. 32 The dramatic rise in the oil revenues of the 
six Gulf members of OPEC--Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
UAE, and Qatar--during the 1970s and 1980s, $185 billion in 
1980, has indeed increased the importance of the region's 
role in global politics and u.S. foreign policy concerns, 
acquiring important commercial and financial dimensions. 33 
Political Overview of the Middle East 
The Middle East is the inheritor of five thousand years 
of history. It is the birthplace of the world's three great 
monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. 
For almost 1400 years, Islam has been the religion of over 
90 percent of the region's inhabitants. The effect of 
religion on politics is more pronounced in the Middle East 
















OPEC CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, 1979-91 
(Millions of Barrels Per Day) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
1.22 1.11 1.00 .99 .97 1.01 1.04 .95 1.05 1.04 1.10 1.18 1.23 
3.17 1.66 1.38 2.21 2.44 2.17 2.25 2.04 2.30 2.24 2.87 3.09 3.31 
3.48 2.50 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.21 1.43 1.70 2.08 2.69 2.90 2.04 0.31 
2.50 1.66 1.13 0.82 1.06 1.16 1.02 1.42 1.59 1.49 1.78 1.18 5.10 
2.09 1.79 1.14 1.15 1.11 1.09 1.06 1.03 .97 1.18 1.15 1.38 1.48 
0.51 0.47 0.41 0.33 0.30 0.39 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.40 
9.53 9.90 9.82 6.48 5.09 4.66 3.39 4.87 4.27 5.09 5.06 6.41 8.12 
1.83 1.71 1.47 1.25 1.15 1.15 1.19 1.33 1.54 1.57 1.86 2.12 2.39 
24.33 20.80 17.35 14.25 13.13 12.84 :1.68 13.65 14.09 15.65 17.10 17.81 22.37 
56 
Source: Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration 












OPEC MIDDLE EAST OIL REVENUES, 1974-91 
(Billions of U.S. Dollars) 
1974 1979 1980 1981 1983 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
122.6 57.6 102.0 113.2 46.1 25.9 19.3 22.2 20.9 25.3 43.8 47.6 
5.7 21.3 26.0 10.4 8.4 12.1 6.8 11.7 11.8 15.2 8.7 0.4 
12.5 19.1 13.5 8.6 21.7 15.9 7.4 10.7 8.9 12.2 18.4 15.0 
6.0 15.2 22.6 15.6 11.2 10.4 4.7 5.6 4.8 6.4 10.8 10.3 
7.0 16.7 17.9 14.9 9.9 9.5 6.3 6.8 6.5 8.3 5.8 0.08 
5.5 12.9 19.5 18.7 12.8 12.2 6.6 8.9 7.4 10.6 15.5 15.0 
3.7 7.5 12.5 10.8 9.7 5.7 2.7 3.4 2.8 6.6 8.2 7.8 
1.6 3.6 5.4 5.3 3.0 3.1 1.6 1.9 1.5 2.1 3.0 2.5 
164.6 153.8 219.4 197.5 122.8 94.8 55.4 71.2 64.6 86.7 114.2 98.68 
Source: Petroleum Economist; Petroleum Finance Company; American 
Petroleum Institute, Guide to Petroleum Statistical 
Information, 1993-94. 
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The Middle East has played a pivotal role in world 
affairs since ancient times. Forming the land bridge between 
Asia, Africa, and Europe, the Middle East has the strategic 
attention of Europe, and later the United States and the 
Soviet Union. 34 Regarding the strategic importance of the 
Middle East, Joseph Weatherby states that, "There is a 
saying in the West that the Middle East is a region that is 
too important to the outside world to allow it to be 
governed by Middle Easterners. "35 
The Middle East has been characterized by instability 
for many centuries due to factors such as ethnic and 
religious diversity and maldistribution of natural resources 
before the development of nation states in the region. 
There is agreement among many who discuss West Asia or the 
Middle East that those regions experience periodic war and 
revolution. According to Yasumasa Kuroda, the region is so 
unstable and subject to so many crises and wars of various 
magni tude, "it is unstable by design. "36 Great Britain and 
France, which dominated much of the region, following the 
34Weatherby, 214. 
35Ibid. 
36Yasumasa Kuroda, "A Structural Analysis of Instability 
and Conflict in the Gulf," in The Gulf War and the New World 
Order, ed. Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael 
(Gainesville: University of Florida, 1994), 54. 
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collapse of the Ottoman Empire (1453-1918) at the end of 
World War I, drew national boundaries and placed kings in 
certain areas to ensure that the Arab World would forever be 
divided. As the Ottoman Empire finally collapsed in World 
War I, all Arabs were subjugated to new western colonial 
masters after 400 years of Turkish rule. It was then easy 
for the European nations to continue their hegemonic rule in 
the region even after the Arab nations became independent. 
After the Arabs were divided and national boundaries drawn 
by colonial powers, mainly Bri tain and France, the new 
countries naturally developed their own national interests 
and agenda that were antithetical to Arab unity and 
independence. 37 
Colonial power continued to control the faith of the 
region since World War I and even after World War II. 
During this period, the policy of "divide and rule" was the 
colonial practice in the region. The creation of the Zionist 
Movement in Europe in the late 19th century marked the 
beginning of the most crucial political instability in the 
Middle East of what has corne to be known as the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
Zionism was a political movement among European Jewry 
that led, beginning in the late 19th century, to increased 
Jewish immigration to Palestine and ultimately to the 
37Ibid., 55. 
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successful establishment of an independent Israeli state in 
1948, had its roots in specific conditions in 19th century 
Europe. 38 Continuous anti-Semitism throughout most of the 
Europe, culminating in the Nazi Holocaust of European Jewry 
during World War II finally led most Jews and the great many 
others in the west to view wi th favor the idea of an 
independent Jewish state in Palestine, where more than half 
a million Jews had established themselves by the end of the 
year. 39 
From its inception the Zionist movement faced general 
opposi tion l.n the Middle East, not only from the Arabian 
inhabitants of Palestine but also from the larger Arab world 
of which Palestine was considered a part. The Arabs of 
Palestine were ill equipped to meet the challenge posed by 
the determined Zionist movement. As the 20th century began, 
Palestine, like most Arab societies, was seriously 
underdeveloped. Long centuries of relatively oppressive 
foreign rule (for four centuries since 1516, the Ottoman 
Empire had ruled Palestine) had fragmented the Palestinian 
Arabs politically and trained them effectively in the 
virtues of political accommodation. 4o As a result, the 





organization. They were disturbed by the Zionist movement, 
and lacked effective political institutions to secure their 
own rights and interests. 
The European powers were competing for influence and 
domination in local regions throughout the rapidly declining 
Ottoman Empire. The European Zionists recognized that they 
could advance their cause by backing the imperial aims of 
the European power most likely to prevail in the context for 
influence in Palestine. This ambition was achieved in the 
last days of World War I, when Great Britain concluded that 
support for the Zionist movement would significantly serve 
its imperial interests in the Middle East. On November 2, 
1917, the British government issued the famous Balfour 
declaration, named after Lord Arthur James Balfour, the 
British foreign minister: 
His Maj esty 1 s Government views with favor the 
establishment in Palestine of a national home for 
the Jewish people and will use their best 
endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this 
object, it being clearly understood that nothing 
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and 
religious rights of existing non Jewish 
communities in Palestine or the rights and 
poli tical status enj oyed by Jews in any other 
country. 41 
Many observers regard this declaration as the beginning of 
what has come to be known as the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
u.s. Congress adopted a resolution approving the declaration 
in September 1922. 
41Ibid., 63. 
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In July 1922 the League of Nations approved an 
arrangement giving Great Britain a mandate over Palestine. 
The mandate which went into force on September 22, 1923 
contained a preamble incorporating the Balfour declaration 
and stressing the Jews historical connection with Palestine. 
Britain was made responsible for placing the country under 
such political, administrative and economic conditions as 
will secure the establishment of a Jewish national horne. 
Between 1923 to 1948 many hundred thousands of Jews 
immigrated to Palestine. In early 1947 the United Nations 
set up a committee of inquiry which ultimately recommended 
that Palestine be divided in to separate Arab and Jewish 
states with Jerusalem becoming an international zone under 
permanent UN trusteeship. On November 29, 1947 the UN 
General Assembly ratified that decision. British set May 
15, 1948 as the date its mandate would end. On May 14, 
1948, the British high Commissioner left Palestine and the 
state of Israel was proclaimed. Minutes after Israel 
declared its independence on May 14, 1948, the United States 
became the first country to recognize the Jewish state. 42 
Arab-Israeli Struggle 
Since the end of the World War II the Arab-Israeli 
conflict has been the central political issue in the Middle 
42Ibid., 64. 
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east. The day after Israel declared its independence Arab-
Israel war broke out. Contingents from five Arab countries: 
Egypt, Trans Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon invaded 
Palestine. The war was stopped on January 7, 1949 and Israel 
held over 30 percent more territory than had been assigned 
to the Jewish state under the UN partition plan. The 
Palestinian state envisaged by the UN plan never 
materialized. Israel gained about 25 hundred square miles. 
Trans Jordan which annexed territory on the west Bank of the 
Jordan river and transformed itself into the state of Jordan 
gained 22 hundred square miles. Egypt took the Gaza strip, 
about 135 square miles. Jerusalem was divided between Israel 
and Jordan. It has been estimated that more than 700,000 
who had lived in the area taken over by Israel became 
refugees. 43 
The Suez Crisis 
The second Arab-Israel war again tore the Middle East 
in 1956, when President Nasser of Egypt nationalized the 
British run Suez Canal and refused to guarantee the safety 
of Israeli shipping. Nationalization of the canal directly 
threatened British and French interests. The British 
government held 44% of all shares in the Suez Canal Company; 
Private French investors held more than three quarters of 
43Ibid. 
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remaining shares. In addition both nations were heavy users 
of the canal, which provided the shortest waterway to their 
oil supplies in the Persian Gulf. The two governments froze 
Egyptian assets and began planning for joint mili tary 
action, secretly enlisting Israel's participation in the 
plan. 44 Israeli armed forces attacked Egypt on October 29 
and by October 31 had occupied the Israeli peninsula to 
within 10 miles of Suez Canal. Britain and France began air 
strikes against Egyptian targets on October 31 and British 
and France troops joined the battle on November 5. By 
November 7, British and French forces had secured control of 
the canal. Despite the close u.S. relationship with Britain, 
President Eisenhower vigorously protested the Suez invasion. 
After intense international pressure from the United States, 
Bri tain and France wi thdrew their forces from Egypt In 
December 1956. 45 Although Egypt was defeated in the war, 
Nasser's stature in the Arab world was bolstered. The 1956 
war did not solve the Arab-Israeli territorial conflict, 
only temporarily altered the military balance in the area. 
The war increased Arab hostility toward Israel and 
Nasser began to successfully promote the concept of Arab 
unity. 
44 "U. S. Policy in the Middle East" in The Middle East, 
Chapter 3 (Congressional Quarterly Inc.), 65. 
45Ibid., 65-66. 
64 
The Six Day War of 1967 
Middle East tension exploded again on June 5, 1967 with 
the start of the six day war on May 23, 1967. President 
Nasser of Egypt imposed a blockade of the Gulf of Agaba. 
The blockade halted most Israeli shipping and threatened to 
strangle Israeli economy. Nasser imposed the blockade 
following his demand that the U.N. Emergency force be 
removed from the Gaza strip and the Gulf of Agaba outpost 
at Sharm el-Shikh. 46 The United Nations relented and 
withdrew the emergency force. At the same time, Nasser 
moved a substantial Egyptian force into the Sinai peninsula 
and Syria. Iraq and Jordan signed a treaty of mutual defense 
and began to mobilize their forces. 47 Fearing imminent 
attack, Israel decided to strike first. Its war planes 
started surprised attack on Egyptian air fields and 
destroyed the bulk of the Egyptian air forces on the ground. 
Then in a lightning move across the Sinai Peninsula, the 
Israeli army broke the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of 
Aqaba and once again put the Israeli soldiers on the banks 
of the Suez Canal. 48 Hundreds of Egyptian tanks and 
artillery pieces were destroyed in Sinai. In the east 
Israel's forces ousted Jordanian troops from the old section 
46David Bowen Lara Drake r "The Syrian Israeli Border 




of Jerusalem and seized control of all Jordanian territory 
west of the Jordan river. In the North Israel captured-the 
Golan Heights. 49 The 1967 war substantially altered the 
political balance in the Middle east. Israel's smashing 
victory stunned the Arabs and left Israel in a position of 
strength. In contrast to 1956, when Israeli forces were 
withdrawn in response to strong Washington pressure, Tel 
Aviv at once announced that Israel would remain in the 
occupied territories until decisive progress a permanent 
settlement had been made. 
On November 22, 1967, the UN Security Council 
unanimously approved a resolution (Security Council 
Resolution 242) aimed at bringing peace to the Middle East. 50 
The document called for (1) withdrawal of Israeli forces 
from the occupied Arab areas; (2) an end to the state of 
belligerency between the Arab nations and the Israel; (3) 
acknowledgment of and respect for the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence of every 
nation in the area; (4) the establishment of secure and 
recognized boundaries; (5) a national waterways in the area; 
and (6) a j~st settlement of the refugee problem. President 
Nasser died in September 1970. He was succeeded by Anwar 
Sadat. As Sadat's differences with the Soviet Union became 
49UN Resolution 242, p. 395. 
50"Arab-Israeli Conflict" in The Middle East, 8th 
edition, 31. 
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more acute, he concluded that Egyptian and Soviet goals were 
incompatible. On July 18, 1972 Sadat ordered all 20 
thousand Soviet military advisers out of Egypt. Sadat's 
action severely damaged the Soviet position in the Middle 
East. The Soviet Union responded by expanding ties to Syria, 
Iraq and Palestine liberation organization. 
The October War of 1973 
The fourth Arab-Israeli war broke out on October 6, 
1973. Egypt and Syria launched an attack on Yom Kippur, the 
holiest day of the Jewish calendar. Egyptian and Syrian 
troops broke through Israel's forward fortifications and 
advanced into the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. 
Nearly 90,000 Egyptian troops crossed the Suez Canal over 
ran existing Israeli defenses. Despite the success of the 
initial Egyptian and Syrian strikes into Israeli occupied 
territory, Israeli forces recovered. They broke through the 
Egyptian lines and drove to the western bank of the Suez 
Canal on the other front, they advanced to within twenty. 
miles of Syrian capital of the Damascus. At this time 
President Nixon carried out a massive air lift of war 
materials for Israel. 51 To avoid the prolong war the U.S. 
and Soviet Union sponsored a joint resolution calling for an 
immediate cease fire and implementation of the 1967 Security 
51Ibid. 
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Council resolution 242 was presented to the Security Council 
on October 21.52 Egypt and Israel was agreed and finally the 
crisis defused, when both Washington and Moscow agreed to a 
Security Council resolution, establishing an international 
peace-keeping force. 
Camp David Agreement: A Treaty for Peace 
Following the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 in order to 
achieve a comprehensive peace settlement, President Jimmy 
Carter devised a strategy for achieving a comprehensive 
peace settlement. 53 The Soviet Union responded favorably and 
the result .was a joint statement on the Middle East, issued 
on October 1, 1977 calling for a conference to work out a 
full resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict incorporating 
all parties concerned and all questions. In fact, President 
Carter persuaded President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister 
Begin of Israel that led to an agreement. Finally, the Camp 
David agreement was signed on September 17, 1977 by Prime 
Minister Begin and President Sadat.54 
There were two agreements at Camp David, one dealing 
with Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and 
peace arrangements between Israel and Egypt, the other a 
52The Middle East, 69-70. 
53Ibid., 71. 
54Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., A Concise History of the 
Middle East (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), 301-03. 
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framework for settling the future of the West Bank and 
Gaza. 55 After the Camp David agreements on December 10, 1977, 
Sadat and Begin received the Nobel Peace Prize for the Camp 
David agreement. 
However, most Arabs saw the Egyptian unilateral 
agreement with Israel as an act against Arab solidarity to 
achieve a comprehensive peace settlement. After the Camp 
David agreement Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, the PLO, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tunisia, the UAE, North Yemen and 
South Yemen adopted a package of tough political and 
economic sanctions against Egypt. Egypt was also expelled 
from the Arab League and the OIC.56 
Crises in the Persian Gulf 
Since 1979, instead of Arab-Israeli conflict, Persian 
Gulf crises received the world attention. In that year the 
Iranian revolution, the u.S. Embassy hostages crisis in 
Tehran, a second round of oil price increases, and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan converged to focus the 
world's attention on the Persian Gulf. During the 1980's 
the Iran-Iraq War underscored the Gulf's volatility as well 
as its strategic and economic importance. In September 1980, 
55Ibid. 
56James A. Bill, Politics in the Middle East (Harper 
Collins College Publishers, 1994), 384-88. 
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by Iraq's invasion of Iran, the eight year war threatened 
the flow of oil throughout the Gulf and ultimately involved 
the United States and other countries outside the regions. 57 
In 1988 a tense peace was concluded between Iran and Iraq. 
But two years later in 1990 the region was again engulfed in 
war when Iraq invaded and occupied oil rich Kuwait in August 
1990. 58 This crisis remained at the forefront of 
international agenda for seven months. President Bush 
responded to the invasion by pulling together an 
international coalition authorized by the UN Security 
Council to oppose Iraq. Nearly 40 nations contributed combat 
forces transport, assistance, medical teams or financial aid 
to the joint effort to force Iraq from Kuwait. 59 The Persian 
Gulf crisis was the first major test of the effectiveness of 
the UN Security Council to confront international aggression 
in the post-cold war era. 
By early March 1991, a U.S. led multinational 
coalition force had driven the Iraqi army from Kuwait and 
occupied much of southern Iraq. Finally Kuwait was liberated 
on February 27, 1991. 60 
57Ibid. 
58Lawrence Freedman and Efrain Casls, The Gulf Conflict, 
1990-91: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 428-
29. 
59The Middle East, 90. 
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Toward an Arab-Israeli Peace Agreement 
The decline of the Soviet economy in the late 1980's 
and the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 
virtually removed Moscow's influence from the Middle East. 
The Arab entities that had depended on Moscow, especially 
Syria and the P.L.O., were left without a patron. In 1990, 
the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait led to hopes 
among many Palestinians that Iraq would function as a 
rallying point for anti-western and anti-Israeli sentiment. 
But the overwhelming defeat of Iraq, forces in 1991 by an 
American led multinational forces that included Arab nations 
compounded the Palestinian isolation. 61 The goal of 
establishing a Palestinian homeland did not appear to be 
achievable through confrontation. Moreover Israel's 
position had grown stronger because of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the defeat of Iraq. 
Globally the American position also had improved 
because of continuing disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
Moscow was increasingly turning inward to address its 
domestic, political and economic crises. Since its 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, completed in 1989, it had shown 
much less interest in an assertive role abroad. By the end 




main successor state was not in a position to proj ect 
military or financial influence into the Middle East. 
In July 1992 Israeli voters returned the labor party to 
power, led by Yitshak Rabin, the Labor Party sought 
negotiations with the Palestinian. All these events created 
a situation in the Middle East which dictated a move toward 
peace. The United States as the only super power sponsored 
the peace negotiation. After years of fruitless negotiation 
and intermittent warfare, diplomatic success in 1993 and 
1994 transformed the Arab-Israeli conflict.62 On September 
13, 1993 PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat shook hands with Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at a dramatic White House 
ceremony and their foreign ministers signed a historic 
document, the first ever between Israel and the PLO, 
recognizing each other and agreeing on the outlines of a 
plan to end their long conflict. 63 The declaration of 
principles established a framework for Israeli transfer of 
the Gaza Strip and the city of Jericho to the control of a 
new Palestinian authority. 
The agreement was followed in May 1994 by the 
withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho. The PLO-Israeli agreement was followed by 




24, 1994, King Hussein of Jordan and Prime Minister Rabin of 
Israel signed the Washington Declaration which formally 
ended the 46 year state of belligerence between their 
nations. On October 26, a Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty was 
signed on the border between the two nations with President 
Bill Clinton in attendance. Although Syrian-Israeli 
negotiations were not so fruitful, expectations were high 
among diplomats and the Syrian people that a peace agreement 
could be concluded immediately, returning the Israeli 
occupied Golan Heights to Syria. Since 1994, the government 
controlled Syrian Press toned down its criticism of Israel 
and the remaining several hundred Syrian Jews were granted 
exit visas. 64 The Jordanian-Israeli agreement may, in the 
future, put pressure on Syrian President Hafez-al-Assad to 
compromise with Israel. 
Conclusion 
Throughout history, the Middle East has been a rich and 
diverse region of enormous culture and significance. It has 
spawned three of the world's great religions--Christianity, 
Islam and Judaism--and has provided many other contributions 
to civilizations. In the 20th century the discovery of the 
largest petroleum deposits in the world made the Middle East 
vital to the international economy. The region is also 
64Ibid., 99-100. 
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strategically important because of its oil assets and its 
location at the crossroads of three continents. 
Perhaps more than any other region, the Middle East has 
been afflicted with conflicts that seemed to defy solution. 
But the march towards peace, including the signing of the 
PLO-Israeli agreement and the Jordanian-Israeli agreement, 
brokered by the United States, and the negotiations between 
Syria and Israel, created a possibility of permanent 
solution to the Middle East problem. Constructing long-term 
settlements requires not only carefully drawn compromises 
backed by international guarantees, but also fundamental 
changes in the attitudes of people toward their enemies. 
CHAPTER IV 
EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. NATIONAL 
INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
Introduction 
Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, U.S. interest 
in the Middle East changed and developed with the changing 
nature of U. S. national interest. Joe Stork argues that 
"U.S. interests in the Middle East, as elsewhere, are 
determined on the basis of strategic considerations and 
access to resources and markets. III 
In the 19th century U. S. involvement in the Middle 
East was dominated by religious, philanthropic, and 
academic organizations. Presbyterians first arrived in 
Lebanon (then part of Syria) in the 1820's, subsequently 
founding the American Uni versi ty of Beirut. 2 In the late 
19th century missionaries from the Reformed Church 
IJoe Stork's remark is cited in The United States and 
the Middle East: A Search for New Perspectives, ed. Hooshang 
Amirah Madi (New York: State University of New York Press, 
1993), 10. 
2Tareq Y. Isrnael and Jacquelines S. Ismael, ed., The 
Gulf War and the New World Order (Gainesville: University 
Press of Florida, 1994), 61. 
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established a string of missions in the Persian Gulf from 
Iraq to Oman. Prior to World War II, official interest in 
the Middle East was limited to the defense of commercial 
interests, mainly oil. 3 
The geo-strategic importance of the region changed 
dramatically during World War II. The Middle East was 
increasingly viewed by u.s. and British military planners as 
a significant theater of operation, which would serve as a 
launching pad for the insertion of allied forces into 
southern Europe as well as a transit zone for movement of 
desperately needed military supplies to support the ground 
forces of the Soviet Union. The Middle East received further 
significance during the Cold War. The Cold War generated 
requirements for access to military facili ties in the 
region, alliance formation on the part of the United States 
and transfers by Washington of military supplies to favored 
friends and allies. By the end of the 1950s the United 
States had a substantial military presence in the region. 
Meanwhile strong u.S. support for the creation of the state 
of Israel and its recognition by the United Nations (UN) in 
1948 forged a relationship with this eastern Mediterranean 
nation that has been a pillar of U.S. policy. In fact, with 
the birth of the Cold War, the United States added two more 
3Ibid. 
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objectives to its Middle East Policy apart from control of 
oil and support of Israel. 
Development of u.s. Policy in the Middle East 
The containment of Soviet influence in the Middle East 
during the Cold War era remarked the beginning of the u.S. 
invol vement ~n the region. The containment of Soviet 
influence was known as the Truman Doctrine. In his famous 
speech of March 12, 1947, before a joint session of Congress 
that became known as the Truman Doctrine, the United States 
had formally announced its readiness to meet the challenge 
of Soviet expansionism. In subsequent years the policy 
makers in the United States increasingly pressured the u.s. 
military establishment to play a more prominent role in the 
securi ty of the Middle East. In October 1950 President 
Truman provided the first presidential security guarantee to 
Saudi Arabia, stating that: 
The United States is interested in the 
preservation of the independence of Saudi Arabia. 
However, because of United States commitments in 
other areas it is in the United States interest 
that the United Kingdom have primary 
responsibility for Israel and the Arab States. 4 
The Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 rose as an effort to 
fill the vacuum created by the British and the French later 
collapse after the 1956 Suez War. In his address before 
4Steven L. Spiegel, Mark A. Heller and Jacob Goldberg, 
ed., The Soviet-American Competition in the Middle East 
(Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1988), 114-15. 
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Congress on January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower called for 
not only providing military and economic assistance programs 
for the region but also authorizing the use of armed forces 
as the President deemed necessary "to protect the 
terri torial integrity and pol i tical independence of any 
Middle Eastern State facing overt armed aggression from a 
country controlled by international communism." 5 By the 
announcement of the doctrine the second u.S. objective was 
the security of the region. Eisenhower promoted the 
establishment of a security agreement among Britain, Iraq, 
Iran, Pakistan and Turkey known as the Baghdad Pact of 1957. 
However, after Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact in 
1958, the United States continued its commitment for the 
securi ty of the reg~on wi th the remaining Baghdad Pact 
nations and its successor organization known as the Central 
Treaty Organization (CENTCO).6 
President John F. Kennedy had been a strong critic of 
Eisenhower's policy regarding the Soviet influence and the 
security of the region, when he came into office in 1961. 
The Kennedy administration sought to enlarge the size of 
the u.S. armed forces by creating the u.s. Strike Command 
(STRICOM), to utilize the newly enlarged U. S. -based army 
forces for operation in the Third World. 
5Ibid., 116. 
6Ibid., 117. 
This new strike 
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command took the responsibilities for the Middle East, 
which in fact was created to meet the responsibilities 
undertaken in the Eisenhower years.? 
In fact, these military preparations were combined with 
some political implications for U.S.-Middle East policy. In 
December 1962, during his meeting with the Israeli foreign 
minister Golda Meir, President Kennedy announced the U.S. 
commitment to the security of Israel. He said: "It is quite 
clear that in case of invasion of Israel, the United States 
would come to the support of Israel. We have the capacity 
and it I S growing." 8 It seems that Kennedy I s statement was 
supported by the growing U.S. conventional military 
capabilities for Middle East operations which gave him the 
power and confidence to make such a security commitment that 
neither Truman nor Eisenhower would have felt comfortable to 
give, even if it were in their policies. 9 In addition, the 
Kennedy administration clearly recognized the growing Soviet 
influence in the region and became convinced that it was 
necessary to correct the growing arms imbalance against 
Israel. President Kennedy indicated that a "balance of 
power" would be a guiding principle of American Middle East 
policy, and the United States will increase the arms sales 





The Johnson administration policy toward the Middle 
East became more concerned with the growing power of 
President Nasser of Egypt with the Russians I support. In 
the belief that Nasser I s influence in the region were a 
threat to the more friendly regimes of Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf States, the Johnson administration decided to continue 
to maintain the balance of power in the region by providing 
more arms to Israel, with the belief that a strong as well 
as secure Israel might be in the best interest of the United 
States. l1 However, the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 marked a 
significant turning point in U. S. -Israeli relations. The 
Johnson administration strongly supported Israel during the 
war and became directly involved. According to Tareq Y. 
Ismael, the United States directly participated in the 1967 
Arab-Israeli War. He said: 
Using information obtained by invoking the Freedom 
of Information Act, Stephen Green (1984) was able 
to determine that the U. S. Air Force directly 
participated in the June 1967 war against the 
Arabs. The United States, with infrared cameras 
designed for night vision, helped Israel by 
providing reconnaissance flights at the outset of 
the spectacular pre-emptive attack that 
annihilated the Egyptian Air Force. Green 
speculated that President Lyndon Johnson ordered 
the U. S. Air Force to take part in the war to 
destroy as many MIGs as possible so that the 
Soviets would be busy supplying new MIGs and 
weapons to Egypt rather than to North Vietnarn. 12 
lOPhilip L. Groisser, The United States and the Middle 
East (Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 
1982), 198. 
llIbid., 198. 
12Ismael and Ismael, 60-61. 
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Moreover, the United States did not join the Soviet and 
Arabs calling for withdrawal by Israel from the territories 
occupied during the war. It helped Israel to resist 
diplomatic and military pressure to pull back. Despite the 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which guided the 
overall Middle East peace settlement, the United States 
interpreted the principle of return of occupied territories 
in the same spirit as did the Israelis. It refused to 
condemn Israel as an aggressor in the U.N. debates following 
the War .13 However, the U. S. strategic interest in the 
region during Johnson's administration were in fact limited 
to the establishment of U.S. military capabilities as a full 
U.S. regional command for the Middle East. 
In fact, the importance of the Persian Gulf as an area 
of strategic interest to the United States became more clear 
during the Nixon era. The British decision to withdraw from 
the region in 1970s and the Vietnam War were the origins of 
the United States policy in the region with regard to 
containment of Soviet influence. Actually, the historical 
context leading to the application of U.S. policy in the 
region, especially the application of the Nixon Doctrine and 
the role of a regional power to protect western interest 
were the prime considerations of the policy makers in the 
United States during the 1970s. 
13Groisser, 199. 
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The decision of the British government to withdraw from 
the Persian Gulf by 1971 was in fact influenced by three 
major factors. The first was the British government's desire 
to cut government expenditures, and the second was the 
growing anti-British movement in the Arab world headed by 
Nasserite Arab nationalism. The maintenance of a British 
military presence abroad was a serious charge on Britain's 
balance of payments. Second, that the maintenance of the 
British military presence east of Suez has been considered 
as a mistaken choice of priorities. Third, that in the Gulf 
the British government was once again backing the wrong 
side, the "feudal" society of Arab sheikhs rather than the 
new emergent forces of Arab nationalism. 
In backing the feudal sheikhs, Britain was alienating 
their inevitable successors, and challenging yet again the 
influence of Nasserite nationalism. 14 However, without the 
British presence, the critics said, the Gulf might become an 
area of persistent unrest in which local conflicts between 
rival Arab states and subversive movements as well as 
international tension between Arabs and Iranians could erupt 
and be exploited by the Soviet Union, imperiling western oil 
interests and supplies. Such risks certainly cannot be 
ignored. Historically, the Gulf has usually been an area of 
division and flux rather than of unity and stability, partly 
14David C. Watt, "The Decision to Withdraw From the 
Gulf," The Political Quarterly 39 (1968): 315-16. 
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because it marks the line of stress between rival Arab and 
Persian cultures and partly because it lacks any indigenous 
focus for its small and scattered Arab communities. 
The long-standing cultural and political disputes in 
the area comprise a formidable list, ranging from general 
sense of territorial rivalry between Iran on one side and 
the Arabs on the other, and between the Arabs in themselves. 
Between Iraq and Iran there are conflicting claims to 
navigation rights in the Shatt al-Arab waterway in the 
south, and the Kurds in the north. On the other hand, 
further conflict arises between the position of Iraq as the 
leading Shiite Arab Muslim country in the Arab world and the 
position of Iran as the largest Shiite non-Arab Muslim 
country in the area. 
Between Iran, Saudi Arabia and the smaller sheikhdoms 
there have been several disputes over the so-called median 
line in the Gulf, which demarcates the areas of offshore oil 
exploration and exploitation. Iraq, Iran and Kuwait have a 
long history of border disputes left over by the British,15 
although the British presence in the Gulf area contributed 
much to the stability of the region for a long period of 
time. The small sheikhdom of the Gulf has been kept under 
the British control regarding their tribal disputes. With 
British withdrawal the stability of the region has been 
I5David Holden, "The Persian Gulf: After the British 
Raj," Foreign Affairs: An American Quarterly Review 49, no. 
4 (July 1971): 725-26. 
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threatened by revolutionary movements such as the Baathist 
regime in Baghdad, which is hostile to all forms of 
traditional government--particularly sheiks, sultans and 
shahs, and all forms of western presence in the area. These 
movements have always been supported by the Soviet Union as 
anti-imperialist movements in the Middle East at large. 
Actually, the British military presence in the area had 
frozen many of the regions' tribal, ethnic, dynastic, and 
territorial disputes. As independent entities, the ability 
of the Gulf states to withstand any recurrence of these 
disputes and their ability to stand for any external threats 
was in some doubt.16 
The British withdrawal from the Gulf affected the 
politico-strategic elements of U.S. interest in the region. 
These elements became more important and central to U.S. 
regional concerns, particularly the flow of the region's 
oil. The Uni ted States became more concerned wi th the 
stability of the new independent small Gulf states, and the 
problem of preserving the conservative status quo in the 
region after the British withdrawal. Meanwhile, u.S. 
interest in insuring the survival of those states had become 
stronger as a result of a number of factors. Apart from 
being the largest oil producers, they shared the same 
concern for growing Soviet influence and Soviet-sponsored 




respect to the flow and price of oil were more flexible than 
those of the radical regimes The political environment in 
the producer nations, as well as their attitudes toward the 
U.S. and other industrially developed countries, clearly had 
an impact on how they approach oil production and price 
decisions. Revolutionary regimes in the region exhibited 
considerable hostility to western oil interests, especially 
when it comes to address the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
There is a growing tendency among the monarchies to use 
a "carrot" approach by suggesting more favorable consider-
ation and being more sympathetic to the oil supply to the 
west (an exception being the Saudi Arabian-led 1973 oil 
embargo) in return for more political support for the 
Palestinian cause. 17 The link between Gulf security, western 
access to oil, and the Arab-Israeli conflict were other 
major politico-strategic developments for the United States 
during the 1970s. The role of the Gulf states in the Arab-
Israeli conflict had been considered as a secondary one by 
the United States in terms of military capacity and 
attitude. However, the economic capability of the Gulf 
states, following the dramatic jump in oil revenues, was the 
key factor in this issue. Joseph Sisco, State Department 
official In 1975, recognized that the major Arab oil 
producing countries: 
17Department of State Bulletin 80, no. 2043 (October 
1980), 41-42. 
Have become the principle financial support for 
the Arab states more directly involved in the 
Middle East conflict their views [on the 
Arab-Israeli issue] are very important, and they 
are regularly consulted by the Arab parties to the 
[peace] negotiations as well as by the 
Palestinians .1S 
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The transition of the Gulf from a traditional geopolitical 
location as an extension to the Indian Ocean for the British 
to a position of significant strategic and economic 
importance to many industrial countries in the world became 
a primary objective to the United States policy during the 
1970s. The United States became more interested in the 
stability of the region. The United States has had a long 
and prof i table cooperation wi th the two maj or regional 
powers in the Gulf, Iran and Saudi Arabia, both of whom 
share mutual interest in the stability and progress in the 
region. 
Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs, in his statement made before the 
Subcommittee on the Near East of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, said: 
We have also recognized that the tensions arising 
from regional conflicts can spread to neighboring 
states and disrupt their stability and orderly 
development. The Gulf area is not immune to the 
virus of the Arab-Israeli conflict, whose peaceful 
and just resolution remains an overriding goal of 
our Middle East policy. 
lSU.S. Congress, House Committee on International 
Relations, The Persian Gulf, 1975: The Continuing Debate on 
Arms Sales, 8. 
Holding to these principles, we have over the last 
few years carefully examined our posture towards 
the strategic Gulf region--an area undergoing 
spectacular economic growth and social change, an 
area which has experienced a decade of historic 
political evolution, an area where American 
interests are of great significance. 19 
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Thus the security of Israel, a significant u.s. 
interest in the region, as well as ensuring the stability of 
and cooperation with the more moderate Gulf states, upon 
which western access to oil depended, were the prime 
objectives of the policy makers in the United States during 
that time. Moreover, the power vacuum caused by the British 
withdrawal created a considerable reaction among the Great 
Powers, mainly the United States and the Soviet Union. The 
U.S. Navy planned to take over part of the British naval 
base recently vacated at Jufair in Bahrain and the Russians 
were, at the same time, considering stretching their naval 
presence in the Indian Ocean. 20 Actually, Soviet naval entry 
into the Indian Ocean soon after the announcement of the 
British withdrawal caused a great deal of concern in the 
west, and some analysts even predicted that the Pax-
Sovietica would replace the Pax-Britannica in the Indian 
Ocean and the Persian Gulf. In April 1968, Lucius Battle, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, told the U.S. 
House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee that: 
19Department of State Bulletin (September 1970), 241-
42. 
20R. P. Owen, "The British Withdrawal from the Persian 
Gulf," World Today (February 1972): 80-81. 
Further withdrawals are contemplated by the 
British in the years ahead, the temptation on the 
part of the Soviets to fill a vacuum or at least 
maneuver in troubled waters is very great. This 
represented a threat to western interest. 21 
87 
In fact, the U. S. attitude to the British plans to 
withdraw from the region were indicated by Under Secretary 
of State Rostow's statement that measures were being taken 
to fill the vacuum created by the British withdrawal, in 
which local states like Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait might be considered to take the security 
responsibilities of the region. 22 Since the 1968 announcement 
by the British government of its decision to withdraw from 
the Gulf by 1971, U.S. policy has centered on support for 
the two largest pro-western states on either side of the 
Gulf--Iran and Saudi Arabia--in order that they might play 
key strategic and regional security roles. 23 This policy came 
to be known as the "twin-pillar" policy adopted by the Nixon 
administration after the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine 
in 1969. With the adoption of this policy, U.S. arms sales 
to Iran and Saudi Arabia dramatically increased as an effort 
to build up local powers which would be expected to assume 
21Middle East Record 4 (1968): 73. 
22Ibid. 
23John K. Cooley, "The u. S. Economic Role in the MIddle 
East and North Africa," in u.S. Congress, Joint Economic 
Committee, The u.s. Role in a Changing World Political 
Economy: Major Issues for the 96th Congress. A compendium of 
papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee. 96th 
Cong., 1st sess., 1979, 534-35. 
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increasing responsibility for collective security with the 
increasing amount of arms, but without direct participation 
of u.s. forces. 24 However, in the 1970s, u.s. policy in the 
region was focused on its efforts to promote Iran as the 
prime regional factor defending security and western 
interests in the region. Actually, this policy owed its 
origins to several factors, the most important among them 
being the shape of u.s. global strategic posture in the wake 
of the Vietnam war.25 Within this context, the Nixon Doctrine 
of 1969 announced the following principles: 
The United States will keep all its commitments. 
We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power 
threatens the freedom of a nation allied with the 
U.S., or of a nation whose survival we consider 
vital to our security and the security of the 
region as a whole. In cases involving other types 
of aggression, we shall furnish military and 
economic assistance when requested and as 
appropriate. But we shall look to the nation 
directly threatened to assume the primary 
responsibility of providing the manpower for its 
defense .26 
It seems that the Nixon administration had not yet 
considered the security issues in the Gulf as the prime 
direct of the U.S. geopolitical mood. The ability of a local 
state to assume the responsibility for the region's security 
on the West's behalf was the desire of the Nixon 
24Ibid., 535. 
25Amitav Acharya, u.s. Military Strategy in the Gulf 
(London: 1989), 21. 
26Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, Toronto: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 224-25. 
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administration during that time. That state was Iran. The 
U.S. views on the role of Iran as a regional leader were 
not new. The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administra-
tions had all considered the role of Iran in the region, but 
not until the British decision to withdraw from the Gulf had 
the United States considered the power vacuum more seriously 
and turned to Iran as an alternative to the British security 
and stability role in that region. However, the Vietnam War 
was the major issue dominating United States policy during 
that time. For this reason, the U.S. policy toward the Gulf 
became more dependent on a regional state to fill the power 
vacuum. In this regard, the Nixon Doctrine urged nations in 
that region to increase their ability to defend themselves. 
It was said that the United States would continue to ship 
arms but should not be expected to send its troops to defend 
other countries. 27 
Apart from this, Iran and Saudi Arabia became the 
twin-pillars of a U.S. policy announced in 1972 by 
Assistant Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco, of placing 
reliance on two states to provide for local and regional 
security and stability.28 The Shah's desire to take the role 
was announced by him immediately after the British 
27Acharya, 22. 
28Alvin J. Contrell and Robert J. Hanks, ed., "The 
Future Role of Iran," in U. S. Congress, Joint Economic 
Committee, The U.S. Role in a Changing World Economy, 1979, 
540. 
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announcement to withdraw from the region. To support his 
desire, the Shah planned to modernize Iran's military 
forces, which he believed necessary to fill the power 
vacuum created by British withdrawal, to respond to the 
potential threat posed by increased Soviet activities in 
the Persian Gulf, and to build up moderate pro-western 
regimes in the Middle East to offset "radical" Arab 
regimes. 
All of these points were reported to have been 
sympathetically received by the U.S. administration. 
Accordingly, the Shah was specifically seeking assurances 
from the United States that Iran could buy more modern arms 
to give Iran "a balanced and significant defense force of 
her own." Such a force, according to Iran, would be able to 
cooperate with friendly powers in the area such as Saudi 
Arabia or Kuwait to maintain stability in the strategic 
Persian Gulf.29 The United States was more sympathetic with 
the Shah's desire. According to Joseph Sisco, Iran had "both 
the will and the capability" to be a key player in providing 
for stability in the Gulf and the continued flow of oil to 
consumer countries. 3o As Henry Kissinger put it, although 
Iran's desire to play the role was not only consistent with 
U.S. strategic objectives, but also achievable without any 
cost to the U.S., since the Shah was willing to pay for the 
29Middle East Record 4 (1968): 83. 
30Department of State Bulletin (4 September 1972), 244. 
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American equipment out of his oil revenues. 31 In fact, Iran 
fit the American foreign policy concept as enunciated by the 
Nixon administration, namely, a policy of building and 
strengthening selected power centers in the region. Under 
this concept, the United States would provide a backup 
support for selected countries in the form of sea-based 
naval and air power without being directly involved, and 
expected the local and regional powers to provide immediate 
security for themselves. For this reason, the United States 
engaged in a large scale transfer of arms to Iran and, to a 
lesser extent, Saudi Arabia. 32 Also, the Uni ted States 
increased its diplomatic efforts in the region in the shape 
of friendship and further cooperation. Joseph Sisco, 
Assistant Secretary of State, in his statement before the 
Subcommi t tee on the Near East of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs in 1972, said: 
We believe that the resultant closer governmental 
contacts will contribute substantially to 
furthering our interests in commercial and 
technological exchange with these new states and 
in encouraging the trend toward cooperation among 
them. 33 
Accordingly, the United States extended its diplomatic 
presence into the region in the forms of small missions. 
Further top administration figure visits included President 
31Kissinger, 1264. 
32Contrell and Hanks, 540. 
33Department of State Bulletin (4 September 1972), 243. 
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Nixon coming to Iran, the Vice President coming to Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, and Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger's visit to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and 
Yemen. 34 However, in its efforts to increase the security of 
the region by relying more on Iran and Saudi Arabia as the 
pillars to u.S. policy, the Nixon administration provided 
increasing amounts of arms to Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran 
became the largest buyer of American made arms during the 
1970s. The Shah perceived Iran's military capability as 
central to its new regional security role. Therefore, 
between 1970 and 1977, the Iran defense budget rose by 1,100 
percent, from nearly $880 million in 1970 to $9.4 billion in 
1977. 
Following the 1974 oil price increase, the percentage 
of the military expenditures increased by approximately 141 
percent from the previous years since 1970. 35 With this huge 
military build-up, Iran became the dominant military power 
in the Persian Gulf area. A U.S. Senate committee report in 
1976 noticed that, upon delivery between 1976 and 1981 of 
equipment ordered to date, Iran on paper can be regarded as 
a regional superpower. 36 Actually, for the United States, the 
Shah's role in serving U.S. interest in the region--access 
34Ibid., 243. 
35U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 
U.S. Military Sales to Iran, 1976, 13. 
36Ibid., iii. 
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order in the region, and the role of u.s. arms transfers in 
its overall strategic framework, all received considerable 
praise in u.s. overall Gulf policy.37 According to Amitav 
Acharya, the Shah dominated the u. S. strategic framework 
for the region until the revolution in 1979 toppled his 
regime. While he ruled, American policy makers were 
generally appreciative of his regional security posture. 
The policy of reliance on him, combined wi th the Nixon 
Doctrine, was considered to be a major u.s. foreign policy 
success in the post-Vietnam era. The Shah was seen to be 
domestically strong and his foreign policy was deemed to be 
both responsible and fully compatible with u.S. interests 
in the region. His quest for military power was viewed to be 
worthy of American support. 38 
The second partner of this twin-pillar policy was 
Saudi Arabia. With the adoption of the twin-pillar policy by 
the Nixon administration, Saudi Arabia became the second 
largest state in the Gulf region which would be expected to 
assume increasing responsibility for collective security 
with increasing u.S. arms, but without direct participation 
of u.S. forces. 39 In the early 1970s, at the time of the 
Bri tish withdrawal from the Gul f, Saudi Arabia began to 
37Acharya, 23. 
38Ibid. 
39Richard M. Preece, "The Future Role of Saudi Arabia," 
in u.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The u.s. Role in 
A Changing World Political Economy, 1979, 535. 
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modernize its armed forces. This led to increased military 
sales and military involvement in the country, and this 
trend is expected to continue for the foreseeable future. 4o 
The military modernization program and u.s. involvement in 
this program matched those in Iran in cost value; however, 
the major differences were in Saudi Arabia the u.S. concern 
was the need to build the basic infrastructure for advanced 
weapon system and rapid military deployment. Accordingly, 
u.S. military sales to Saudi Arabia were worth over $30 
billion between 1971 and 1980. 41 More than 60 percent of the 
mili tary spending represents the value of construction 
proj ects, and the other 40 percent was divided between 
training and hardware. Much of their construction projects 
were managed by the u.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which at 
the end of the 1970s held military and other related 
facilities projects worth more than $20 billion. 42 
Actually, being the pillars of U. S. policy did not 
prevent Saudi Arabia and Iran from imposing their political 
40U. S. General Accounting Office, 
Military Sales to Saudi Arabia," Report 
(Washington, D.C.: October 26, 1977), i. 
"Perspectives on 
to the Congress 
4lU. S. Congress, House Commi ttee on Foreign Affairs, 
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and 
the United States. 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, 48. 
42U.S. General Accounting Office, 34-40. Also see u.S. 
Congress, House Committee on International Relations, 
Subcommittee on International Military Affairs, Mili tary 
Sales to Saudi Arabia: Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
International Milita~ Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, 
1-6. 
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and economic conditions on the western access of oil. 
While Saudi Arabia was more flexible on prices, it was the 
driving force behind the political restriction on the flow 
of oil to the west in relation to the support to Israel. 43 
Iran, on the other hand, did not join the Arab oil embargo 
against the West and Israel in 1973, but it did use its 
leading role in OPEC to increase the price of oil, not for 
political reasons, but for its own economic needs. 44 
However, despite its continuing supports to Israel, the 
Nixon administration did manage to strengthen the position 
of the United States in the Arab world. The Arab states 
reestablished diplomatic relations broken off during the 
War of 1973. The Arabs also terminated their oil boycott 
of the United States. President Nixon visited Egypt, Syria, 
Jordan and Israel, met with regional leaders, and pledged 
closer cooperation with the Arab states, in order to 
preserve peace and stability in the region by relying more 
on regional powers which was the main objective of the Nixon 
Doctrine, rather than direct U.S. military intervention. 
Accordingly, President Nixon stepped up military aid to the 
region, especially to Iran to be the guardian of the Persian 






When Nixon resigned as president in 1974, Gerald Ford 
became u.s. president. As Israel became more dependent on 
u.s. economic and military support, the Ford administration 
increased pressure on Israel to change its position 
regarding the Arab's occupied territories in order to get 
the Arabs to the peace table. He declared reassessment of 
the entire u.s. Middle East policy and temporarily 
restricted the flow of economic and military assistance to 
Israel, and forced Congress to drop this proposal. 46 
It is quite clear that the Nixon Doctrine and its twin 
pillar policy, which was also endorsed by the Ford and 
Carter administrations, was in fact challenged by its own 
pillars. Saudi Arabia, for example, was the driving force 
behind the 1973 Arab oil embargo against the west. The 
linkage between the Gulf oil and the Arab-Israeli conflict 
changed the whole scenario of U. S. policy in the Middle 
East. Despite the lack of their military power, the Arab 
Gulf states have become the principal financial support for 
the Arab states more directly involved in the Middle East 
conflict. Their views on the Arab-Israeli issue, said State 
Department official Joseph Sisco in 1975, are very important 
and they are regularly consulted by the Arab parties to the 
peace negotiations as well as by the Palestinians. 47 
46Ibid., 202-03. 
47U.S. Congress, House Committee on International 
Relations, Special Subcommittee on Investigations, The 
Persian Gulf, 1975: The Continuing Debate on Arms Sales: 
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However, Henry Kissinger disregarded the linkage between oil 
and the way the United States conducted its policy in the 
Middle East. He said: 
It is commonly believed that tensions in the 
Middle East do not particularly help the world oil 
si tuation. The United States has taken the 
position that it would conduct its negotiations in 
the Middle East independent of any oil pressures. 
And American policy will not let itself be 
affected by oil pressures. 48 
In fact, it had been fully recognized by many U. S. 
officials during the 1970s, that if the United States was 
to secure a settlement ensuring Israel's right to exist, 
which they believed a significant U. S. interest in the 
region, then it had to seek the cooperation of the pro-
western segment of the Arab states. 
The connection between the Persian Gulf security and a 
just and lasting resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict 
came to recognize both in the Gulf region and in the United 
States. The Saudi action in 1973 was a stab in the back for 
the twin pillar policy and its basic goals, the free flow of 
the region's oil. Saudi Arabia, under King Faisal' s 
leadership in 1973, fully recognized that among outside 
powers, the United States, because of its continued 
commitment to the security of Israel and its friendly 
relations with the more moderate Gulf states, had a unique 
Hearing before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations, 
94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, 8. 
48Department of State Bulletin. Vol. LXXII, no. 1867 (7 
April 1975), 467. 
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ability to play an affective role in the search for a 
comprehensive Middle East pace. 
The gradually increasing linkage became quite clear 
during the Carter administration. In his remarks to 
community leaders on March 20, 1980, President Jimmy Carter 
stated that his Camp David peace initiative between Egypt 
and Israel in 1978 was tied to the Persian Gulf stability. 
He said: 
This is intimately tied in with the Persian Gulf 
stability, with the threat to the region in 
Southwest Asia by the invasion of the Soviet Union 
[Afghanistan], and with energy supplies for our 
country and also with an overdependence of our 
nation on imports of oil from the region 
countries. There is nO'way to separate these 
issues. 49 
Although his goals for the Middle East were basically 
the same as his predecessors, President Carter took an even 
more active role as a peace conciliator and mediator in 
search for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. While committed 
to Israel's security and survival, he .also gave Arab leaders 
assurance of his awareness of their needs and concerns. In 
1978 President Carter received a great credit for helping to 
get President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of 
Israel to sign a peace agreement at Camp David, with the 
49public Papers of the President of the United States: 
Jimmy Carter (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1981), Book 1, 1980-1981. 
99 
u. S. as a full partner, which was considered as an 
outstanding diplomatic triumph. 50 However, 1979 began with 
the fall of the Shah of Iran and ended with the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. These events were pre-conditions 
for a major shift in u.S. policy in the Persian Gulf region. 
It appears clear that the twin pillar policy associated with 
the Nixon Doctrine and the reliance on local power, mainly 
Iran and Saudi Arabia, did not prevent direct and unilateral 
use of u.S. power to maintain stability in the region in 
order to protect its vital interests. 
The 1979 events forced a transition in America's role. 
The U.S. lost Iran as one of its greatest allies in the 
Middle East. The revolution of 1979 replaced the most pro-
western ally in the region by a rabidly anti-American 
Khomeini regime. This had a great influence on the world oil 
market. The Iranian shortfall of oil production doubled oil 
prices from $12.81 per barrel in 1978 to $23.50 in October 
1979. 51 The American hostage crisis and the growing concern 
among smaller Gulf states for their security and their loss 
of confidence of the American responses all had a great deal 
of influence on the adoption of the Carter Doctrine. 
50Philip, 203. 
51Bernard Reich, "The United States and Iran: An 
Overview," in u. s. Congress. Joint Economic Corruni t tee. 
Economic Consequences of the Revolution in Iran, 1979, 
10-14. 
100 
According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Carter Doctrine 
recognized that the security of the United States had 
become interdependent with the security of three central 
and inter-related strategic zones consisting of Western 
Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East-Persian Gulf 
area. Among them, the Persian Gulf appeared to become a 
significant strategic zone in U. S. Security Planning. 52 
The second threat to U.S. interests in the region came after 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This Soviet threat 
brought with it another challenge to U. S . pol icy and 
interest in the region. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary 
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affair under the Carter 
administration, described U.S. interest in the Gulf as long-
standing, major and interrelated. He outlined the factors 
effecting U.S. interest in the region, which he believed 
that since the British withdrawal, had changed little in 
nature but have grown in importance: 
• The area's strategic location and its 
significance to maintaining a global strategic 
balance, 
• The significance we place on the sovereignty and 
independence of these countries as part of a 
more stable world, 
• The world's vital need for the region's oil, and 
• The importance of these states in international 
finance and development and as markets for our 
goods and technology. 
52Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of 
the National Security Advisor 1977-1981 (New York: Farra, 
Straus, Giraux, 1983), 443. 
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As he referred to the growing importance of the region to 
u.s. and its allies' interests, Saunders also said: 
We then spoke of the vital flow of Gulf oil to our 
NATO allies and our friends east of Suez. Now we 
ourselves have become excessively dependent upon 
Gulf oil.53 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan represented a 
serious threat to the security of the Persian Gulf region 
and indeed, to the vi tal interest, mainly oil, of the 
United States and its allies. In his address before the 
Council on Foreign Relations in New York City on March 6, 
1980, Defense Secretary Harold Brown said: 
Oil is the lifeblood of modern industrial 
societies. Sixty percent of the world's imported 
petroleum comes from this region: about 13% of the 
oil consumed in the United States and much higher 
percentages for our allies--45% for Germany and 
75% for France and Japan. The loss of this oil to 
the economies of the West and the industrialized 
Far East would be a blow of catastrophic 
proportions. 54 
Secretary Brown also defined U.S. interests related to the 
Gulf region as: 
• To insure access to adequate oil supplies, 
• To resist Soviet expansion, 
• To promote stability in the region, and 
• To advance the Middle East peace process, while 
insuring--and indeed, in order to help insure--
the continued security of the state of Israel. 55 
53 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 80, no. 
(October 1980), 1. 
54Department of State Bulletin, vol. 80, no. 
(October 1980), 1. 
55Ibid. , 63. 
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As the 1970s closed with these two events--the loss of 
Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 1980s 
opened with how to respond to these challenges. In fact, the 
Carter administration's response to these two crises had 
two aspects. The first, related to crisis management, 
presented short-term measures to deal with the present 
situation. These included economic sanction, diplomatic 
efforts through the United Nations aimed at punishing Iran 
for holding American hostages and the Soviets for invading 
Afghanistan, increased u.S. naval deployment to demonstrate 
American resolve to friends and enemies alike, and 
diplomatic missions to the Gulf region to reassure the pro-
Western regional clients of continued U.S. commitment to 
their security and stability. The second aspect was the 
adoption of a long-term military strategy to replace the 
defunct twin pillar doctrine as a basic framework for U.S. 
policy in the region. This involved increasing demand for 
building a U.S. force protection capability to deal with 
contingencies in the region. Therefore, the Carter 
administration decided to rely more heavily on the U.S.'s 
own capability to protect western interest in the region. 56 
In his State of the Union address on January 23, 1980, 
President Jimmy Carter stated that: 
These two acts--one of international terrorism and 
one of military aggression--present a serious 
56Acharya, 49-50. 
challenge to the Uni ted States of America and 
indeed to all the nations of the world. 
I am determined that the United States will remain 
the strongest of all nations, but our power will 
never be used to initiate a threat to the security 
of any nation or to the right of any human being. 
We seek to remain secure--a nation at peace in a 
stable world. But to be secure we must face the 
world as it is. Three basic developments have 
helped to shape our challenges: 
• The steady growth and increased proj ection of 
Soviet military power beyond its borders; 
• The overwhelming dependence 
democracies on oil supplies 
East; and 
of the Western 
from the Middle 
• The press of social and religious and economic 
and political change in the many nations of the 
developing world--exemplified by the revolution 
in Iran. 57 
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In the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, the Carter 
administration took immediate steps to shape up its 
weakened position in the Gulf region. At this point, the 
U.S. was dropping its non-interventional stance of the past 
decade and was prepared to use its own military forces to 
protect its interest in the Persian Gulf.58 Defense Secretary 
Brown stated that: "In the protection of those interests 
including the protection of the oil flow from the Middle 
East, we will take any action that is appropriate including 
the use of military force. ,,59 
57Department of State Bulletin, vol. 80, no. 2035 
(February 1980), A. 
58Gordon Murray, ed., Conflict in the Persian Gulf (New 
York: Facts on File, 1981), 123-24. 
59Paul C. Bradley, Recent Uni ted States Policy in the 
Persian Gulf, 1981-82 (Thomson and Rutter Inc., 1982), 87. 
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In fact, the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan were the motives behind the 
adoption of the Carter Doctrine. The Doctrine was a 
definitive statement of u.S. policy to meet the strategic 
threat posed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
President Carter, in his State of the Union address in 
January 1980, declared: 
Let our position be absolutely clear, any attempt 
by any outside force to gain control of the 
Persian Gulf region would be regarded as an 
assault on vital interests of the United States of 
America and such an assault will be repelled by 
any means necessary, including military force. 6o 
The Carter Doctrine signaled to the Soviet Union the 
willingness of the United States to use force in the Gulf 
to protect its vital interests. It sought to create the real 
expectation of U.S. military action if the Soviet Union 
attempted to siege the Gulf oil fields or cut off the west's 
vital oil lifeline from the region. Washington underscored 
the firmness of commitment by ordering an overflight of the 
Gulf by B-S2 strategic bombers in January 1980 following the 
Soviet troops movement near Iran. 61 The Carter Doctrine, in 
fact, reflected the beginning of the direct U.S. involvement 
in the region. With the fall of the Shah, whose removal 
60Department of State Bulletin (February 1980), B. 
61Charles"G. McDonald, "U.S. Policy and Gulf Security 
Into the 1980s," in U. S. Policy Towards the Persian Gulf, 
ed. Robert G. Darius, John W. Amos, and Ralph H. Magnus 
(Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institutions Press, 1980), 100. 
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undermined any continued application of the Nixon Doctrine 
regarding the Persian Gulf, the Iranian pillar had fallen, 
and the Saudi pillar was too weak to protect western 
interest. 62 
On the other hand, the Carter Doctrine was too backed 
up with the newest military option, the Rapid Deployment 
Forces (RDF). The RDF had been in the planning stages for 
several years and was intended to enhance the u.S. military 
presence in the Middle East. Initially, it was to consist 
of three Marine brigades of 5,500 each to be ready by 
1985. 63 However, the RDF concept was subjected to criticism 
both by outside experts and in the Congress. Senator Edward 
Kennedy, who saw the unilateral and unlimited u.s. 
commitment embodied the Doctrine as "hazardous and 
ineffective."64 Criticism of the Doctrine was not in fact 
related to the needs for strengthened u.S. military force to 
meet any future challenges to u.S. interest in the Gulf. It 
was, however, to the ability of the Carter administration to 
back the Doctrine with the level of force it needed. 
Senator Robert Dole accused the Carter Doctrine of being 
"nothing but a propaganda that the Soviet will pay little 
620re Gold, "Toward the Carter Doctrine: The Evolution 
of American Power Projection Policies in the Middle East, 
1947-1980," in Spiegel, Heller and Goldberg, 120. 
63McDonald, 100. 
64Congressional Record, 30 January 1980: S651-S653. 
106 
attention to."65 However, an overall evaluation of the 
Doctrine ended with congressional approval supporting the 
commitment to use u.s. military force to ensure western 
access to Persian Gulf oil. 66 Actually, security and 
stability of the region, containment of Soviet influence, 
and ensuring the free flow of the region's oil were the 
primary objectives of U.S. policy in the region during the 
Carter administration with its support of the idea of a more 
active and direct role of U.S. military force. 
The Reagan Doctrine, unlike previous doctrines, had 
less direct consideration to the Middle East in terms of 
urgency. According to Sanford Lakoff, the Truman Doctrine 
was tailored to apply to Turkey and Iran as well as Greece. 
The Eisenhower Doctrine led to the first dispatch of U.S. 
marines to Lebanon. The Nixon Doctrine led the United States 
to rely on Iran to be the policeman of the Persian Gulf and, 
to a lesser extent, on Israel as a stabilizing force in the 
area to the west of the Gul f. The Carter Doctrine, in 
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and to the 
overthrow of the Shah in Iran, announced a resolve to 
protect vital interests in the Gulf by any means necessary, 
including military force. Although the Reagan Doctrine, 
while once more sweeping and less specific than any of its 
65Congressional Record, 1 February 1980: S808-S809. 
66New York Times, 2 December 1979, A16. 
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predecessors, it too carried implications for the Middle 
East. 67 
The Reagan administration policy toward the Middle 
East was in fact less motivated by the idea of the 
importance of the region to the United States' interests. 
It has been viewed generally by the conventional Cold War 
strategy and the general commitment to resist the spread of 
Soviet influence to the region by a variety of ways. 
However, the main theme of the doctrine regarded the Middle 
East has been reflected in a set of active policies for the 
region, in particular: 
1. A commitment to Israel's security and to 
cooperation with Israel for the sake of common 
interests in regional stability. 
2. Support for and cooperation with pro-western or 
moderate Arab states, chiefly Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, and Jordan, for the sake of maintaining 
ties to the Arab world and of preventing the 
internal subversion or external overthrow of 
these regimes, and in the expectation that 
these states will play some role in protecting 
western access to oil and cooperate with the 
United States in the event of an emergency 
requiring direct U.S. intervention. 
3. Readiness to mediate in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, in the belief that amelioration of 
the Palestinian issue would greatly improve 
Arab attitudes toward the United States. 
4. Readiness to interject U.S. forces in order to 
safeguard western access to Middle East oil. 
5. Readiness to use diplomatic pressure and force 
(where it is not counter productive) against 
terrorism on the understanding that terrorism 
67Sanford Lakoff, "The Reagan Doctrine and U. S. Policy 
in the Middle East," in Spiegel, Heller and Goldberg, 127. 
is a form of low-intensity warfare directed 
against western interests by hostile states 
with indirect assistance from the Soviet 
Union. 68 
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The Reagan administration policies in the Middle East 
were driven by the standard attitude of the containment 
policy and the idea of resisting the Soviet influence and 
threats to the vital interest of the west in the region. 
Its commitment to the security of Israel and cooperation 
wi th Israel for the sake of common interests has been 
affirmed by the Reagan administration by verbal commitment 
and, even more importantly, by tangible actions. President 
Reagan declared that after the fall of the Shah, Israel 
remained the one regional ally on which the United States 
could still count. 69 The Reagan policy supported and 
implemented the Carter administration's effort to equip a 
U.S. force for possible use in the defense of the west's 
vital interests in the Persian Gulf oil resources. The 
Reagan administration recognized that the western allies 
and Japan depend heavily on oil imported from the Gulf and 
decided to support the continuing effort to build the RDF 
to protect the west's interest in the region. As a result, 
the Reagan administration announced in June 1987 that the 
United States would re-flag Kuwaiti oil tankers operating 




which has been considered as an attempt to use u.s. force 
to protect its interest in the region. 7o 
Another attempt by the Reagan administration to use 
U.S.military force in the Middle East was the determination 
to resist terrorism. The destruction of the u.s. Marine 
barracks in Lebanon in 1982, the hijacking of the cruise 
ship Achille Lauro in 1985 which had been forced by aircraft 
from the American Sixth Fleet to land in Italy, and the 
major use of force to combat "state terrorism" come in April 
1986, with the raid on Libya. All indicated the 
administration attempt' to use U. S. military force to 
protect U.S. interest abroad. 71 
Regarding the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran War, the United States 
found itself facing another threat to its interest in the 
region after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
loss of the Shah in Iran. This threat came from the fear of 
another· oil shock and the possible threat to the 
conservative regimes in the region by the spillover of the 
conflict. Yet, while the situation was very serious, the 
United States had little chance to influence the course of 
events. 72 At the time, the United States had no diplomatic 
relations with either side. Cooperation with Iran was 
70Ibid., 135. 
71John Dumbrell, American Foreign Policy: Carter to 
Clinton (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997), 84. 
72Washington Post, 25 September 1980, A36-37. 
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impossible in regard to the hostage crisis, and the case of 
Iraq was also hostile. On the other hand, an attempt by the 
u.s. to take sides with either Iraq or Iran was restricted 
by a fear that any help it might extent to either side could 
push the other towards Moscow. Also, the United States 
feared that a clear victory for either side would jeopardize 
its interest in the region. 73 
The nature of u.s. policy toward the Gulf during the 
Iran-Iraq war was influenced by these considerations. It had 
four basic objectives. 
1. to ensure the continued free flow of oil. 
2. to seek a balance of power between both sides so 
that neither achieved victory, 
3. to keep the Soviets out of the conflict or to 
gain a dominant position in either side, and 
4. to ensure the security and survival of the 
conservative regimes in the region. 74 
However, the concept of neutrality in the conflict was 
not fully followed by the Reagan administration. In fact, 
the U. S. policy makers were determined to protect the 
Uni ted States I interest and friendly regimes from the 
continuation of hostilities in the Gulf. The Reagan 
administration increased its commitment to Saudi Arabia 
securi ty and strengthen U. S. -Saudi military cooperation. 
The sale of the AWACS package to Saudi Arabia, which also 
73U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
War in the Gulf. A staff report, 98th Cong., 1984, 9. 
74Acharya, 127. 
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linked to the long-term strategy in the region, became a 
symbol of growing u.s. concern over the future consequences 
of the war in the Gulf.75 
The second shift in the Reagan administration's 
neutrality policy toward the war was the beginning of a 
u.s. tilt towards Iraq, :in an effort from the 
administration to keep the balance of power intact, after 
the Iranian advance during the third year of the war. This 
policy was adopted by the Reagan administration in order to 
achieve the no-winner equation of the war. 
During 1984 the Reagan administration's political 
support for Iraq became more clear by the removal of Iraq 
from the list of unfriendly states, and blaming Iran for 
continuation of the war. 76 In addition, the political-
diplomatic support for Iraq was backed by economic means. 
A U.S. commodity credits was made available to Iraq for the 
purchase of u.S. agricultural products, and the u.S. Banks 
encouraged by the Reagan administration to extend credit 
guarantees to an Iraqi pipeline construction proj ect. 77 
Although a full diplomatic relations between the u.s. and 
Iraq has been established in November 1984, and the Reagan 
administration's support for Iraq was apparently extended 
75Ibid., 130. 
76Middle East International, 29 June 1984. 
77U.S. Congress, House committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Development in the Persian Gulf, June 1984, 51. 
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into the strategic arena. 78 According to Amitav Acharya, this 
included intelligence information, in the form of photos 
taken by u.s. satellites and reconnaissance aircraft, on 
Iranian positions and installations which were, or would 
be, targets of Iraqi bombing missions. Later the CIA 
established a direct secret link between Baghdad and 
Washington to improve the communication channels 
transmitting u.s. intelligence, William Casey, reportedly 
encouraged Iraq to carry out more raids on Iranian 
installations. 79 
Apart from the Cold War politics, the Reagan Doctrine 
offered American sponsorship to all enemies of communism in 
the developing world. 8o According to John Dumbrell, in regard 
to the Middle East, the Reagan administration officials 
oriented their understanding to the problems of the Middle 
East within a framework provided by containment theory and 
geopol it ical security considerations. Strategic consensus 
for the region was the declared goal. Richard Burt of the 
State Department told the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 
March 1981 that the new administration: 
viewed the Middle East, including the 
Persian Gulf, as part of a larger politico-
strategic theater, the region bounded by Turkey, 
Pakistan and the Horn of Africa and we view it as 




treatment to insure a favorable balance of 
power. 81 
113 
The Reagan Doctrine's main obj ecti ve regarding the 
Middle East was in fact the continuation of the standard 
u.s. policy toward the region. It added new dimension to the 
ways u.s. policies have been carried out, with its 
overriding concern with the Soviet challenge, its readiness 
to use force in defense of western interests, and its 
willingness to support states and movements whose aims are 
compatible with those of the United States. 82 Although the 
Reagan Doctrine reflects a recognition that u.s. interests 
in the region are multiple. The Middle East energy sources 
are vital to the security of the West, the region's trouble 
spots are potential flashpoints for conflict with the 
Soviet Union, the importance of the region as a marketplace 
for u.s. manufactured goods and arms sales the commitment 
of the u.s. to the security of Israel, all are multiple 
factors combined with the general attitudes of u.s. policy 
in the region. The Reagan Doctrine is no different. 
However, the ways of how it was carried out are what 
discriminated the doctrine from the previous ones. The use 
of u.s. military force against state-sponsored terrorism, 
as in Libya, the use of force against unfriendly regimes in 
Central America, and re-flagging the Kuwaiti oil tankers 
81Ibid., 81. 
82Sp iegel, Heller and Goldberg, 139-40. 
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during the Iraq-Iran War are clear evidence of the direct 
u.s. intervention against any threats to its interest in 
the Middle East. After the announcement of the Reagan 
Doctrine, u.s. Central Command (US CENTCOM) was established 
in Tampa, Florida on January 1, 1983. Its responsibility 
encompassed all of the Gulf nation including Afghanistan, 
Iran, Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, and two non-
Arab States in Africa, Ethiopia and Kenya. B3 
The Bush administration policy towards the Middle East 
was more aggressive and decisive. The invasion and 
occupation of oil rich Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 set in 
motion a crisis that would remain at the forefront of 
international agenda for seven months. President Bush 
responded to the invasion by pulling together an 
international coalition authorized by the United Nations 
Security Council to oppose Iraq. In his August 8, 1990 
speech announcing the first deployment of U. S. forces in 
'" 
Saudi Arabia, President Bush declared: 
Four simple principles guided our policy. First, 
we seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete 
withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. 
Second, Kuwait I s legitimate government must be 
restored to replace the puppet regime. And third, 
my administration, as has been the case with every 
president from President [Franklin D.] Roosevelt 
to President [Ronald] Reagan, is committed to the 
security and stability of the Persian Gulf. And 
83Ismael and Ismael, 62. 
fourth, I am determined to protect the lives of 
American citizens abroad. 84 
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The Bush administration directed a major diplomatic 
initiative aimed at Security Council adoption of a 
resolution to authorize the use of force against Iraq if it 
did not withdraw from Kuwait. The campaign culminated in the 
adoption of the Security Council's resolution 678 on 
November 29, which set January 15 as the deadline for Iraq 
to pullout of Kuwait. After that, the resolution authorized 
the member states to use all necessary means to enforce 
previous U.N. resolutions demanding the withdrawal. Once the 
U.N. deadline passed, Bush acted swiftly. On January 16, he 
ordered coalition forces to begin a sustainable bombing 
campaign against Iraq. On February 24, after thirty-eight 
straight days of bombing, the allies launched a ground 
offensive into Kuwait and Iraq, which totally defeated Iraqi 
defenders. On February 27, President Bush announced a cease-
fire and declared Kuwait liberated. 85 
With the election of Bill Clinton to the presidency, 
the Clinton administration remained committed to expanding 
the Arab-Israeli peace. Although the president's foreign 
policy in several parts of the globe were being sharply 
84public Papers of the President of the United States: 
George Bush (Washington, D. C.: u. S. Government Printing 
Office, 1991), Book II, 1108. 
85The Middle East, 8th ed. (Washington, D. C. : 
Congressional Quarterly, 1995), 90. 
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criticized by the Republicans, the Middle East was 
perceived as an area of success for Clinton. 
Secretary of State Christopher sought to build on this 
success by conducting shuttle diplomacy between Syria and 
Israel. Clinton lent the prestige of his office to this 
enterprise by meeting with President Asad on January 16, 
1994 in Geneva. President Clinton facil i tated the peace 
treaty on September 13, 1993, at a sun-drenched ceremony on 
the White House lawn, where Yitzhac Rabin and Yasir Arafat 
shook hands and their foreign ministers signed a historic 
document, the first ever between Israel and the P.L.O., 
recognizing each other and agreeing on the outlines of a 
plan to end their long conflict. 86 So, from the rapidly 
changing scenario of the Middle East it is discerned that, 
during the Clinton administration, the United States saw 
all four of its traditional goals in the Middle East 
advanced: 
1. The security of Israel was improved by the weakening 
of Iraq, during the Gulf War and the conclusion of peace 
agreements between Israel and the P.L.O. and Jordan, 
2. The same agreements brought by tangible hope that a 
second objective might be achieved--a permanent Arab-Israeli 
peace, 
3. Although the United States remained dependent on 
Persian Gulf oil for a growing share of its energy needs, 
86Ibid., 98. 
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the victory over Iraq preserved u.s. access to that oil. 
The success also strengthened u.s. strategic relationships 
with Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf oil producing states. 
4. The collapse of the Soviet Union had eliminated 
Moscow from the Middle East picture ending fears that 
conflict in the Middle East could touch off a super power 
confrontation. 87 
The significant importance to the west of the Middle 
East in general and the Persian Gulf in particular, goes 
beyond the political and strategic location of the area to 
the world political stability. The Middle East as the 
world's largest energy source and rich market for investment 
became significantly important for the economic well-being 
of the western industrial nations. Economic interests, on 
the other hand, are the most important factors which 
affected u.S. policy toward the region. 
Oil 
The western industrial nations and Japan became more 
dependent on Persian Gul f oil after World War II. As 
mentioned earlier, historically the u. s. oil companies 
introduced the first major element of u.s. interest in the 
region. In the late 1930s, the Arabian-American Oil Company 
(ARAMCO) introduced the first element of the commercial 
interests of the u.s. in Saudi Arabia. In its first years in 
87Ibid., 100. 
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the country, ARAMCO had found itself in the grocery 
business, the refuse collection business, hardware and other 
businesses; it provided health services, education, 
sanitation, banking, housing, telephone, road construction, 
trucking and many others. By the mid-1960s, ARAMCO was 
buying $16.9 million worth of construction and services a 
year from Saudi Arabia firms. It also set up a home 
ownership program under which Saudi Arabia employees have 
bought more than 6,500 homes. 88 ARAMCO, which later became a 
mostly state-owned company, handles all but about 2 percent 
of total Saudi production. The four u.S. "parents"--Exxon, 
Standard Oil of California, Texaco, and Mobile--still own 40 
percent of ARAMCO's producing assets. 89 The Saudi efforts 
to take over ARAMCO's assets was by far the widest Saudi-
u.S. economic issue. In June 1978, it was reported that the 
u.S. partners had already been paid nearly $3 billion--about 
half the value of their oil producing and refining assets--
exclusive of their huge gas-gathering, power-generation, and 
other industrial projects in the kingdom. 9o 
The importance of the Middle East oil to the U. S. 
became one of the main considerations of the policy makers 
in the United States through the years since its discovery. 
88George Lenczowski, Uni ted States Interests in the 
Middle East (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute 




Aside from such broad considerations, which derive from 
u. S. interest in having heal thy trading partners to buy 
American made goods, the u.s. has a specific interest in 
oil sales to Europeans and Japanese markets. Of oil produced 
by u.s. firms outside the United States, over two-thirds 
come from the Middle East and North Africa--mostly Libya and 
Algeria. 91 In addition, worldwide United States income from 
direct petroleum investments abroad, during the 1960s, was 
$1.8 billion in 1966, in which over $1.1 billion, more than 
half, come from the Middle East and Libya. Indirectly, 
American investments in the Middle East stimulate purchases 
by the nations of the area of American capital goods, petro-
chemicals and other products, service, and management fees. 
Many American wage earners working for United States firms 
in the Middle East and North Africa, also remit substantial 
portions of their pay to the United States. 92 In fact, 
imported oil had become a critical factor in the economic 
security of the west. Between 1950 and 1973, oil imports as 
an energy need of the U.S., Europe and Japan increased from 
30 percent to about 53 percent by 1973. 93 According to Walter 
J. Levy, oil consumption in the non-communist world 
91Lenczowski, 41. 
92Ibid. 
93U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, 
Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations, 
Military Construction Appropriations for 1984: Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Military Construction 
Appropriations, Part 5. 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, 358. 
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increased from 10 million barrels daily in 1950 to 39 
million in 1970, and projected 67 million for 1980. u.s. oil 
consumption increased from 7 million barrels daily in 1950 
to 15 million in 1970, and projected 21 million for 1980. 94 
Accordingly, because of growing u.s. dependence on Middle 
East oil, the United States became more aware of the rising 
price of the region's oil. During the 1970s, as a result 
of two major political events, namely the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
War and the Arab oil embargo associated with it, and the 
1979 Iranian revolution, the price of oil dramatically 
increased causing a significant impact on the world 
financial market. 
According to John K. Cooley, because of growing u.s. 
dependence on Middle East oil and the rising price of the 
oil, the u.s. trade deficit in 1977 reached a record $26.7 
billion, of which $7.5 billion is attributed by the 
Department of Commerce to the imbalance of u.s. trade with 
the Near East and North Africa. Figures are likely to be 
higher for 1978 and 1979. 95 Cooley also referred to the 
importance of the area to the U. S . economy during the 
1970s. He said: 
. the area probably never has been of such 
vital importance to the United States as in 1979. 
Events like the upheaval in Iran, the resulting 
94Walter J. Levy, "Oil Power," in Foreign Affairs 49, 
no. 4 (July 1971): 552. 
95Cooley, 491. 
world shortfall of Iranian oil, and the new 
uncertainties this has brought to the Arab states 
of the Persian Gulf oil reservoir, which supplies 
better than 60 percent of the west's energy needs, 
have an inescapable economic impact here. 96 
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It has been fully recognized by the policy makers in 
the United States that the region's oil is so vital to the 
u.S. economy. In the words of Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant 
Secretary of State in 1972, "The American interest in the 
Gulf tends to be characterized in terms of oil." According 
to Sisco, American companies are heavily invested in the 
development of the oil resources of the region, and the 
returns in their investment have made substantial balance 
of payments·. 97 
Actually, the main concern in the Persian Gulf region 
is oil. The dependence of the industrial nations, including 
the U.S. on oil imported from the region has been well 
documented. The region holds approximately 55 percent of the 
world's reserves and in recent years has provided as much as 
28 percent of the U. S., 61 percent of European and 70 
percent of Japanese imports. 98 Therefore, any threat to win 
oil supply or to dictate its price, particularly at a time 
of tight balance between supply and demand could threaten 
the economies of the western nations. 
96Ibid., 489. 
97Department of State Bulletin (4 September 1972), 242. 
98Bruce R. Kuniholm, Persian Gulf and Uni ted States 
Policy (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books), 35. 
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Ensuring continued free flow of the region's oil and 
its reasonable price became a primary objective for the 
policy makers in the United States. In order to achieve 
that, stability and security of the region are so vital to 
the national interests of the United States. Richard N. 
Cooper, Under Secretary for economic affairs, in his 
address at Brown University on March 7, 1980, referred to 
the stability of the region and its relations to the 
economic security. He said: 
A world in which 60% of crucial commodity comes 
from 14 nations, with the supply heavily 
concentrated in a political unstable area, in not 
a comfortable one. And the medium-run outlook 
promises to be more worse rather than better, with 
prospective demand outrunning prospective supply. 
This outlook has several implications. The first 
is slower world economic growth, with possibly 
devastating implications for developing nations. 
The second is more inflation, with its corrosive 
effect on our own institutions. The third is that 
it will give rise to divisive competition among 
oil-consuming nations for the limited supplies of 
oil, with a corrosive effect on political harmony 
among allies. Finally, it suggests a dangerous 
vulnerability to interruptions in supply which may 
come about as a consequence of political turmoil 
or by military action, e.g., a Soviet move into 
the Persian Gulf.99 
Actually, maintaining stable and friendly relations 
with the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, after the 
loss of Iran in 1979, are crucial to the economies of the 
United States and its western allies. The 1973 Arab oil 
embargo was clear evidence to the importance of the 
99Department of State Bulletin (October 1980), 33. 
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region's friendly attitudes toward the United States and 
its western allies. According to Amitav Acharya, the 
embargo--which involved a decision by the participants to 
cease all exports to the United States and the Netherlands, 
accompanied by a 5 to 10 percent cut in their oil 
production--had grave economic consequences for the 
consuming nations in general and the United States in 
particular. The producer states raised oil prices from about 
$3 a barrel in 1973 to over $11 per barrel by January 1974. 
For the United States, the embargo caused a reduction of 
some 2.7 mbd in imports by 1974, and the increase of the 
price of oil led to a U.S. GNP loss of about 2.5 percent in 
1973-1974, equivalent to $30 billion of prevalent prices. lOO 
In his statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and 
the Middle East in the U.S. Congress, Acting Deputy 
Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs Gerald A. Rosen 
said: 
Today [July 1, 1980] the United States receiving 
about a million barrels a day less oil than a year 
ago, but U.S. payments for imported oil in 1980 
are expected to reach $90 billion. This import 
bill will make it harder to master inflation and 
overcome the current recession. lOI 
Also in his remarks, Rosen recognized the importance of the 
free flow of the region's oil by saying that: 
I f we are unprepared to cope with reduced oi 1 
supplies, the result would be a rapid bidding up 
lOOAcharya, 9-10. 
lOlDepartment of State Bulletin (October 1980), 39. 
of world oil prices which would impose tremendous 
economic costs on the u.s. Any interruption of 
these reduced supplies--whether by accident or 
political design--would impose still more serious 
costs .102 
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Moreover, it has been noted that the world oil market 
was directly effected by events in the Persian Gulf region. 
Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, the world oil market 
noticed a dramatic change in the issue of supply and demand 
equation. On the other hand, the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War 
caused an increase of production and sharp fall in prices. 
However, the region's oil became more relevant to the u.s. 
during the 1980s. This trend was evident in 1986 when Vice 
President George Bush appealed to the Saudis to stabilize 
the oil price situation after most of the oil companies' 
decisions to cut their exploration budgets. 103 In this case, 
the Gulf still remain the most important source of oil to 
the United States to meet any future or sudden increase in 
world oil demand. The growing demand for Gulf oil by the 
United States was fully represented by the House of 
Representatives Committee on economic stabilization remarks 
on August 7, 1990. Their subject was "U.s. Economic and 
Energy Security Interests in the Persian Gulf," chaired by 
representative OAKAR who in his opening statement said: 
It was almost exactly two years ago (on July 14, 
1988) that our subcommittee held its first hearing 
on the impact of events in the Persian Gulf vis-a-
102Ibid., 37. 
103Acharya, 8. 
vis U.S. energy security and economic stability. 
Since then, we have held nine hearings on various 
aspects of this one subject. 
Our findings were summarized in an extensive 
statement to the full House last year, which I 
wish to make a part of this record. We expressed 
our deep concern at that time over the growth of 
U.S. dependency on imported oil. We pointed out 
that President Reagan made a formal finding that 
oil imports of approximately 38 percent 
"threatened to impair the national security." 
What did we see happen? Last year the dependency 
ratio climbed to 42 percent, and for the first 7 
months of 1990, climbed again to 45 percent of 
U.S. consumption. There are some estimates that 
the dependency ratio will be more than 50 percent 
for 1990. 104 
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The Gulf states provided almost half of the world 's 
oil imports. Because their absorptive capacity is, at least 
in the short run, limited in relation to their enormous oil 
reserves, they have considerable flexibility in production 
policy. These Gulf countries have generally been on the 
moderate side in OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries) price issues, and they have tended to produce 
more than their domestic needs as an effort to help meet 
international demand .105 
The commercial and financial dimensions of the 
region I s oil in U. S. policy was related to the economic 
activities of the oil multinationals, whose estimated 
104U. S. Congress, House Cornrni t tee on Banking, Finance 
and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, 
U.S. Economic and Energy Interests in the Persian Gulf: 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, 
101st Cong., 2nd sess., 7 August 1990, 2. 
10SDepartment of State Bulletin (October 1980), 6. 
126 
capital investment in the Gulf were at some $50 billion, 
which the annual income from these investments was equal to 
half the U. S. balance of payment deficit at that time .106 
In fact, these states are very significant to the U. S. 
economy. 
Market 
The oil producing countries in the Persian Gulf had 
gradually become an important market to the United States 
investment. Following the dramatic rise in the oil revenues 
of the region as a result of the price increases in the 
1970s, the Persian Gulf states have been acquiring the money 
to expand imports on a huge scale, making the region the 
fastest growing market for U.S. goods and services. 107 
A State Department report to the Congress in 1973 
stated that the Persian Gulf is an area which will provide 
almost unlimited opportunities for the sale of every kind 
of U.S. goods and services. It is an area which is ideally 
complimentary to the high technology and management 
services that the United States can provide. 10B 
106Robert M. Burrel, The Persian Gulf, The Washington 
Papers, No.1 (New York: New York Library Press, 1972), 4. 
107U. S. Congress, House Cornrni t tee on International 
Relations, The Persian Gulf, 1975: The Cotninuing Debate on 
Arms Sales: Hearing before the Commi ttee on International 




Among all states in the region, Saudi Arabia became 
the largest market for u.s. goods and services during the 
1970s and 1980s, Joseph W. Twinan, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, told 
Congress on July 1, 1980 that the U.S.-Saudi economic ties 
has expanded significantly. According to Twinan, in 1980, 
about 37 percent of U.S. exports to the Middle East and 
North Africa are going to Saudi Arabia. 109 
However, in 1980 U.S. exports to the Gulf countries 
exceeded $7 billion a year, representing about one-half of 
U.S. sales to. the Middle East. Sales to these countries said 
a state department official in 1980, provide employment for 
some one-quarter million - Americans .110 U. S. commercial 
interest in the region significantly increased through the 
years. Trade with the Middle Eastern region, especially the 
oil producing countries, became an important factor for the 
balance of payment to the U.S. economy. The establishment of 
the Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation (JCEC) between 
Saudi Arabia and the U. S. in 1974 provided a symbolic 
economic relationship between the two countries. The 
commission is considered an important instrument for 
furthering the U.S.-Saudi economic relations. Through the 
JCEC in 1978, American companies had won contracts worth $23 
billion. The number of American companies licensed to work 
109Department of State Bulletin (October 1980), 43. 
llorbid., 7. 
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in the kingdom had risen to 173 by the end of 1978. 111 
Treasury Department Director of Saudi Affairs, Bonnie 
Pounds, in 1978 said: 
Saudi Arabia was the largest u.S. market in the 
Middle East and the United States expected to do 
more than $4 billion in business in the kingdom by 
the end of 1978; projections indicated that 
overall Saudi imports would reach between $18 and 
$20 billion, some 25-30 percent more than the 1977 
import level. 112 
According to John K. Cooley, in order to stabilize the 
economy and to enhance the balance of payment with those 
oil exporting countries, the U.S. policy makers, both the 
Congress and various executive departments reportedly 
encouraged U.S. export sales to recycle oil revenues from 
the major oil exporters, like Saudi Arabia, to help offset 
the imbalance, strengthen the dollar, protect jobs and 
otherwise stimulate the U.S. economy. 113 
The huge amount of oil revenues the Gulf states had 
gained during the 1970s helped to finance a massive 
development program with an ever-growing demand for 
western, especially U.S., goods and services. Saudi Arabia 
alone in its five year development plan, 1975-1980, has 
deposited $142 billion for this purpose. As one U.S. trade 
official points out, the region lacks trained manpower and 





must be imported, and "U.S. industry is highly qualified to 
respond to this demand for high-technology products and 
services. "114 In its report to Congress, the U. S. General 
Accounting Office on October 26, 1977 stated that: 
Oil sales account for 95 percent of Saudi Arabia's 
total revenues, and increases in prices from an 
average $3.28 a barrel in 1973 to $10.46 in 1974 
have given the Saudis unprecedented resources for 
both military and economic development. Increased 
spending for economic development has heightened 
the Saudi demand for American goods and services. 
In 1974, 31 percent (about $1.8 billion) of Saudi 
Arabia's imports come from the United States. The 
U. S. Embassy stated that 1975 U. S. exports to 
Saudi Arabia were about $2.5 billion; in 1976 they 
had risen to $3.5 billion. ll5 
Accordingly, the number of U. S. business firms in 
Saudi Arabia is increasing. U.S. officials point out that 
more than 270 such firms have offices in Saudi Arabia, and 
the number of U. S. government employees and American 
businessmen in that country is also increasing. Embassy 
officials estimated that 25,000 Americans are in Saudi 
Arabia "during this time. 116 
Arms Sales 
A major component of U.S. trade has been armaments. 
The United States had emerged by 1975 as the largest 
supplier of weapons and military services to the countries 
114Ibid. 
115U.S. General Accounting Office, 5. 
116Ibid. 
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in the Persian Gulf region. With the adoption of the twin 
pillar policy by the Nixon administration and the Shah's 
desire to fill the power vacuum after the British 
withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, Iran became the largest 
purchaser of American made military equipment in the 
region. Between 1972 and 1978, Iran ordered $19.5 billion 
worth of arms from the United States. One Congressman has 
referred to this as the most rapid build-up of mili tary 
power under peace time conditions of any nation in the 
history of the world. 117 With the U.S. encouragement and 
support of the modernization of both Iran and Saudi Arabia 
military conditions, through massive arms sales, between 
March 1970 and March 1977, Iran's defense budget increased 
approximately from $880 million in 1970 to $9.4 billion in 
1977. A U.S. Senate committee report in 1976 pointed out 
that Iran is considering to purchase additional 
sophisticated military equipment from the u.S. as a 
proposed arrangements of "weapons for oil."IIS According to 
Andrew D. Pierre, the Iranian market became a bonanza for 
U.S. weapon manufacturers, both by government to government, 
and by private contractors, under the guidance of the 
Department of Defense. Some, like the Grumman Corporation, 
were able to gain financial support from the Shah of Iran 
117Murray, 25. 
1ISU.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, u.s. Military Sales to 
Iran. A staff report, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., July 1976, iii. 
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for its new weapon system. At the time of the downfall of 
the Shah in 1979, u.s. military sales to Iran worth $12 
billion was waiting delivery over the next 5 years. 119 
The second largest purchaser of u.s. arms after Iran 
during the Shah's regime was Saudi Arabia. After the British 
withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, u.S. policy had been to 
encourage Iran as well as Saudi Arabia to assume primary 
responsibility for the security of the Persian Gulf. The 
growing u.S. military commitment in Saudi Arabia is designed 
to support the u.s. foreign policy objectives in the region 
which are: 
1. insuring continued access to Saudi Arabia's 
tremendous oil resources and its air space and 
ports. 
2. encouraging a politically stable, moderate 
Saudi Arabia to play a construct i ve role in 
Middle East affairs, and 
3. protecting u. S. access to the growing Saudi 
market for imports .120 
Unlike Iran, about 63 percent of u.S. military sales 
to Saudi Arabia have been for military construction managed 
by the U.s. Army Corps of Engineers. The huge u.S. military 
construction programs of the Corps were estimated by some 
sources in 1978 to be $24 billion for the entire Saudi 
119Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), 142-
56. 
120U.S. General Accounting Office, 4. 
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program. 121 In his statement before the Congress on November 
4, 1975, Lt. General Howard M. Fish said: 
The Army Corps of Engineers is an active 
participant in the construction program, 
fulfilling management requirement to insure that 
program objectives are attained for the Saudi 
government. The Saudi government and the United 
States have entered into foreign military sales 
agreements which provide for the delivery of 
military equipment, technical services, and 
assistance to the Saudi Arabian government in 
return for cash payment .122 
Accordingly, between 1971 and 1980, U.S. military sales to 
Saudi Arabia, worth over $33 billion. Most of the military 
expenditures were focused on construction and training, 
managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers which at the 
end of the 1970s held projects in the country worth more 
than $20 billion. 123 In addition, the U.S.-Saudi military 
corporation continued through the 1980s. The centerpiece of 
this was the 1981 sale of the AWACS (Airborne Warning and 
Control System) package to Saudi Arabia at a total price of 
$5 billion. The AWACS package was part of a U.S. military 
commitment to the security of the region, which included the 
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) , including 
121Cooley, 500. 
122U. S. Congress, House Committee on International 
Relations, Subcommittee on International Political and 
Military Affairs, Mili tary Sales to Saudi Arabia: Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on International Political and 
Mili tary Affairs. 94th Cong., 4 November and 17 December 
1975, 2. 
123Congressional Budget Of fice, The Effect of Foreign 
Milita~ Sales on the u.s. Economy. Staff working paper, 23 
July 1976, 7-9, 17. 
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Saudi Arabia, Kuwai t, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Oman, as a u.S. commitment to their security 
and to strengthening their ability to defend themselves 
against any Soviet or Soviet supported threat. By helping 
the GCC states defend themselves, the United States could 
avoid politically risky and potentially counter-productive 
intervention in low-level conflicts in the Gulf. Thus, u.s. 
security assistance to the regional countries could 
compliment the whole u.S. security plan for the region and 
enhance, but not substitute, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task 
Force (RDJTF). However, in addition to the security issue, 
the economic factor remained a valid one. See Table 5. 
TABLE 6 
u.s. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO THE GULF COOPERATION 
COUNCIL STATES 
(in millions u.S. dollars) 
Type of 
Assistance Bahrain Kuwait Oman 




Total no. of Military 
Student Trained 
(1983-1987) 78 1,196 
a Figures are for 1974-1987 period. 














Source: Statement of General George B. Crist, Commander-in-Chief, 
u.S. Central Command Before the Defense Policy Panel of the 
House Armed Services Committee, March 17, 1987. 
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Among all the GCC countries, Saudi Arabia continued to 
be the largest buyer of u.S. military equipment by a 
substantial margin. The AWACS deal was the most important 
one between the United States and Saudi Arabia during the 
1980s .124 
Investment in the United States Market 
The only three Arab countries in the Gulf, except Iraq, 
with financial surpluses available for investments are Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Because 
of their traditional economies and small populations, these 
states could not spend a substantial portion of their oil 
revenues after their local needs. However, much of their 
surplus was recycled to the west, especially to the United 
States. These countries, as members of OPEC, became very 
involved in many economic activities in the United States. 
According to Cooley, critics of the growing involvement of 
the United States and Saudi Arabia in each other's economies 
claim that U. S. Treasury data underestimates total OPEC 
surpluses since the oil price increase of 1973. This data 
shows that some $43.25 billion, or about one-quarter of the 
Treasury's estimated OPEC investible surplus, was invested 
in the United States from 1974. Treasury instruments, 
corporate stocks and bonds, and commercial bank deposits 
accounted for $31.8 billion, while direct investment, 
124Acharya, 130-35. 
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prepayment on u.s. exports and debt amortization make up the 
remaining $11.4 billion .125 
However, Cooley also referred to a study made by the 
American Jewish Committee of the subject prepared in October 
1978 which contends: 
These figures do not take into account two other 
ways that OPEC members funds are placed through 
third parties, and through substantial holdings in 
foreign branches of u.s. banks--the actual total 
of such investment in the United States could 
conservatively be estimated at $50 billion and 
another $10 billion were accounted for by Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates. The 
Saudi share must have been close to $50 billion--a 
sum which was probably increased by $10-$12 
bi Ilion in 1978. 126 
However, despite all critics, such as those who 
claimed that "Arabs are buying America," these investments 
provided substantial benefits to the u.S. economy. By cash 
availability in the u.S. money market, these petrodollars 
inflow reduced the need for government borrowing from the 
private sectors and kept interest rates lower, which in the 
end, helped to increase overall economic activities. 
On the other hand, these Gulf states required payment 
to their oil in u.S. dollars. As one study put it: 
The final customer who puts petrol in the tank of 
his car or oil under his heating boiler pays for 
the product in his local currency. The producer 
of the crude oil, however, requires payment in 
u.S. dollars. Accordingly, for this reason and by 
investing in the United States, the Gulf countries 
125Cooley, 495. 
126Ibid. 
helped to keep the U.S. dollar stronger against 
any other maj or currencies .127 
U.S. Interests in the Middle East: The Cold War Period 
136 
The Middle East assumed greater strategic significance 
during the period of the Cold War. The war generated 
requirements for access to military facilities J.n the 
region, alliance formation on the part of the United States 
and transfers by Washington of military supplies to favored 
friends and allies. In fact, during the Cold War period, the 
traditional U.S. interests in the Middle East were: 
1. Containment of expanding Soviet influence in 
the region. 
2. Ensuring access to Persian Gulf oil for USA 
and its West European and Japanese allies. 
3. Support for Israel's sovereignty and security. 
4. U.S. Arms Sales and Supply to Middle East. 128 
Containment of Expanding Soviet Influence in the Region 
As a matter of fact the main argument behind the 
containment policy of the Uni ted States was that the 
Soviets would gain wider influence in the Third World, 
achieving strength from this and use this strength to 
dominate the industrial regions of Europe and Asia 
127" Arabs Are the Dollar's Best Friends, Like It or 
Not," Far Eastern Economic Review (May 25, 1979): 54-60. 
128Phebe Marr and William Lewis, ed., Riding the Tiger: 
The Middle East Challenge After the Cold War (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1993), 2. 
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(Eurasia) and then would exploit Eurasia I s resources to 
threaten the United States. 129 In fact there was very little 
debate over whether the United States should attempt to 
limit Soviet influence in the Middle East. The proposition 
was widely accepted among the policy community in Washington 
that if the Soviet Union was allowed to obtain a dominant 
influence over the resources of the area, it would pose a 
substantial geo-political threat to the economic well being 
and military security of NATO countries and Japan. 130 So the 
primary U.S. interest in the Middle East was fixed by the 
policy makers as the containment of Soviet influence. Henry 
Kissinger in June 1970 clearly pointed out that the object 
of U.S. policies was "to expel the Soviet military presence 
(from the Middle East) before they become .... firmly 
established. "l31 The United States in the Cold War era 
adopted the means of confronting the Soviets, alliance 
building, super power cooperation and the political and 
economic development in the Middle East in order to contain 
the Soviet influence in the region. 
129Seymom Brown, On the Front Burner: Issues in u.s. 
Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984), 
135. Also see Ibid. 
130Kenneth A. Oye et al., ed., Eagle in a New World: 
American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era (Harper 
Collins Publishers, 1992), 109. 
131Kissinger I S remark on "expelling the Soviets from the 
Middle East" is quoted by Marvin and Bernard Kalb, 
Kissinger (New York: Dell 1975), 22. 
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Confronting the Soviets 
Confrontation has been one of the prominent means of 
attempting to oppose Soviet intervention in the Middle 
East, since World War II. President Truman bluntly informed 
Stalin in 1946 that the United States would not put up with 
Stalin I s failure to honor his war time agreement with 
Churchill for a withdrawal of British and Russian military 
forces from Iran at the end of the war. If the USSR did not 
honor its commitment, Truman warned, the United States would 
be compelled to bring this Soviet malfeasance before the 
newly formed Uni ted Nations and prospects for Soviet-
American political cooperation would be severely undermined. 
The President also strengthened his verbal demands wi th 
redeployment of U. S. naval forces. Stalin reassessed the 
stakes and pulled his troops behind the Soviet-Iranian 
border. 132 
In the 1973 October war, reacting to indications that 
President Leonid Brezhnev was preparing to dispatch Soviet 
paratroops into the Sinai to rescue the Egyptian third army 
corps from the Israelis, the Nixon administration put United 
States forces on a high alert status around the world and 
Kissinger announced that any Soviet military intervention 
would spell the end of the detente relationship. Brezhnev 
backed off and allowed Kissinger to work with the Israelis 
132Brown, 136. 
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in his own way to obtain a cease-fire with the Egyptians. 133 
In response to the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of 
Afghanistan and Islamic revolution of Iran, the Carter 
doctrine came into being with the establishment of the Rapid 
Deployment Force (RDF) (later known as Central Command) 
which would enable the United States to strike with massive 
force. It was aimed at repelling any attempt by the Soviets 
to gain control of the Persian Gulf region. 134 Throughout the 
Cold War, the U. S. was busy in building its confronting 
policy towards Soviet Union in the Middle East. 
Alliance Building 
Widening the containment line in the Middle East by 
reinforcing existing alliances and constructing new ones 
has been the favorite policy of the U.S. governments since 
the Truman doctrine. This policy was seriously questioned 
after the overthrow of closest U.S. friend in the Middle 
East, the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and his replacement by 
anti-western, anti-American regime led by Ayatullah 
Khomeni. Even the alliance building strategy was re-
instituted with trumpets at the start of the Reagan 
administration under the banner of "Strategic Consensus." 
133Ibid., 137. 
134Elise Boulding, ed., Building Peace in the Middle 
East: Challenges for States and Civil Society (Boulder and 
London: 1994), 177. Also see Lawrence Freedman and Efraim 
Karets, ed., The Gulf Conflict 1990-97 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1991), 5. 
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The heyday for alliance building in the Middle East was the 
period of Foster Dulles I tenure as secretary of State 
(1953-1959) .135 Foster Dulles promoted the security agreement 
between Britain, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey known as Baghdad 
Pact. The Iraqi withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact led to the 
United States effectively joining the remaining Baghdad Pact 
nations by renaming the alliance as the Central Treaty 
Organization (CENTO). 
This network of alliances in the northern tier of 
north-west Asia would consti tute a barrier to Soviet 
penetration of the Persian Gulf Middle East region. 
Alliance building was another major Cold War device of the 
United States for Soviet containment. 
Super Power Cooperation 
This was the means of containing the Soviet influence 
that was initially adopted by the Carter administration. 136 
The main theme of the super power cooperation theory was 
that the Kremlin can be induced to moderate its aims and 
behavior in the region, provided that the United States 
accepts the Soviet Union as an equal partner in efforts to 
get the local parties to resolve their differences and also 
135Brown, 138. 
136President Carter took the guidance for super power 
cooperation from the Brooklings Institution study, toward 
peace in the Middle East, in which Zbigniew Brezezinski had 
a large hand. See Ibid., 141. 
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as a guarantor of the peace. This philosophy was reflected 
in the October 1, 1977 joint U.S.-Soviet call for a 
reconvened Geneva Conference .137 But opposition to such a 
joint Soviet-American approach to Middle Eastern affairs 
came from countries in the region which did not want to be 
treated either as objects of a super power condominium or 
as parts of the super powers mutually agreed upon spheres 
of influence. Anwar Sadat's historic trip to Jerusalem in 
November 1977 to start the first direct negotiations on a 
peace settlement between an Arab state and Israel was 
prompted in part by his fears of precisely such results 
from the October 1977 joint Soviet-American statement. 
Political and Economic Development 
A fourth approach attempted to limit the Soviet 
Union's influence in the Middle East by reducing the need 
of the societies in the region to become dependent on Soviet 
help for security or economic well being and by reducing the 
susceptibility of the local regimes and movement to 
subversion by Moscow leaning revolutionaries. This approach 
was based on the premise that Soviet influence in the region 
supposedly will be reduced as the countries in the area gain 
in national self confidence and political stability. The 
resultant economic prosperity might also help build up a 
substantial middle class committed to political and economic 
137Ibid. 
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liberalism. 13B Under this approach U.S. policies l.n the 
Middle East were exclusively directed toward country and 
regional development objectives. The containment of Soviet 
influence was simply a by-product. The main advantage of 
this policy was that it did not require the recipient of the 
U.S. assistance to compromise their third world and domestic 
legitimacy by sacrificing Cold War nonalignment for the role 
of U.S. pawn. It also provided a rationale for U.S. decision 
makers to favor relatively progressive governments who were 
committed to work toward liberal modernization and to bring 
pressure on traditional governments like Saudi Arabia to 
institute domestic reform before they fall victim to the 
revolutionary tides sweeping the region. 139 
Ensuring Access to Persian Gulf Oil 
During the Cold War period Persian Gulf oil supplied 
the life blood of America and its west European allies 
especially the industrial societies. 
A denial of access to Persian Gulf oil would threaten 
the security and well being of the United States. The United 
States imports about 40 percent of the oil it consumes and 
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Persian Gulf. Western Europe imports more than 80 percent, 
of which approximately 60 percent comes from the Persian 
Gulf .140 
Even as prices for oil from the Persian Gulf quadrupled 
during the 1970s and as the Arab oil producers demonstrated 
that they could and would embargo oil exports to countries 
140Ibid., 144. 
144 
supporting Israel, the import dependence pattern of the 
western industrial countries and Japan was not substantially 
altered. 
Actually about 66 percent of the world's known 
recoverable oil reserves are located in the Persian Gulf; 
only 2.6 percent are found in the United States and 1.9 
percent in western Europe (Table 7) .141 Therefore how to 
ensure access to Persian Gulf oil was the prime concern of 
the United States throughout the Cold War period. The two 
most obvious ways of attempting to ensure access to Persian 
Gulf oil were (1) to cultivate friendly relations with oil 
producing countries, and ( 2 ) to maintain military 
capabilities for intervention against hostile governments 
or movements and for direct seizure of the oil production 
faci li ties .142 
Friendly Relations 
The cultivation of friendly relations with oil 
producing countries of the Middle East has been an 
important characteristic of U.S. policy since World War II. 
In the early post war period the U. S. and the western 
countries were engaged in oil exploration and had complete 
control over pricing. However, with the nationalization by 
141William C. Ramsay, "Oil in the 1990' s: The Gulf 
Dominant" in Phebe Marr and William Lewis, ed., Riding the 
Tiger (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 40. 
142Brown, 145. 
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Middle Eastern governments of oil resources and production, 
the United States has been deeply involved in negotiations 
with the producer-country governments and with the 
organization of' Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on the 
terms of trade, including price per barrel arrangements. 143 
Moreover since the oil producing countries had 
accumulated huge holdings of dollars and were able to 
recycle these petro-dollars by purchase or investments in 
the United States, friendly relations with these states 
were deemed necessary for the economic interest of the 
United States. In fact U.S. denial of friendly relations 
with the oil producing countries would be disastrous on the 
U.S. economy. Regarding the impact of Saudi Arabia, on U.s. 
economy Sheikh Yamani has pointed out: 
Saudi Arabia ... alone is in a position to inflict 
very severe damage on the world economy as a whole 
or on selected group of nations .... lf the Saudi 
simply cut production to the level needed to meet 
their own development, there would be ... depression 
in the United States in which the rate of 
unemployment would at least double. the price of 
oil would double and the inflation rate would 
rise .144 
143Ibid. 
144Yamani is quoted by Walter Levy in "Oil: An Agenda 




Whenever the U. S. access to the oil of important 
supplier countries is threatened, a debate comes in the 
U.S. policy circles over whether the United States should 
intervene militarily to secure access. Military intervention 
to counter any attempted strangulation of the industrial 
world by the oil producers was publicly contemplated by the 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Asked by Business Week 
magazine whether he had considered military action to secure 
oil at reasonable prices, Kissinger replied that this would 
be "a very dangerous course," but added: 
I am not saying there is no circumstance where we 
would use force .... It is one thing to use it in 
the case of dispute over price, but it is another 
where there is some actual strangulation of the 
industrial world. 145 
Actually, the United States deployed its mi Ii tary 
forces in the Persian Gulf in different phases of the Cold 
War. In 1979, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and 
Islamic revolution in Iran, the United States moved forward 
to the Middle East with the Carter doctrine which advocated 
any means including military option to foil any attempt by 
any outside force to control the Persian Gulf region. 146 
While the Reagan doctrine clearly supported the U. S. 
145Interview of Henry Kissinger by Business Week, 
January 13, 1975. 
146See the Carter Doctrine in Lock K. Johnson, America 
as a World Power: Foreign Policy in Constitutional Framework 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 88. 
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presence in the Gulf to ensure the access to oil, Ronald 
Reagan stated: 
The Uni ted States and its allies maintain a 
presence in the Gulf to assist in the free 
movement of petroleum, to reassure those of our 
friends and allies in the region of our commitment 
to their peace and welfare, to ensure that freedom 
of navigation and other principles of 
international accord are respected and observed -
in short to promote the cause of peace. 147 
Similarly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 
2, 1990, the United States deployed military in Saudi 
Arabia and led the multinational military operation against 
Iraq. The rationale behind the costly and bloody military 
operation was to ensure U. S. access to the oil of the 
Persian Gulf. 
Support for Israel's Sovereignty and Security 
Since the founding of the State of Israel in 1947-48 
the U. S. support to the Jewish nation in the Middle East 
originated primarily out of moral consideration. 148 The U.S. 
commitment to the Jewish nation in the Middle East was 
founded in the consensus of concern among American Jews and 
their fellow Americans for the fate of the Jewish people in 
the Middle East. This concern became aU. S. national 
147Vital US interests in the Persian Gulf, statement by 
President Reagan, May 29, 1987 in American Foreign Policy: 
Current Document 1987 (Washington, D. C.: Department of 
State, 1988), 428. 
148Brown, 150. 
148 
interest in reaction to the slaughter of millions of Jews 
by Hitler in World War II. 
The second important reason behind u.s. support toward 
Israel during the Cold War period was U. S. national 
security and national interests, which was ensured by the 
role played by Israel. In the Middle East, Israel 
successfully prevented victories by radical nationalist 
movements J.n Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen as well as in 
Palestine~ Israel has a predominant air force in the region. 
Israel's frequent wars provided battlefield testing for U.S. 
arros often against Soviet weapons. Israeli military advisers 
have assisted the contras, the Salvadoran junta and foreign 
occupation forces in Namibia and western Sahara. Their 
secret service assisted the United States in intelligence 
gathering and covert operations. Israel has missiles capable 
of reaching the former Soviet Union and cooperated with the 
U.S. military industrial complex, with research and 
development for new jet fighters, anti-missiles defense 
systems, and even strategic defense initiatives. 149 It is 
obvious that in the Cold War era u.s. material aid and 
political backing for Israel discouraged Israel's Arab 
opponents from becoming more dependent on Moscow or from 
using oil as a political weapon against the United States. 
Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pointed out: 
"Israel's obstinacy ... serves the purposes of both our 
149Boulding, 179. 
149 
countries best."150 It is clearly evident that, throughout 
the Cold War, the u.s. policy makers used Israel also in its 
national interest. Leading Israeli intellectual Ishwa 
Leibowitz noted: 
The existence of the Jewish people of 60 to 80 
generations ... was a heroic situation. We never 
got from the goyish world a cent. We supported 
ourselves. We maintained our own situations. Now 
we have taken 3 million Jews, gathered them there 
and turned them over to be parasites - parasites 
of America. And in some sense we are even the 
mercenaries of America to fight the war of 
American interest or what the ruling persons in 
America consider to be American interests. 15I 
u.s. Arms Sales in the Middle East 
During the Cold War period, the u.s. arms supply to 
the Middle East reflected a variety of important U. S. 
interests in the region. By this time the u.s. enlarged 
its role as a regional arms supplier. By the early 1980s, 
the United States was supplying arms to its Middle Eastern 
regional clients at the rate of $10 billion a year, a 
fourfold increase over the early 1970s.l52 The basic policy 
of arms sales to the Middle Eastern countries was directed 
by the 1950 Tripartite declaration between the United 
States, Britain and France to limit their transfer of arms 
l50Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1982), 621. 
151Ishwa Leibowitz, interview, Public Broadcasting 
System, 1987. Quoted in Boulding, 17-18. 
152Brown, 168. 
150 
to countries in the region in order to avoid an arms race 
between the Israelis and the Arabs. IS3 
But the restraints called for in the tripartite 
declaration were overwhelmed by Middle East complexities 
from the start. The agreement did not restrict the British 
and the French from supplying arms to their various Arab 
clients who were engaged in arms races against one another, 
and actually the Eisenhower administration encouraged 
Britain to arm Arab states that were willing to be allies 
of the NATO countries in containing Soviet attempts to 
penetrate the Middle East. 154 
The United States sponsored the Baghdad Pact of 1955 
between Britain, Turkey and Iraq and the U.S. rebuff of 
Egypt's request for arms turned Egyptian President Nasser 
toward the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union responded by 
arranging for their arms producing satellite Czechoslovakia 
to be Egypt's principal arms supplier. ISS 
The Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms deal threatened 
Israel's capacity to balance Egypt's military power and 
Israel looked towards its western allies, especially USA, 
UK and France, for additional arms. The U.S. and UK refused 





request for additional arms.156 Because France was anxious to 
divert Nasser from helping the Algerian rebels and led him 
toward the Israeli-Egyptian border by supplying arms to 
Israel. 
The U. S. replaced France as the principal arms 
supplier to Israel by the mid-1960s. France sloughed off 
this role once she had withdrawn from Algeria and no longer 
needed Israel as a counterweight to Egypt. Despite the arms 
deals between Egypt and the Soviet Union, the defeats of 
Egypt by Israel in 1956 and 1967 led many Arabs to believe 
these defeats were prompted by the poor qualities of Soviet 
arms. Some Arabs also believed the Soviet Union was not 
interested in seeing any Arab state or combination of Arab 
states achieve either parity with Israel or a military 
victory against it. 157 This mistrust arose over the quality 
of Soviet arms to the Arab states. The first Arab state that 
openly showed its disenchantment with the Soviet arms policy 
toward the Middle East was Egypt under President Anwar 
Sadat, who requested the withdrawal of Soviet military 
experts in 1972. 158 This move was not only motivated by 
Egyptian skepticism of Soviet claims of sincerity in 
supplying the Arab states with weapons to challenge Israeli 
lS6Ibid. 
1570mar Ali, Crisis in the Arabian Gul f (West Port, 
Conn, London: Praeger, 1993), 44-45. 
158Anwar el-Saddat, In Search of Identi ty (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1978), 228-231. 
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tactical step. Sadat was preparing to shift from total 
dependence on the Soviet Union to a dramatic opening in the 
relations between Egypt and the west, particularly the 
United States. He was convinced that he ought to reach a 
bilateral settlement with Israel with the help of the United 
States. However, before taking any step in the direction of 
peace with Israel, Sadat decided to prepare for the 1973 
October war in order to show that he was negotiating from a 
position of strength. 159 At that time Egypt was neither 
financially capable of buying arms from other sources nor 
politically on good enough terms with the u.s. to achieve 
that goal But the U.S. at that time established what was 
called a bridge to provide arms and ammunition to Israel 
during the war .160 The Nixon administration continued the 
transfer of arms to Israel initiated by Johnson 
administration. Following the 1973 war Nixon and Kissinger 
requested the Congress to authorize $2.2 billion in military 
aid to Israel to prevent a new imbalance from the large 
scale Soviet military supply of Egypt and Syria .161 Apart 
from this the Nixon administration also dramatically 
increased its military sale to Iran, Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan. The Iranian arms purchase jumped from $236 million 





buying only $4 million of arms from the United States in 
1969 bought nearly $6 billion in 1976. 162 Between 1950 and 
1987 Saudi Arabia purchased more than $30 billion of u.S. 
defense articles. Much of this was spent on sophisticated 
aircraft and ultra-modern air, naval and army bases. 163 
Jimmy Carter adopted a restrictive arms supply policy 
and issued a directive in May 1977 imposing a ceiling on 
further military sales. The Carter administration's 1978 
request for Congressional authorization of $4.5 billion 
worth of military aircraft to Israel, Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt reflected Carter's new attitude toward the utility of 
arms transfers as an instrument of u.S. diplomacy in the 
Middle East. 
The Reagan administration had no philosophical problem 
wi th the use of arms transfer as a prime diplomatic 
instrument in the Middle East. Not only did they willingly 
implement the arms deals their predecessors had negotiated, 
but they also actively explored opportunities to win 
friends, solidify alliances and make as many Middle Eastern 
countries as possible dependent upon u.S. arms supplies for 
their security. 
The 1981 arms package sold to Saudi Arabia (including 
five AWACs planes) was fully consistent with this 
162Ibid. 
163Text of American-Israeli Agreement of November 30, 
1981 in New York Times, 1 December 1981. 
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approach. 164 The Israelis protested that the 1981 U.S.-Saudi 
arms deal would alter the Arab-Israeli balance of power. To 
satisfy the Israelis, the Reagan administration responded to 
Israeli desire for a U.S. Israeli strategic cooperation 
agreement that would solidify the U. S. -Israel special 
relationship. The memorandum of strategic understanding 
signed in November 1987 by Secretary of Defense Weinberger 
and Israeli defense minister Sharon165 further alienated the 
Saudis. But the Reagan administration's reassurance to the 
Saudis that the U.S. was impartial on all major Arab-Israeli 
issues was considered by the Israelis as alarming because 
they believed it was a decided shift away from the U. S.-
Israeli special relationship. 
After the Islamic revolution of Iran and during the 
Iran-Iraq war of 1988, the Reagan administration increased 
U.S. arms sales significantly to Iraq aimed at weakening the 
Khomeni's Islamic revolution. In 1982 the Reagan 
administration opened the door for American sales to Iraq. 
Reagan took Iraq off the list of terrorist nations and in 
1984 he renewed U.S. diplomatic relations with Baghdad which 
had broken off since 1967. One study 166 shows that American 
sales to Iraq increased from $571 million to $3.6 billion 
164Brown, 170. 
165Text of American-Israeli Agreement of November 30, 
1981 in New York Times, 1 December 1981. 
166Lester H. Brune, America and the Iraqi Crisis, 1990-
1992: Origins and Aftermath. 
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between 1983 and 1989. In fact, the Reagan administration 
wanted to make Iraq a moderate. client state. 167 The Bush 
administration continued Reagan's policy towards Iraq until 
August 2, 1990. The above review shows that throughout the 
Cold War, U.S. arms sales to the Middle East was a core 
element in its virtual economic interest, which the U.S. did 
not want to damage. In fact, during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq 
war, the United States increased its arms sales to the 
Persian Gulf countries including Iran (see Table 8). 
TABLE 8 
TOTAL VALUE OF ARMS IMPORTS. 1984-1988 ($ millions) 
Exporting Countries Importing 
Countries USSR USA France China U.K. W.G. Italy 
Bahrain o 250 60 o 50 180 o 
Iran 5 10 100 2500 100 10 200 
Iraq 5400 o 3100 2800 30 675 370 
Kuwait 180 210 525 o 110 280 
Oman o 30 20 o 330 280 
Qatar o 10 300 o 20 o 
Saudi Arabia 0 5800 7500 2500 2100 o 
U.A.E. 20 350 o o 180 o 
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament, 1989. See Nozar 
Alaolmolki, The Persian Gulf Region in the Twenty-First 









According to Nozar Alaolmolki, since the end of the 
Persian Gulf War, nearly $40 billion worth of arms have 
been ordered from the United States, France and Britain by 
the GCC member states--the GCC states are: Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In 
1991-1992 Saudi Arabia purchased arms from the United 
States worth $13.751 billion. Kuwait also purchased arms 
worth $2.500 billion in 1992. 168 
Conclusion 
Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, U.S. interests 
in the Middle East changed significantly according to the 
needs and requirements of the United States. During the 19th 
century the United States basically had religious, 
philanthropic and academic interests in the Middle East. 
Prior to World War II, official U.S. interest in the 
Middle East was mainly limited to the defense of commercial 
interest, principally oil. The Cold War generated greater 
strategic significance in the Middle East. It created 
requirements for access to military facilities in the 
region, alliance formation on the part of the United States, 
and transfers by Washington of military supplies to 
strategic friends and allies. The establishment of Israel 
168Nozar Alaolmolki, The Persian Gulf in the Twenty-
First Century (Lanham, Md.: University of America Press 
Inc., 1996), 39, 56. 
157 
marked the beginning of extensive u.s. political, economic 
and military involvement in the Middle East. In fact, 
throughout the Cold War period u.s. had four major 
objectives in the Middle East: 
1. ensuring the security of Israel, 
2. containing Soviet influence in the Middle East, 
3. maintaining u. S. and western access to Middle, 
Eastern oil in the region and 
4. ensuring u.s. arms trade in the Middle East. 
Apart from this the United States also pursued several 
lesser policy goals that are related to its four main 
obj ectives including combating terrorism, preventing the 
spread of nuclear and chemical arms and improving economic 
and security ties with moderate Arab states. Actually during 
the 1970s when Britain abrogated all its defense 
responsibilities in the Gulf and the foreign oil companies 
gradually lost their oil concessions, u.s. interests in the 
oil became strategic as well as economic. With American 
involvement in Vietnam, President Richard Nixon adopted a 
strategy of transferring weapons to regional allies 
prepared to bolster their self-defense capabilities. In the 
Persian Gulf when the Shah of Iran signaled his willingness 
to become the Persian Gulf "Policeman," Washington accepted 
it. A 1972 Presidential decision initiated a major arms 
sales program for Iran but sought to balance it on the Arab 
side of the Gulf with arms sales to Saudi Arabia, which was 
well known as America's two pillar policy. 
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However, by the end of the 1970s this two pillar 
policy had begun to crumble. In the following year eruption 
of armed conflict between Iran and Iraq brought the Persian 
Gulf to the brink of instability, threatening western access 
to vital oil supplies. Toward the end of the 1980s a 
Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza shattered 
complacency about Israel's occupation of those territories 
and initiated an Arab-Israeli conflict. By the 1990s with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War 
poli tics, containment of the Soviet Union ceased to be a 
politico-military objective. 
CHAPTER V 
THE 1990-1991 GULF WAR 
Introduction 
Regarding the 1990-91 Gulf War, Shlomo Gazit wrote: 
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the subsequent 
political and military steps and their culmination 
in Operation Desert Storm carried out by an 
international coalition under US leadership, 
resembles a Greek tragedy: each of the actors 
wanted to halt the slide toward the war, yet fate 
willed otherwise. And it was fate that determined 
the course of events. l 
The invasion and occupation of oil rich Kuwait by Iraq 
on August 2, 1990, set in motion a crisis that would remain 
at the forefront of the international agenda for more than 
seven months. American President George Bush quickly 
declared the annexation of what Iraqi President Saddam 
Hussein called the "19th Province of Iraq" an unacceptable 
act of aggression. 2 President Bush responded to the invasion 
by pulling together an international coalition authorized by 
the United Nation's Security Council to oppose Iraq. Nearly 
lShlomo Gazit, "The Gulf War-Main Political and 
Military Developments," in War in the Gulf: Implications for 
Israel, ed. Joseph Alpher (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 
7 . 
2Donald M. Snow, Distant Thunder: Third World Conflict 




forty nations contributed combat forces, transport vehicles, 
medical teams and financial aid to the joint effort to force 
Iraq from Kuwait. The Persian Gulf crisis was the first 
major test of the effectiveness of the UN Security Council 
to confront international aggression in the post Cold War 
era. 3 President Bush and Secretary of State Howard Baker 
directed a maj or diplomatic ini tiati ve aimed at Security 
Council adoption of a resolution to authorize the use of 
force against Iraq if it did not withdraw from Kuwait. The 
campaign culminated in the Security Council's adoption of 
November 29, 1990 resolution 678, which set January 15 as 
the deadline for Iraq to pullout of Kuwait. After that, the 
resolution authorized member states to use "all necessary 
means" to enforce previous UN resolutions demanding the 
withdrawal. 
Once the UN deadline had passed, Bush acted swiftly. 
On January 16, once he ordered coalition forces to begin a 
sustained bombing campaign against Iraq, virtually every 
target of military significance in Iraq had been bombed. On 
February 24, 1991 after 38 straight days of bombing, the 
allies launched a ground offensive into Kuwait and Iraq. By 
early March 1991, the U.S.-led coalition force had driven 
the Iraqi army from Kuwait and occupied much of southern 
Iraq, completing the liberation of Kuwait. However, this 
3The Middle East, 8th edition (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995), 89. 
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chapter seeks to focus on the 1990-91 Gulf war. In this 
regard our discussion will center on three aspects: 
I. Background of the war 
II. Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
III. US response to the crisis 
Background of the Gulf War 
Historical Background of Kuwait 
Kuwait is a small country of 6,880 square miles (16,600 
sq. km.) with about 1.8 million people. 4 It is bordered on 
the south by the Neutral Zone of Saudi Arabia and on the 
north and west by Iraq. The 130 krn. border between Kuwait 
and Iraq has never been demarcated. The main Kuwaiti 
islands, Bubiyan and Warbah, face the Iraqi port of Umrnal 
Qasr and Iraq's sea cost. Bubiyan is about 1.6 km. from 
Kuwait and 8 km. from Iraq, while Warbah is about 3.2 krn. 
from Kuwait and 1 krn. from Iraq. These islands are critical 
to the security of Iraqi oil loading facilities in the Gulf. 
Kuwait is strategically exposed to pressure from Iraq, Iran 
and Saudi Arabia. It is particularly vulnerable to Iraqi 
pressure because Iraq can deploy its forces with only short 
warning. 5 
4Ewan W. Anderson and Khalil H. Rashidian, Iraq and the 
Continuing Middle East Crisis (London: Pinter Publishers, 
1991),99. 
5Ibid. 
___ - ________________________ ----1 
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Modern Kuwait had its origins ~n the middle of the 17th 
century. The rise of the Sheikdom of Kuwait under the ruling 
AI-Sabah family suggests that the town of Kuwait was built 
in the early 18th century (about 1716). Kuwait was first 
shown on a map produced by the Danish traveler Niebuhr. 
Before that, the name "Grane" had appeared in European 
documents used for trading in the region. 6 
As a small trade town, Kuwait was built by Barrak, the 
Sheikh of the Bani Khalid tribe, who ruled Eastern Arabia in 
the 17th century.7 The geographical position of Kuwait on 
the important Persian Gulf and desert caravan trade routes, 
allowed the Kuwaiti merchants to carry goods from Kuwait to 
the neighboring countries and the Mediterranean. This led to 
the growth of Kuwait in the 18th century. Kuwait's trade 
with India and Mediterranean countries increased 
continuously during the 19th century.B The ruling AI-Sabah 
was the first independent Emir of Kuwait. The AI-Sabah was 
chosen by the inhabitants of Kuwait in the tribal manner to 
administer justice and general affairs of the town. By the 
end of the 19th century, most of the Arabian peninsula was 
governed by the independent rulers who did not acknowledge 
the authority of the Ottoman Sultans. Instead, they 
7Abu Halirn Ahmad Mustafa, The Modern History of Kuwait 
(1750-1965) (London: Luzac, 1983), 1. 
BThe Middle East, 8th edition, 100. 
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established treaties of friendship with Great Britain. In 
the Anglo-Turkish convention of July 29, 1913, the territory 
of Kuwait was recognized as an autonomous khuza of the 
Ottoman Empire. Its territorial boundaries were defined and 
practical autonomy was conceded to the Kuwaiti Emir, Shaish 
Mubarak. Mubarak established a clearly independent status 
free from Ottoman influence. 9 
With the beginning of World War I and Britain fighting 
the Ottomans, Kuwait, under the leadership of Mubarak took 
the side of the British. After Mubarak's death in 1915, 
Kuwai t was ruled by Jabir, who was followed by Salim in 
1917. Jabir followed examples set by Mubarak and supported 
the British. Salim, a strict observer of the Muslim faith 
was sympathetic to the Ottomans. This attitude towards the 
Ottomans provoked the British to such an extent that they 
threatened Salim by declaring they would not respect the 
1899 agreement if Kuwait were subjected to foreign attack. 10 
However, Salim was determined to defend the entire territory 
of his Sheikhdom against any aggressor. 
In the meantime, Abd-al-Aziz, the ruler of Najd and al-
Hasa was not willing to accept the 1913 demarcation of 
9The 1913 agreement between the British and the 
Ottomans, agreed the borders of Iraq, Kuwait and Najd. 
According to that agreement, Kuwait's borders in the south 
extended to Jabal Munifa, about 160 miles south of its 
present borders with Saudi Arabia. This agreement was made 
when Kuwait was run by Sheikh Mubarakal-Sabah, the most 
powerful ruler in the Arabian peninSUla at the time. Ibid. 
lOIbid. 
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boundaries between Kuwait and his domains. The tension 
between Abd-al-Aziz and Salim increased when Kuwait was 
attacked by Ikhwan who was supported by Abd-al-Aziz. 
Britain intervened in the conflict and arranged the Uqir 
conference to solve the problem of the borders between 
Kuwait and Najd. 
Sir Percy Cox11 called Iraq, Kuwait and Najd together 
for a conference which was held at Uqir, the seaport of al-
Haso in 1922. Although the 5-day long conference was ended 
without any progress, Sir Percy Cox was determined not to go 
home without any settlement. He took the initiative and 
informed the parties that he would himself decide on the 
type and general line of the frontier, which ended the 
impasse. Sir Percy Cox took a red pencil and very carefully 
drew on the map of Arabia a boundary line from the Persian 
Gulf to Abal Anaisan, close to the Trans Jordan frontier.12 
This gave Iraq a large area of territory claimed by Najd. 
He also deprived Kuwait of nearly two-thirds of its 
territory and gave it to Najd, ignoring the previous Anglo-
Turkish agreement which had drawn the Kuwait boundaries. 
South and west of Kuwait proper, he drew out two zones, 
which he declared would be neutral and known as the Kuwaiti 
llSir Percy Cox was the British high official at that 
time who was working on matters of utmost importance; the 
settlement of differences over mutual borders. 
12H. R. P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbors (London: 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1956), 274. 
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Neutral zone and the Iraq Neutral zone. 13 The results of the 
al-Uqir conference were satisfactory for Iraq and allowed 
Abd-al-Az i z Ibn. Su 'ud of Naj d to gain terri tory at the 
expense of Kuwait. Kuwait lost two-thirds of its southern 
territories that extended 160 miles beyond its present 
borders. 
History shows that Iraq had long ambitions to exert 
political and military influence over Kuwait. These 
ambitions were realized immediately after the British 
withdrawal from Kuwait on June 19, 1961. The Iraqi 
revolutionary regime of Abdul Karim very quickly reacted to 
the British action. On June 25, 1961, Iraq laid claim to 
Kuwait on the grounds that the Sheikhdom was an integral 
part of Iraq.14 While the Iraqi government tried to convince 
Arab and world public opinion that Kuwait was an integral 
part of Iraq, Kuwait rejected the Iraqi claim vigorously by 
providing evidence that it had never belonged to Iraq. 
Beginning July 24, 1959, Kuwait successively became a member 
of the following international organizations: 15 The 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) , the Universal 
Postal Union (UPO) , the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), United Nation's Education, Scientific 
13Ibid. 
14Anderson and Rashidian, 102. 
15A. G. Mezerik, Kuwait-Iraq Dispute (New York: 
International Review Service, 1961), 6. 
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and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International 
Labor Organization (ILO). Membership in these organizations 
can be interpreted as an international recognition of the 
independence of Kuwait. On July 20, 1961, Kuwait became the 
member of the Arab League. Kuwait was admitted into the 
United Nations on July 29, 1961. Kuwait achieved full 
independence on June 19, 1961 In 1963 Iraq recognized the 
independence and complete sovereignty of Kuwait. 
Immediate Background of the War 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was not a sudden incident, 
but rather the outburst of Iraq's decades-long grievances 
over Kuwait. The following factors caused the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait: 
1. During the early 1970s, Kuwait was caught up in the 
Iraq-Iran dispute over the Shatt-al-Arab. Iraq's need to 
find some way to load large tankers without being vulnerable 
to Iranian military action and its reliance on a water way 
that was subject to silting and placed its parts within 
Iranian artillery range, led Iraq to seek a less vulnerable 
location. Iraq could not achieve such security within its 
own territory or territorial waters. Iraq's coastline was 
only 38 miles wide and the only port that was not dominated 
from the Iranian shore was dominated by the Kuwaiti islands 
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of Warbah and Bubiyan. 16 Having built up its port and naval 
facilities at Ummal Qasr, Iraq demanded access to Kuwaiti 
waters and territory to build an offshore oil loading 
facility with pipelines crossing Babiyan Kuwait refused 
this demand out of fear that Iraq may permanently seize the 
islands. Iraq sent troops into northern Kuwait on March 20, 
1973, occupying the island of Babiyan as well as the area 
surrounding the Kuwaiti border post at Samita and causing 
the closing of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. Relations steadily 
improved after 1975 and Iraq formally abandoned its claim to 
all of Kuwait. However, Iraq's claim over Kuwait as part of 
the former Ottoman province of Basra and as an integral part 
of the geographical unit situated to the southwest of the 
Shatt-al-Arab river--Iraq's neutral zone of access to the 
Persian Gulf--acted as a pretext to justify Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait .17 
2. The second important cause behind the war was the 
effect of the eight year long Iran-Iraq war which caused 
serious economic damage to Iraq and its domestic conditions. 
According to The Economist, prior to the invasion of Kuwait, 
Iraq's economy was in serious trouble, despite a 50 percent 
growth rate in 1989. Low oil prices did not help Iraq to pay 
16Anthony Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for 
Strategic Ability (London: Westview Press, 1984), 403. 
17Joseph Alpher, ed., War in the Gulf: Implications for 
Israel (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). 
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its large debt or to purchase essential imports. Iraq's 1989 
oil revenues were estimated at about $15 billion--not enough 
to pay for $11 billion of civilian imports (including $3 
billion of food imports), $5 billion of arms, $3 billion of 
debt repayment, and $1 billion of transfer by foreign 
workers. Oil and refined oil products are the source of 97 
percent of Iraq's exports. Iraq faced a 50 percent inflation 
rate, a food shortage and unemployment of soldiers who were 
to be demobilized from the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq's dependence 
on oil and imported food for its revenues increased many 
times over since its war with Iran. In addition, Iraq 
increased its dependence on imported raw materials and 
manufactures. In 1989, nearly half of all imports came from 
the United States and the European community, and 10 percent 
from Turkey. These domestic conditions were important 
factors prior to the invasion of Kuwait. 18 
3. The Iraqi regime accused Arab Emirates of launching 
an economic war against Iraq. Iraq demanded that the Arab 
states had been violating the organization of petroleum 
exporting countries (01?EC) quotas. In fact, Kuwait and 
Uni ted Arab Emirates were the maj or of fenders, as Iraq 
claimed. 
18The Economist's (11 August 1990) remark is cited in 
Nozar Alaolmolki, The Persian Gulf Region in the Twenty-
First Centu~: Stability and Change (Lanham, Md.: University 
of America Press Inc., 1996), 41-42. 
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Kuwait's OPEC quota was 1.5 million barrels a day, but 
for some time Kuwait had actually produced 2.4 million 
barrels a day, which was considered a maj or factor in 
depressing the prices of oil. Iraq argued that these 
depressed oil prices were making it impossible for Iraq to 
recover economically. The violation of oil quotas was 
considered by Saddam Hussein as economic war against Iraq.19 
4. Kuwait's importance to the international economy is 
far beyond its size. It sits atop the fourth largest oil 
reserve in the world. If Saddam could have added the 
Kuwai t 's oil resources to Iraq's and used his superior 
military might to bully Saudi Arabia and smaller Gulf oil 
states into supporting Iraq's position in OPEC, he could 
have dominated the oil production and pricing policies. 2o 
5. Iraq's effort to acquire nuclear weapons and its 
stocks of conventional, chemical and biological weapons made 
that country a long-term military threat to the entire 
Middle East and perhaps beyond. 21 
6. Iraq's government had demonstrated an appetite for 
military conquest and a capacity for shaking the security of 
the region. Since 1980, Iraq had invaded Iran, resorted to 
the use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers, and 
19Roger Hilsman, George Bush v. 
(California: Lyford Books, 1992), 72. 







fired ballistic missiles against Iranian citizens. In 
addition, it used poisoned gas against its own Kurdish 
population during a campaign to eliminate the Kurdish 
resistance movement. These aggressive acts, combined with 
the restrained world reaction to Iraq's behavior, gave Iraq 
the courage needed to invade Kuwait. 22 
7. Although Iraq had claimed victory in its war with 
Iran, there had been no profit in it. Iraq had a difficult 
time recovering from the war. Saddam Hussein sought help 
from Kuwait, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia. He argued that 
Iraq's long and costly war with Iran had not been Iraq's 
private business but the defense of the entire Arab world 
against Iran's shift in fundamentalism. He had made a number 
of demands. First of all, he wanted Kuwait, Emirates and 
Saudi Arabia to forgive their loans to Iraq. Second, he 
wanted Kuwait to pay Iraq 2.4 billion for the oil stolen 
from Iraq through eight wells dug into the Rumaila oil field 
on Iraq's side of the border. But all his demands were 
rejected by the fellow Arab leaders with the Emir of Kuwait 
in the lead. 23 
8. Iraq's ambition was to assume a leading role in the 
entire Arab world. It had expected to achieve it by means of 
the war against Iran, but the way it conducted that war on 




scene and eventually added to its harsh frustrations. The 
strategic advantages expected to achieve from a takeover of 
Kuwait were to make up for the earlier war time failures, 
and render Iraq a leading and pivotal Arab force after all. 24 
9. During the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein 
reestablished diplomatic ties with the United States, 
although Iraq had been identified as a terrorist state. 
These ties had been broken by Iraq in 1958. Since he opposed 
Iran and the Khomeni, he became the incarnation of the old 
saying, "The enemy of my enemy is my friend." To help Iraq 
in its war with Iran, the CIA passed to Iraqi intelligence 
services information on Iran gathered by its spy satellites. 
The U.S. extended agricultural credits to Iraq and American 
banks were encouraged to lend the Iraqis money. The Reagan 
administration remained silent when Iraq used intermediate 
range ballistic missiles against Iranian cities. As payment 
for his sacrifice in opposing the Iranian revolutionaries, 
he was rewarded with huge amounts of assistance, notably 
weaponry. His stock rose to the point that when an Iraqi 
missile slammed into the USS Starke, killing several 
Americans on a Kuwaiti reflagging mission, there was hardly 
a murmur of condemnation. Likewise, when he gassed Kurds 
within his own territory, the international system treated 
the act with disingenuousness, as a doubtful occurrence but 
an internal act under the circumstances. In fact, the end of 
24Alpher, 8. 
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the Iran-Iraq war left Iraq with an impressive arsenal of 
weapons. 25 After u.s. troops were sent to the Middle East, a 
joke going around the Pentagon was that if an American 
soldier got shot, it would probably be with a Soviet bullet. 
But if he was wounded by a chemical or biological warhead, 
the missile would probably have been designed by an American 
computer. Actually, this huge arsenal of weapons provoked 
Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait and made him confident to 
sustain its control over Kuwait. 26 
10. In spite of the strains in U.S.-Iraq relations, 
Saddam Hussein ironically seems to have had good reason to 
believe that the United States had· given him the green light 
to invade Kuwait. A few days before the Iraqi attack on 
Kuwai t, Hussein called on the .American Ambassador, April 
Glaspie. He repeated his complaints that Kuwait had violated 
the OPEC agreements on oil supplies and prices, and that 
Kuwait had stolen Iraqi oil by digging slant wells under the 
border to tap the oil deposits on the Iraqi side of the 
Rumaila oil field. Moreover, Hussein's feeling was that in 
1923, Great Britain gave Kuwait the two uninhabited islands 
that blocked the approach to the Iraqi port, fixing the 
borders of Iraq in such a way as to deny Iraq a port on the 
25Snow , 184. 
26Hillsman, 40. 
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Gulf. Saddam Hussein obviously thought that he had a strong 
case for moving against Kuwait. 27 
In his meeting with Ambassador Glaspie, Saddam Hussein 
threatened not only to use force against Kuwait, but also 
against the United States if tried to stop him. Ambassador 
Glaspie, acting on the instructions from President Bush and 
the State Department, replied that the "United States had no 
opinion on the Arab v. Arab conflict such as Iraq's dispute 
with Kuwait, although it opposed the use of force and 
continued to support its friends in the region. "28 Hussein 
interpreted this as U.S. permission to march into Kuwait. 
Moreover, Glaspie herself indirectly admitted that she knew 
of his intentions to attack Kuwait when she informed the New 
York Times in September 1990: "Obviously I did not think--
and nobody else did--that the Iraqis were going to take all 
of Kuwait. "29 
It is obvious that the United States clearly under-
estimated the Iraqi capacity to attack Kuwait despite the 
Iraqi threats. Ambassador April Glaspie explained to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 1991 that the 
reason for ignoring Saddam's warnings was that "We foolishly 
27Ibid., 43. 
28Haim Bresheeth and Nira Yuval-Davis, ed., The Gulf War 
and the New World Order (London: Zed Press Ltd., 1991), 62-
63. 
29The U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad was interviewed by the 
New York Times in September 1990. 
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did not realize he was stupid and impervious to logic and 
diplomacy. "30 
Any fair analysis of the situation should not hide any 
fact regarding this conflict. Saddam Hussein invited the 
u.s. ambassador to Baghdad on July 25, 1990. Although there 
were differences between the Iraqi and the u.s. versions of 
what happened in that meeting, Congressional leaders who had 
seen the coded cables received from the u. S. Embassy in 
Baghdad later confirmed the accuracy of the Iraqi version. 31 
While stressing the desire of the u.s. government to see the 
Gulf Crisis resolved peacefully, U. S. Ambassador April 
Glaspie, directed by the State Department and President 
Bush, may have misled Saddam Hussein regarding the position 
of the United States toward the situation in the Gulf. 
According to Omar Ali, Ambassador Glaspie made the 
following five mistakes: 
1. The ambassador did not sternly warn President Saddam 
Hussein that the u.S. government was aware of the 
concentration of Iraqi troops on the Kuwaiti borders and 
that the occupation would be met with force. 
2. On the contrary, the ambassador flattered Saddam 
Hussein and was apologetic for the campaign against him in 
the u.S. Congress and the media. The ambassador even told 
30Quoted Snow, 18. 
310mar Ali, Crisis in the Arabian Gulf (West Port, 
Conn., London: Praeger, 1993), 88. 
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Saddam Hussein that many in the United States agreed that 
the price of oil should go up to $25 per barrel. 
3. The U. S. ambassador again failed to warn Saddam 
Hussein when he informed her about his pledge to President 
Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, that Iraq would not use force while 
the negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait, expected to 
commence within a few days, were going on. In view of the 
drastic measures later taken by the United States 
unilaterally and through the United Nations, the ambassador 
should have informed Saddam Hussein that the charter of the 
United Nations contains other options to settle conflicts by 
peaceful means, options such as arbitration or referral to 
he ICJ. 
4. The ambassador made yet another mistake by informing 
Saddam Hussein that the US government did not have an 
opinion on the border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. 
According to Omar Ali, if that was the case, then why, after 
Iraq I s defeat, did the United States and Britain push 
through the Security Council the 1932 demarcation of the 
borders between Iraq and Kuwait? Why did the ambassador fail 
to inform President Hussein that the United States 
considered the border as agreed upon in 1932 as the legal 
frontiers between the countries? Or she could also have 
informed him that if Iraq refused to return to these 
borders, it would have to agree to submit the dispute to 
settlement by other peaceful means. For example, Egypt and 
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Israel were able to settle the dispute on Taba Coastal Strip 
with the help of the United States, which convinced the two 
countries to solve the dispute by peaceful means. Now 
Bahrain and Qatar have agreed to submit their borders 
dispute to the ICJ. After listening to Saddam Hussein 's 
explanation about the border dispute and Iraqi historical 
claims wi th regard to the border with Kuwai t, the UN 
Secretary-General suggested it would be helpful if Iraq 
agreed to submit the border dispute to the ICJ, but this was 
done after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Furthermore, Saddam 
Hussein might have wanted to know what the reaction of the 
United States would be if he decided to use force against 
Kuwait. 
5. The ambassador told Saddam Hussein that the United 
States did not have a defense treaty with any country in the 
Arabian Gulf. Although true, this statement may have been 
the final clue to Saddam Hussein I s decision to attack 
Kuwait. Many Arabs who sympathized with Iraq and who did not 
want to see a war between Arab countries described this 
interview as an enticement to Saddam Hussein. 32 
Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait 
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi military force, on order from 
Saddam Hussein, crossed the Kuwaiti border and occupied the 
entire country within six hours, after which Hussein 
32Ibid., 88-89. 
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announced that Kuwait was being incorporated into Iraq as an 
"eternal merger. "33 In fact, the world was visibly surprised 
when Iraqi forces moved across the border and overwhelmingly 
defeated the tiny Kuwait armed forces. The Emir, Sheik Jaber 
al-Ahmed al-Sabah and his entourage rapidly fled to Saudi 
Arabia. After the consolidation of occupation, Baghdad 
announced Kuwait as the nineteenth Province of Iraq.34 It has 
been reported that the Iraqi occupation was bloody and 
destructive. The Iraqi deliberately destroyed many of the 
country's wealth and assets, much of what had no strategic 
or military purpose or benefit, causing a flood of refugees 
out of Kuwait. In reaction, the Kuwaiti embassy in 
Washington hired publicity firms regarding the Iraqi 
destruction of occupied Kuwait, looting by the Iraqi troops 
for the country's wealth, torture and summary executions of 
Kuwaiti citizens, and more. The story of the daughter of the 
Kuwaiti ambassador who claimed that Iraqi troops took 
incubators from Kuwaiti children, is well known as an effort 
to gain public support to remove Iraq from Kuwait. This 
story proved false and became an embarrassing issue because 
it was part of the Kuwaiti pUblicity campaign. It became 
more embarrassing because she did not reveal her true 
identity as the daughter of the ambassador, as discovered 
33Hillsman, 45. 
34The Middle East, 8th edition, 111. 
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later by a journalist. 35 It was also reported that during the 
invasion, she was outside Kuwait. Ali charges that 
congressional supporters of Israel knew of her identity but 
failed to reveal it. 36 
u.s. Response to the Crisis 
Immediately after the Iraqi invasion, on August 2, 
1990, the United States demanded the immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and 
called for an emergency session of the United Nations.37 In 
fact, President Bush's primary concern on the day after the 
invasion was deterring an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia. The 
Saudi's massive oil reserves were vital to both U.S. and 
world economy. He called a full National Security Council 
(NSC) meeting to discuss the matter. 
General Colin Powell, head of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, pointed out the President called a full NSC meeting 
for 8:00 a.m. the next day. The talk was disjointed and 
unfocused, as much time was spent discussing the impact of 
the invasion on the price of oil and on how we should 
respond to Saddam's aggression. According to Powell, Bill 
35Ali, 92. 
36Ibid., 94. 
37Sherill Brown Wells, ed., American Foreign Policy: 
Current Documents (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 
1991), 455. 
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Webster, the CIA director, gave a bleak status report. He 
said: 
The Iraqis are within eight tenths of a mile of 
the Saudi border. If Saddam stays where he is, 
he'll own twenty percent of the world's oil 
reserves. And a few miles away he can seize 
another twenty percent. He'll have easy access to 
the sea from Kuwaiti ports. Jordan and Yemen will 
probably tilt toward him, and he'll be in a 
position to extort the others. We can expect the 
Arab states to start cutting deals. Iran will be 
at Iraq's feet. Israel will be threatened. 38 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saddam's threat to 
gain control over the Saudi oil became a major concern of 
President Bush and his National Security Council, most of 
whom would seek a military response to the crisis. 
President Bush drew a line in the sand for Saddam Hussein 
and went "the extra mile for the war option." The military 
option was immediately considered by the policy makers in 
Washington. Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf were already 
representing their military plan to the White House. A full 
scale military offensive deployment was prepared to move to 
Saudi Arabia. President Bush pressed the Saudi Arabian 
government to allow American soldiers to be stationed in 
that country to defend it from any attempt by Saddam Hussein 
to cross the border. President Bush had already made up his 
mind to send troops. Secretary Cheney was appointed to lead 
the delegation team to convince King Fahad to allow the 
deployment of u.S. military troops in his country. 
38Colin L. Powell, My American Journey: The 
Autobiography (New York: Random House, 1995), 462. 
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General Schwarzkopf, one of the most important members 
of the team, stated that only Secretary Cheney and he were 
to speak. According to Schwarzkopf, Secretary Cheney made a 
few remarks during the meeting with the king about the 
gravity of the situation, and then said: 
Here is the message that President 
instructed me to convey. We are prepared 
these forces to defend the kingdom 
Arabia. If you ask us, we will come. We 
no permanent bases. And when you ask 





us to go 
General Schwarzkopf briefed the king on the situation 
by showing the king satellite intelligence photographs of 
Iraqi missiles pointed at Saudi Arabia and Iraqi forces 
massing near the Saudi border. The king, after discussion 
among the members of the royal family, turned to Cheney and 
said, "Okay," allowing the deployment of U. S. forces in his 
country. 39 
Meanwhile the diplomatic issue quickly moved to the 
United Nations. The Americans and the Soviets took the lead 
in introducing a series of resolutions under Chapter VII of 
the U. N. charter. This chapter referred to action with 
respect to threats to the peace, breaches of peace, and acts 
of aggression. Under this charter, Article 39, 40, 41, 42, 
43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, and 51, all of which 
authorized the Security Council to act upon any given 
39Norman H. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn' t Take a Hero: The 
Autobiography (New York: Linda Grey-Bantam, 1992), 304-05. 
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situation to determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and decide 
what measures shall be taken in accordance with the 
situation. 4o The U.N. Security Council, led by the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union, introduce a series of resolutions under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. charter, which authorizes collective 
securi ty actions regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
These resolutions are: 
1. Resolution 660 (1990). Adopted by the Security 
Council at its 2932nd meeting on 2 August 1990. The Security 
Council, alarmed by the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 
by the military forces of Iraq, determining that there 
exists a breach of international peace and security as 
regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Acting under Articles 
39 and 40 of the charter of the U.N. 
a. condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 
b. demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and 
unconditionally all its forces to the positions in 
which they were located on 1 August 1990, 
c. calls upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately 
intensive negotiations for the resolution of their 
differences and supports all efforts in this regard, 
and especially those of the League of Arab States, 
40A. Leroy Bennet, International Organizations: 
Principles and Issues (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1991), 
445-47. 
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d. decides to meet again as necessary to consider 
further steps to ensure compliance with the present 
resolution. 
2. Resolution 661 (1990). Adopted by the Security 
Council at its 2933rd meeting on 6 August 1990. Reaffirming 
its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990. Noting that 
resolution 660 has not been implemented by Iraq and the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait continues with further loss of 
human life and material destruction, and called upon the 
adoption of resolution 661 by the Security Council acting 
under Article 42 of Chapter VII of the U. N. charter for 
economic sanctions against Iraq and demand Iraq's total and 
unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. 
3. Resolution 662 (1990). Adopted by the Security 
Council at its 2934th meeting on 9 August 1990. Recalling 
its resolution 660 (1990) and 661 (1990). Gravely alarmed by 
the declaration by Iraq of a "comprehensive and eternal 
merger" with Kuwait, demanding, once again, that Iraq 
withdrew immediately and unconditionally all its forces to 
the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990. 
4. Resolution 664 (1990). Adopted by the Security 
Council at its 2937th meeting on 18 August 1990. Recalling 
the Iraqi invasion and purported annexation of Kuwait and 
resolutions 660, 661, and 662, deeply concerned for the 
safety and well being of third state nationals in Iraq and 
Kuwait and demands that Iraq permit and facilitate the 
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immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of 
third countries and grant immediate and continuing access of 
consular officials to such nationals; Iraq take no action to 
jeopardize the safety, security or health of such nationals, 
in addition, compliance with the former resolutions. 
5. Resolution 665 (1990). Adopted by the Security 
Council at its 2938th meeting on 25 August 1990. Recalling 
its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 
(1990) and demanding their full and immediate 
implementation. 
6. Resolution 666 (1990). Adopted by the Security 
Council at its 2939th meeting on 13 September 1990. 
Recalling its resolution 661 (1990), paragraphs 3(c) and 4 
of which apply, except in humanitarian circumstances, to 
foodstuffs. Recognizing that circumstances may arise in 
which it will be necessary for foodstuffs to be supplied to 
the civilian population in Iraq or Kuwait in order to 
relieve human suffering. 
7. Resolution 667 (1990). 
Council at its 2940th meeting 
Reaffirming its resolutions 660 
Adopted by the Security 
on 16 September 1990. 
(1990), 661 (1990), 662 
(1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), and 666 (1990) considering 
that the decision of Iraq to order the closure of diplomatic 
and consular missions in Kuwait and to withdraw the immunity 
and privileges of these missions and their personnel is 
contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, the 
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international conventions of 18 April 1961 on diplomatic 
relations and of 24 April 1963 on consular relations, to 
both of which Iraq is a party, and the international law. 
Acting under Chapter VII of the charter of the U.N., the 
Security Council determined to ensure respect or its 
decisions and or Article 25 of the charter of the U.N., 
deeply concerned that Iraq, notwithstanding the decisions of 
the Security Council and the provisions of the conventions 
mentioned above, has committed acts of violence against 
diplomatic missions and their personnel in Kuwait, the 
council consider not only to express its immediate reaction 
but also to consider further concrete measures to ensure 
Iraq's compliance with the council's resolutions. 
8. Resolution 669 (1990). Adopted by the Security 
council at its 2942nd meeting on 24 September 1990. 
Recalling its resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 
recalling also Article 50 of the charter of the U.N. 
concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. 
9. Resolution 670 (1990. Adopted by the Security 
Council at its 2943rd meeting on 25 September 1990. The 
Security Council, reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990), 
661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990) 
and 667 (1990) condemning Iraq's violation of these 
resolutions and of international law, and the treatment of 
Iraqi forces of Kuwaiti nationals, including measures to 
force them to leave their own country and mistreatment of 
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persons and property in Kuwait in violation of international 
law. The Security Council determined to ensure by all 
necessary means the strict and complete application of the 
measures laid down in resolution 661 (1990), and to ensure 
respect for its decisions and the provisions of Article 25 
and 48 of the charter of the U.N. 
10. Resolution 674 (1990). Adopted by the Security 
Council at its 2951st meeting on 29 October 1990. Recalling 
its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 
(1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990) and 670 (1990). 
The Security Council stressing the urgent need for the 
immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait, for the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity, and of the authority 
of its legitimate government. Condemning the actions by the 
Iraqi authorities and occupying forces to take third state 
nationals hostage and to mistreat and oppress Kuwait and 
third state nationals, and the other actions reported to the 
Security Council such as the destruction of Kuwaiti 
demographic records, forced departure of Kuwaitis, and 
relocation of population ~n Kuwait and the unlawful 
destruction and seizure of public and private property in 
Kuwait including hospital supplies and equipment, in 
violation of the decisions of this Council, the charter of 
the U. N. 's, the Fourth Geneva Convent ion, the Vienna 
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Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and 
international law. 
11. Resolution 677 (1990). Adopted by the Security 
Council at its 2962nd meeting on 28 November 1990. The 
Security Council recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 
August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990 and 674 (1990) of 
29 October 1990, reiterating its concern for the suffering 
caused to individuals in Kuwait as a result of the invasion 
and occupation of Kuwait by IraqI gravely concerned at the 
ongoing attempt by Iraq to alter the demographic composition 
of the population of Kuwait and to destroy the civil records 
maintained by the legitimate government of Kuwait. 
12. Resolution 678 (1990). Adopted by the Security 
council at its 2963rd meeting on 29 November 1990. The 
Security Council, recalling, and reaffirming its resolutions 
660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 
662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 
665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 
1990, 667 (1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 
September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) 
of 29 October 1990 and 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990. 
Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq 
refuses to comply with its obligation to implement 
resolution 660 (1990) and the above-mentioned subsequent 
relevant resolution, in flagrant contempt of the Security 
Council. Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under 
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the charter of the United Nations for the maintenance and 
preservation of 
Security Council, 
international peace and security. The 
acting under Chapter VII of the charter, 
determined to secure full compliance with its decision: 
1. demand that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 
(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and 
decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to 
allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of 
goodwill, to do so; 
2. authorizes member states cooperating with the 
government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 
January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in 
paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use 
all necessary means to uphold and implement 
resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant 
resolutions and to restore international peace and 
security in the area; 
3. requests all states to provide appropriate support 
for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 
2 of the present resolution; 
4. requests the states concerned to keep the Security 
Council regularly informed on the progress of 
actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
the present resolution; 
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5. decides to remain seized of matter. 41 
In fact, soon after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the 
Bush administration decided to make the U.N. the center of 
international legitimacy for any actions against Iraq. The 
Bush administration launched a diplomatic campaign to carry 
out the diplomatic issue through the U.N. to create an anti-
Iraq consensus within the international community. As 
mentioned before, the Bush administration succeeded in 
building an international attitude against Iraq in the U.N. 
which ended with the adoption of many U.N. Security Council 
resolutions following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its 
aftermath. However, the Bush administration found that the 
Soviet Union agreed to use the UN charter as a justification 
for stopping Iraq's aggression. When Bush decided to make 
the U.N. the centerpiece for u.s. action, he never had been 
a U.N. champion, but to get help from other allies and to 
appeal to the moral sense of Americans, Bush found that the 
use of U.N. served the interests of both the Arab states and 
the Soviet Union, which would have had difficulty in simply 
backing the unilateral decisions of the United States. 42 
According to Lester, Bush and Secretary of State James Baker 
used every possible means to get unanimous U. N. Security 
41U.N. Security Council Resolutions on Iraq and Kuwait 
1990-1991 (1990), are available at gopher://gopher.undp.org: 
70/00/undocs/scd/scouncil/s90/32 accessed 9 February 1998. 
42Lester H. Brune, America and the Iraqi Crisis, 1990-
1992: Origin and Aftermath (California: Regina Books, 1993), 
58. 
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Council backing for the u.s. decisions and to maintain u.s. 
control of the military command in Saudi Arabia. Through 
phone calls, personal contacts, economic packages and 
diplomatic favors, Bush and Baker maneuvered UNSC votes much 
more than they could control votes in the u.s. Congress. 
These U.N.S.C. votes has been conducted as follows: 
August 2, 1990 - Resolution 660 
Condemns invasion. Demands unconditional and immediate 
withdrawal. 
Vote: 14 for, 0 against, 1 abstention (Yemen) 
August 6, 1990 - Resolution 661 
Imposes economic sanctions. Authorizes non-military 
measures to enforce trade sanctions. 
Vote: 13 for, 2 abstentions (Yemen and Cuba) 
August 9, 1990 - Resolution 662 
Declares Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void. 
Vote: Unanimous (15-0) 
August 18, 1990 - Resolution 664 
Condemns Iraq for holding foreign nationals hostage and 
demands their immediate release. 
Vote: Unanimous (1S-0) 
August 25, 1990 - Resolution 665 
Outlaws all trade with Iraq by land, sea, and air. 
Bars financial dealings with all U.N. members. 
Vote: 13 for, 2 abstentions (Yemen and Cuba) 
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September 13, 1990 - Resolution 666 
Establishes guidelines for humanitarian food aid to 
Iraq and occupied Kuwait. 
Vote: 13 for, 2 opposed (Yemen and Cuba) 
September 16, 1990 - Resolution 667 
Condemns Iraq for violence against foreign embassies 
and diplomat s in Kuwait. Demands protection for 
diplomatic and consular personnel. 
Vote: Unanimous (15-0) 
September 24, 1990 - Resolution 669 
Agrees to consider exceptions to Resolution 661 for 
shipment of humanitarian supplies and authorizes 
examination of requests for economic assistance under 
Article 50. 
Vote: Unanimous (15-0) 
September 25, 1990 - Resolution 670 
Tightens embargo on air traffic and authorizes 
detention of Iraq's merchant fleet. 
Vote: Unanimous (15-0) 
October 29, 1990 - Resolution 674 
Holds Iraq responsible for all financial losses 
resulting from invasion and seeks evidence of human 
rights abuses by Iraqi troops in Kuwait. Calls for the 
release of third-country nationals and the provision of 
food to those being held against their will. 
Vote: 13 for, 2 abstentions (Yemen and Cuba) 
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November 28, 1990 - Resolution 677 
Condemns Iraqi attempts to alter the demographic 
composition of Kuwait and destroy the civil records 
maintained by the legitimate government of Kuwait. 
Mandates Secretary General to take custody of a copy of 
the Kuwaiti population register. 
Vote: Unanimous (15-0) 
November 29, 1990 - Resolution 678 
Authorizes "member states cooperating with the 
government of Kuwait" to use "all necessary means" to 
uphold the above resolutions, while giving Iraq "one 
final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill" to abide by 
the resolutions by January 15, 1991. 
Vote: 12 for, 2 against (Yemen and Cuba), 1 abstention 
(China) .43 
Bush had gained the support of the Soviet Union in 
addition to his NATO allies, who in the end made it easy to 
gain additional U.N. actions against Iraq Between August 2 
and November 29, 1990, the U.N. Security Council passed ten 
resolutions, in addition to resolution 660 and 661, which 
had condemned the conquest of Kuwait and called for economic 
sanctions. The most crucial were resolution 678, which set a 
deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait on January 15, 
1991, authorizing the use of force, under Article 44 of 
43Department of State Dispatch, vol. 1, no. 14 (3 
December 1990), 296. 
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Chapter VII of the U.N. charter, to force the Iraqi 
withdrawal. It was the first time such a vote had been taken 
by the U.N. Security Council and the adoption of that number 
of resolutions in that short period of time. Finally, the 
U.N. Security Council's resolutions were used by the U.S. 
and its allies not only to condemn Iraq, but to justify 
actions being taken by the U.S.-led multinational force. In 
1990, George Bush's new world order included the U.N., 
especially if the u.S. could dominate it.44 However, the u.S. 
responses to the crisis are listed below. 
Deployment of US Troops in Saudi Arabia 
Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United 
States was worried about a probable Iraqi attack on Saudi 
Arabia, which could j eopardi ze the Saudi' s massive oi I 
reserves and threaten vital U. S. interests. After the 
invasion, U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney met with 
King Fahad of Saudi Arabia. King Fahad invited American 
troops into Saudi Arabia to protect the kingdom against any 
further advance by the Iraqi army. This deployment was 
termed Operation Desert Shield. On August 6, 1990, President 
Bush ordered a U.S. military build-up in the Persian Gulf 
that was to reach the level of 500,000 US men and women in 
the brief period of five and a half months.45 The build-up of 
44Lester., 59. 
45 Snow, 187. 
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Desert Shield was an unprecedented achievement in logistics 
with a stunning flow of weaponry, personnel, equipment and 
supplies sent a long way in a short period of time. 
King Fahad also asked the United States to invite the 
Arab and Muslim forces to join the defensive coalition. The 
Gulf states of Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab 
Emirates sent 5500 troops while Egypt sent 30,000, Syria 
sent 21,000, while other Muslim states such as Pakistan, 
Senegal and Bangladesh sent token forces. 46 Throughout the 
crisis, Great Britain was the staunchest western ally of the 
United States. It contributed 35,000 troops, the largest 
western contingent to the multi-national force, next to the 
United States. It also provided unqualified support to the 
US initiatives. France also made a sizable contribution with 
17,000 forces. 47 Actually, the United States encouraged broad 
international participation in the military effort to defend 
Saudi Arabia and enforce UN sanctions. The Bush 
administration succeeded in building a broad multinational 
coalition that proved to be enduring and resilient. More 
than two dozen nations contributed combat forces to the 
defense of Saudi Arabia and the eventual liberation of 
Kuwait. On November 8, 1990, the Bush administration renamed 
Operation Desert Shield to Operation Desert Storm, by 
46Wells, 455. 
47Snow , 187. 
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sending offensive weaponry and infantry to the Gulf to force 
Iraq out of Kuwait. 
TABLE 9 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MULTINATIONAL COALITION 
Argentina-100 troops, 2 transport planes Morocco-2000 troops 
and 2 warships 
Australia-2 warships, 1 supply ship 
Bangladesh-6000 troops 
Belgium-2 mine sweepers, 1 supply ship, 
3 other ships and 6 transport planes 
Bulgaria-Medical personnel 
Canada-2 warships, 1 supply ship, 18 
combat aircraft, 12 other planes 
Netherlands-3 warships and 18 combat 
aircraft 
New Zealand-2 transport planes and 
medical personnel 
Niger-480 troops 
NorwaY-1 support ship 
Pakistan-5000 troops 
Poland-Medical personnel and 1 hospital 
Czechoslovakia-200 chemical defense ship 
troops and 150 medical personnel 
Denmark-1 ship 
Egypt-30,OOO troops, 400 tanks 
France-17,OOO troops, 350 tanks, 38 
combat aircraft and 14 ships 
Germany-5 mine sweepers and 3 other 
ships in the eastern Mediterranean and 
18 war planes 
Great Britain-35,OOO troops, 120 tanks, 
60 combat aircraft and 18 ships 
Greece-1 ship 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) combined 
force of 10,000 frontline troops 
Kuwait-7,OOO frontline troops, 34 combat 
aircraft 
Portugal-1 transport ship 
Saudi Arabia-66,OOO troops, 550 tanks 
and 300 planes and 8 ships 
Senegal-500 troops 
Soviet Union-4 ships 
Spain-3 war ships 
Sweden-Medical personnel 
Syria-19,OOO troops deployed in Saudi 
Arabia, 50,000 deployed along the Iraqi-
Syrian border and 270 tanks 
Turkey-100,OOO troops deployed along the 
Iraqi-Turkish border, 2 warships in 
Persian Gulf and 7 ships in the eastern 
Mediterranean 
United States-430,OOO troops, 2000 
tanks, 1800 combat aircraft and more 
than 100 ships including 6 aircraft 
carriers 
Source: The Middle East (8th edition), Congressional Quarterly, 
(Washington, D.C., 1995), 113. 
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U.N. Sanctions 
Soon after the Iraqi invasion, the Bush administration 
decided to make the U. N. the centerpiece for any actions 
against Iraq. The Bush administration launched a diplomatic 
campaign to create an anti-Iraq consensus within the 
international community. The United Nations Security Council 
became the focus of this campaign. 
On August 2, 1990, the same day of Iraqi invasion, 
Thomas Pickering, the U.N. Ambassador to the U.S., led the 
Security Council in adopting resolution 660 which condemned 
the aggression and called for an immediate Iraqi 
withdrawal. 48 Four days later, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 661, which established an almost total embargo on 
Iraqi commerce. The embargo was to include all imports going 
to and exports corning from Iraq, except for humanitarian 
shipments of medicine and food. 49 Iraq was particularly 
vulnerable to complete economic embargo because it depended 
almost completely on oil exports for foreign earning and it 
imported about 75 percent of its food. Resolution 661 called 
for all U.N. member states to observe the embargo. 
Resolution 661 (1990) was adopted by the Security Council at 
its 2933rd meeting on 6 August 1990. 
48The U.N. Security Council resolution 666 (1990). The 
resolution was adopted by a vote of 14 in favor, 0 opposed, 
1 abstention (Yemen). 
49The U.N. Security Council resolution 661 (1990). The 
resolution was adopted by a vote of 13 in favor, 0 opposed, 
and 2 abstentions (Yemen and Cuba) . 
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The Security Council reaffirmed its resolution 660 
(1990) of 2 August 1990, deeply concerned that that 
resolution has not been implemented and that the invasion by 
Iraq of Kuwait continues with further loss of human life and 
material destruction. 
Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait. 
Noting that the legitimate government of Kuwait has 
expressed its readiness to comply with resolution 660 
(1990). 
Mindful of its responsibilities under the charter of 
the United Nations for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. 
Affirming the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense in response to the armed attack by 
Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the 
charter. Acting under Chapter VII of the charter of the 
United Nations: 
1. Determines that Iraq so far has failed to comply 
with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990) and has usurped 
the authority of the legitimate government of Kuwait, 
2. Decides, as consequence, to take the following 
measures to secure compliance of Iraq with paragraph 2 of 
resolution 660 (1990) and to restore the authority of the 
legitimate government of Kuwait; 
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3. Decides that all states shall prevent: 
(a) The import into their territories of all 
commodities and products originating in Iraq or 
Kuwai t exported there from after the date of the 
present resolution; 
(b) Any activities by their nationals on in their 
territories which would promote or are calculated 
to promote the export or trans-shipment of any 
commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait, and 
any dealings by their nationals or their flag 
vessels or in their territories in any commodities 
or products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and 
exported therefrom after the date of the present 
resolution, including in particular any transfer of 
funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purposes of such 
activities or dealings; 
(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their 
terri tories or using their flag vessels of any 
commodities or products, including weapons or any 
other military equipment, whether or not 
originating in their territories but not included 
supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, 
and, in humanitarian circumstances, food stuffs, to 
any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any 
person or body for the purposes of any business 
carried on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait, and 
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any activities by their nationals or in their 
terri tories which promote or are calculated to 
promote such sales or supply of such commodities or 
products; 
4. Decides that all states shall not make available to 
the government of Iraq or to any commercial, industrial or 
public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or 
any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent 
their nationals and any persons within their territories 
from removing from their territories or otherwise making 
available to that government or to any such undertaking any 
such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds 
to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, except payments 
exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes 
and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs; 
5. Calls upon all states, including states non-members 
of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with 
the provisions of the present resolution notwithstanding any 
contract entered into or license granted before the date of 
the present resolution; 
6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of 
the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council 
consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake 
the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council 
with its observations and recommendations: 
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(a) To examine the reports on the progress of the 
implementation of the present resolution which will 
be submitted by the Secretary-General; 
(b) To seek from all states further information 
regarding the action taken by them concerning the 
effective implementation of the provisions laid 
down in the present resolution; 
7. Calls upon all states to cooperate fully with the 
committee ~n the fulfillment of its task, including 
supplying such information as may be sought by the committee 
in pursuance of the present resolution; 
8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all 
necessary assistance to the committee and to make the 
necessary arrangements in the secretariat for the purpose; 
9. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 through 8 
above, nothing in the present resolution shall prohibit 
assistance to the legitimate government of Kuwait, and calls 
upon all states: 
(a) to take appropriate measures to protect assets of 
the legitimate government of Kuwait and its 
agencies; 
(b) not to recognize any regime set up by the occupying 
power; 
10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the 
Council on the progress of the implementation of the present 
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resolution, the first report to be submitted within thirty 
days; 
11. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to 
continue its efforts to put an early end to the invasion by 
Iraq.50 
It is clear that resolution 661 (1990) provided no 
explicit authorization of a military blockade to enforce the 
sanction. The United States insisted that it had the right 
to use military force to prevent break of an embargo. 51 On 
August 16, 1990, U.s. naval forces in the Gulf began 
interdicting ships carrying cargo to or from Iraq. The 
Bri tish concurred in this judgment but the other three 
permanent members of the Security Council, the French, 
Chinese and Soviets, claimed that a new resolution was 
necessary if military force were to be used to prevent 
leakage through the embargo. On August 25, after much 
lobbying by the United States, the Security Council passed 
resolution 665, which authorized the use of force necessary 
to ensure compliance with the embargo against Iraq.52 
Resolution 665 (1990). Adopted by the Security Council 
at its 2938th meeting on 25 August 1990. 
The Security Council: 
50Se e U.N. Security Council resolution 661 (1990). 
Available at gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/undocs/scd/ 
scouncil/s90/32 accessed 9 February 1998. 
51The Middle East, 8th edition, 114. 
52Ibid., 114. 
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Recalling its resolution 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 
(1990) and 664 (1990) and demanding their full and immediate 
implementation. 
Having decided in resolution 661 (1990) to impose 
economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the charter of the 
United Nations. 
Determined to bring an end to the occupation of Kuwait 
by Iraq which imperils the existence of a member states and 
to restore the legitimate authority, and the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait which 
requires the speedy implementation of the above resolutions. 
Deploring the loss of innocent life stemming from the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and determined to prevent further 
such losses. 
Gravely alarmed that Iraq continues to refuse to comply 
with resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), and 664 
(1990) and in particular at the conduct of government of 
Iraq in using Iraqi flag vessels to export oil. 
1. Calls upon those member states cooperating with the 
government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to 
the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific 
circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the 
Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime 
shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and 
destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the 
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provisions related to such shipping laid down in resolution 
661 (1990); 
2. Invites member states accordingly to cooperate as 
may be necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of 
resolution 661 (1990) with maximum use of political and 
diplomatic measures, in accordance with paragraph 1 above; 
3. Requests all states to provide in accordance with 
the charter such assistance as may be required by the states 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution; 
4. Further requests the states concerned to coordinate 
their actions in pursuit of the above paragraphs of this 
resolution using as appropriate mechanisms of the military 
staff committee and after consultation with the Secretary-
General to submit reports to the Security Council and its 
committee established under resolution 661 (1990) to 
facilitate the monitoring of implementation of this 
resolution; 
5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 53 
In fact, between August 2 and November 29, 1990, the 
U.N. Security Council passed 10 resolutions in addition to 
660 and 661, which condemned the invasion of Kuwait and 
called for economic sanctions. The most crucial were 
resolution 665 and 670, which permitted the enforcement of 
naval and air embargo against Iraq and Kuwait and resolution 
53S ee U.N. Security Council resolution 665 (1990). 
Available at gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/undocs/scd/ 
scouncil/s90/32 accessed 9 February 1998. 
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678, which set a deadline (January 15) for Iraq's withdrawal 
from Kuwait, after which the allies could use "all necessary 
means" to force a withdrawal. 54 In fact, the U.N. blockade 
quickly succeeded in cutting off virtually all of Iraq's 
exports and by some estimates 90 percent of its imports. 
u.s. Congressional Approval for the Use of Force 
Since the end of World War II, American presidents have 
employed the armed forces in actions short of war over two 
hundred times. 55 
Regarding the president's decision, James Meernik 
wrote: 
The literature on U. S. foreign policy making 
unambiguously demonstrates that because of his 
constitutional prerogatives and political 
incentives as well as congressional weakness in 
foreign policy, it is the president who exercises 
supreme control over the nation's military 
actions. 56 
This has been considered as the opportunities for 
presidents to use military forces for political purposes. 
However, specific events ought to alert presidents to 
threats to American poli tical, economic, and military 
interests. International events, where the president have 
54The U.N. Security Council resolution 678 (29 November 
1990). Available at gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/undocs/ 
scd/scouncil/s90/32 accessed 9 February 1998. Also see 
Brune, 59. 
55James Meernik, International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 
1 (March 1994): 121. 
56Ibid., 122. 
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reason to consider as a threat to the United States, also 
motivated the President to use military forces as a policy 
option where there was evidence of one of the following: 
1. The situation involved a perceived current threat to 
the territorial security of U.S. its current allies, major 
clients, or proxy states; 
2. The situation posed a perceived danger to U.S. 
government, military, or diplomatic personnel, to 
significant number of U.S. citizens, or to U.S. assets; 
3. Events were perceived as having led, or likely to 
lead to advances by ideologically committed opponents of the 
U.S. (i.e., communists or "extreme leftists" broadly 
defined) be they states, regimes, or regime contenders; 
4. Events were perceived as likely to lead to losses of 
U.S. influence in regions perceived as within the U.S. 
sphere of influence, especially viewed as Central and South 
America; 
5. Events involved inter-state military conflict of 
potential consequence: in human and strategic terms, or 
events, because of civil disorder, threatened destruction of 
substantial number of persons. 57 
According to Meernik, opportunities to use force may be 
divided into five different categories of events. First are 
cases containing major threats to the U.S. itself, its NATO 
allies, Japan, South Korea, and other states with whom the 
57Ibid., 123. 
205 
u. S. enj oys particularly close relations, such as the 
various incidents regarding the status of Berlin and 
incidents along the demilitarized zone in Korea. Second, 
there are actions taken by governmental or non-governmental 
actors regarding u.S. military forces, government personnel, 
civilians, property, or economic assets. For example, Fidel 
Castro's nationalization of American business in Cuba in the 
early 1960s. North Korea's capture of the u.S. Pueblo, or 
the takeover of the u.S. embassy in Iran in 1979, all fall 
under this type of opportunity to use force. Third, there 
are the instances in which the Soviet Union or other 
communist guerrilla groups attempted to advance their 
interests, such as Vietnam, Laos, Angola, and Afghanistan. 
Fourth, are those events taking place ~n the western 
hemisphere, such as the riots in Colombia in 1948, the 
various insurgency movements in EI Salvador and Nicaragua, 
and the military coups in Brazil (1964) and Chile (1973). 
Finally, there are the major wars of concern to the u.S. for 
their potentially disruptive effects, such as the Iran-Iraq 
war, the various wars among Israel and her neighbors, and 
the conflicts between India and Pakistan. 58 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, 
considered as an international event, should have alerted 
President Bush to threats to u.S. political and economic 
interests in the region. However, the deployment of large 
58Ibid., 125. 
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numbers of American forces in Saudi Arabia along with huge 
multinational forces and their war preparedness against 
Iraq, triggered a constitutional debate on the division of 
war powers between the executive and legislative branches in 
the United States. Most law makers asserted that, because 
the responsibility to declare war rested with Congress, the 
president did not have the power to launch a military 
offensive against Iraq without prior congressional approval, 
unless Iraq attacked U.S. forces. Having Vietnam experience 
in mind, and the public fear of that experience, the 
Congress held many sober and considered debates regarding 
the issue. As Congress continued to look for alternatives 
before granting a resolution, the President and his team, 
especially Secretary of State Baker and Secretary of Defense 
Cheney, in an effort to rally publtc support throughout the 
u.S. and abroad for Bush's policy in the Gulf, defined the 
U. S. goals regarding the Iraqi invasion by stating: "The 
mission of the American troops was defensive. A line had 
been drawn in the sand," he said in defense of any invasion 
of Saudi Arabia. The American ambassador to the U.N., Thomas 
R. Pickeringrn hailed the decision to draw such a line as "an 
historic moment." 59 
In his August 8, 1990 speech to the nation, Bush 
claimed that his mission was. the need to stop further 
aggression He said: 
59Hilsman, 47. 
America does not seek conflict. Nor do we seek to 
chart the destiny of other nations. But America 
will stand by her friends. The mission of our 
troops is wholly defensive. Hopefully, they will 
not be needed long. They will not initiate 
hostilities but they will defend themselves, the 
kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other friends in the 
Persian Gulf. 60 
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Bush, also, in his August 15, 1990 speech to Pentagon 
employees, discussed the ramifications of Hussein over 
gaining control of Saudi Arabia: "Our jobs, our way of life, 
our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries all 
around the world would suffer if control of world's great 
oil reserve fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein. "61 
President Bush tried to explain his purpose behind 
sending American troops to Saudi Arabia in order to gain the 
American public support to his mission. He announced that 
the American purpose was to prevent Saddam from taking over 
Saudi Arabia. However, once the American troops deployed in 
the Gulf, and Bush had demanded the Iraqi withdrawal from 
Kuwait, his position probably was similar to his campaign 
slogan, "Read my lips--no new taxes." 
Secretary of State Baker took the same step in his 
October 29, 1990, address before the Los Angeles World 
Affair Council to explain why America was in the Gulf. 
Secretary of Defense Cheney, in his October 30, 1990, 
60public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: 
George Bush (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1991), Book II, 1109. 
61Hilsman, 48. 
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address before the Pittsburgh World Affair Council, argued 
for u.s. strategic interests in the Gulf. 62 In fact, despite 
all criticism, President Bush managed to gain support for 
his policy both locally and abroad. He proved to have 
unbounded energy and a dazzling display of personal 
diplomacy. He managed a massive international political 
campaign condemning Iraq's aggression worldwide and through 
the United Nations. Although he used his executive power by 
sending a large number of American troops to Saudi Arabia 
without Congress' approval, a spokesperson for the 
administration said that, like Reagan, Bush considered the 
War Powers Act unconstitutional. He sent Congress "a 
notification [for the dispatch of troops] consistent with 
the Act, rather than the formal document the Act requires.,,63 
He claimed that the President's role as Commander-in-Chief 
empowered him to order offensive action against Iraq. The 
president, however, promised to consult with Congress in 
regard to this Gulf policy.64 
In early January 1990, when last ditch diplomatic 
efforts to persuade Iraq to withdraw failed and war became 
more likely, Bush appeared to have enough votes in the 
Congress to win approval for the war option. He sought to 
62Sherrill Brown Wells, ed., American Foreign Policy: 
Current Documents (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 
1991), 336-37. 
63Hilsman, 47. 
64The Middle East, 8th edition, 90. 
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rally the government and the country behind his policies by 
asking Congress to authorize an attack against Iraq if one 
became necessary in his judgment. 
The U.N. Resolution 678 authorized the use of all 
necessary means to force Iraq to comply with all U.N. 
resolutions regarding the invasion of Kuwait. President Bush 
asked Congress to support this resolution by passing a 
congressional resolution authorizing the use of U.S. 
military forces pursuant to U.N. S.C. resolution 678, and the 
use of U.S. military forces against Iraq. He sent identical 
letters to the speaker of the House of Representatives 
Thomas S. Foley, Senate majority leader George J. Mitchell, 
Senate Republican leader Robert Dole, and House Republican 
leader Robert H. Michel. The letter said: 
The current situation in the Persian Gulf, brought 
by Iraq's provoked invasion and subsequent brutal 
occupation of Kuwait, also threatens the peace. 
It would, however, greatly enhance the chances for 
peace if Congress were now to go on record 
supporting the position adopted by the U.N. 
Security council on twelve separate occasions. 
Such an action would underline that the United 
States stands with the international community and 
on the side of law and decency; it also would help 
dispel any belief that may exist in the minds of 
Iraq's leaders that the United States lacks the 
necessary unity to act decisively in response to 
Iraq's continued aggression against Kuwait. 
Secretary of State Baker is meeting with Iraq's 
Foreign Minister on January 9. It would have 
presented the Iraqi government a resolution passed 
by both houses of Congress supporting the U.N. 
position and in particular Security Council 
Resolution 678. As you know, I have frequently 
stated my desire for such a Resolution. 
Nevertheless, there is still opportunity for 
Congress to act to strengthen the prospects for 
peace and safeguard this country's vital 
interests. 65 
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The request of the President satisfied most members of 
Congress that the President had not usurped their war-making 
role. In fact, the President requested an authority to begin 
a military action against Iraq as soon as the U.N. Security 
Council deadline expired. However, on the anti-war side, 
many who favored giving economic sanctions more time, 
senators like Edward Kennedy, strongly opposed the war 
option and said, "Not a single drop of American blood should 
be spilled because American automobiles burn too many drops 
of oil a mile." Congressman Esteban Torres argued that "u.s. 
soldiers should not die in Kuwait and Iraq so that the 
multinational oil corporations continue to reap huge 
profits." Senator Biden criticized Bush's New World Order: 
"It will always be a matter of the u.S. leading, with Europe 
and Japan being content to hold our costs." On the other 
hand, supporters of the president's option, mostly 
Republicans, argued that the only way to achieve peace is to 
support strong military pressure on Saddam Hussein and to 
convince others that Saddam' s effort to develop nuclear 
weapons which will pose a major threat to u.s. interests in 
the region, and Saddam could not be allowed to do so.66 
65public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: 
George Bush (Washington, D. C.: U. 5. Government Printing 
Office, 1992), Book 1, 13-14. 
66Congressional Record, Vol. 137, no. 8, 12 January 
1991: 5232; S272; 5332-336; 5365-375; H406. 
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Congress held three days of sober and considered debate 
before turning on its Democratic leaders, who favored giving 
sanctions more time. The Senate proceeded to consider a 
joint resolution regarding u. S. policy to reverse Iraq's 
occupation of Kuwait. The debate took directions, one 
favoring giving economic sanctions more time to hopefully 
force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. This option was 
represented by Senator Mitchell and Senator Nunn, called 
Mitchell-Nunn resolution (S.J. Res.l), which urged the 
Senators to vote for continuing economic sanction and 
diplomatic pressure. The second resolution was to authorize 
the use of u.s. military forces in support for U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 678. This resolution was represented by 
Senators Warner and Dole, called the Warner-Dole Resolution 
(S.J. Res.2). Senator Mitchell's statement urged the Senate 
to give sanctions more time, saying that "No one will ever 
be able to answer that question, if we go to war now, no one 
will ever know if sanctions would have worked, if given a 
full and fair chance." The Senate voted 53 to 46 against, 
so the Mitchell-Nunn Resolution (S.J. Res.1) was rejected. 
The second resolution (S.J. Res.2) or Warner-Dole 
resolution, authorizing use of u.S. Armed Forces pursuant to 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 678, was considered and 
passed. The Senate voted 52 with and 47 against. 57 
67Ibid., S369; H404. 
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In addition, the Joint Congressional Resolution (H.J. 
Res. 77) cited as the "Authorization for Use of Military 
Force Against Iraq Resolution," was considered and passed. 
Both House and Senate on January 12, 1991, voted 250 with 
and 183 against. This joint resolution authorized the 
President to use United States armed forces against Iraq. 
The joint resolution said in part: 
Whereas in the absence of full compliance by Iraq 
with its resolutions, the United Nations Security 
Council in Resolution 678 has authorized member 
states of the United Nations to use all necessary 
means, after January 15, 1991, to uphold council 
resolutions and to restore international peace and 
security in the area; and 
whereas Iraq has persisted l.n its illegal 
occupation of, and brutal aggression against 
Kuwait: 
now, therefore, be it resolved by the Senate 
and House of Representatives of the United States 
of America in Congress Assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This j oint resolution may be ci ted as the 
"Authorization for use of military forces against 
Iraq resolution." 
SECTION 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES 
ARMED FORCES. 
(a) AUTHORIZATION - The President is authorized, 
subject to subsection (b) to use United States 
Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve 
implementation of Security Council Resolutions 
660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, 
and 677. 
(b) REQUIREMENT FOR DETERMINATION THAT USE OF 
MILITARY FORCES IS NECESSARY - Before exercising 
the authority granted in subsection(a) , the 
President shall make available to the speaker of 
the House of Representatives and the president pro 
tempor of the Senate his determination that: 
(1) the United States has used all appropriate 
diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain 
compliance by Iraq with the United Nations 
Security Council resolutions cited in subsection 
(a)i and 
(2) that these efforts have not been and would 
not be successful in obtaining such compliance. 68 
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As required by this resolution the President responded 
in his report to the speaker of the House of Representatives 
on January 16, 1991, in which he concluded that: 
1. The United States has used all appropriate 
diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain 
compliance by Iraq with all U.N. Security 
Council resolutions, and 
2. That those efforts have not been and would not 
be successful in obtaining such compliance. 
The president concluded that all diplomatic 
efforts to achieve a peaceful solution to this 
crisis has failed. Economic sanction, the 
president said, II even if sanctions were to 
continue to be enforced for an additional six 
to twelve months, economic hardship alone is 
highly unlikely to compel Saddam to retreat 
from Kuwait or cause regime-threatening popular 
discontent in Iraq. 1169 
With the passage of the joint congressional resolution, 
the president was now authorized to use U.S. armed forces 
against Iraq. Even before the U.N. deadline expired, the 
president's mind was made up to go to war. On January 14, 
1991, one day before the deadline, President Bush signed a 
National Security Directive committing the U.S. to go to war 
against Iraq. In his January 14, 1991 statement on signing 
68United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 105, Part 1, 
1991 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1992) Public Laws 102-1. 
69U. S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
102d Cong., 1st sess., 16 January 1991 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 1-7. 
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the joint resolution authorizing the use of u.s. military 
forces against Iraq, Bush said in part: 
Today I am signing H.J. Res 77, the "authorization 
for use of military forces against Iraq 
resolution." By passing H.J. Res 77, the Congress 
of the United States has expressed its approval of 
the use of u.s. armed forces consistent with U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 678. I asked the 
Congress to support implementation of U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 678 because such 
action would send the clearest possible message to 
Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw from Kuwait 
wi thout condi tion or delay. I am grateful to 
those of both political parties who joined in the 
expression of resolve embodied in this resolution. 
To all, I emphasize again my conviction that this 
resolution provides the best hope for peace. 70 
President Bush argued that this resolution provided the 
best hope for peace while he was preparing for war. For more 
than five months, the military build up and preparation had 
no other meaning except war. When he asked why he ordered 
more troops to the Gulf, he said "1 remain hopeful that we 
can achieve a peaceful solution to this crisis. But if 
force is required we will have enough power to get the job 
done."71 He also said, "1 will never-ever-agree to a halfway 
effort. II From the very beginning, President Bush seemed 
determined to go to war. He drew his conclusion that only 
the use of armed forces would achieve an Iraqi withdrawal 
from Kuwait. In his letter to the Congress regarding his 
70public Papers of the President of the United States: 
George Bush (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1992), Book 1, 40. 
7lDepartment of State Dispatch, vol. 1, no. 14, (3 
December 1990), 296. 
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decision to commence military operations against Iraq on 
January 16, 1991, President Bush said in part: 
My determination that appropriate diplomatic and 
other peaceful means had not and would not compel 
Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait and 
meet the other requirements of the U.N. security 
Council and the world community. With great 
reluctance, I concluded, as did the other 
coalition leaders, that only the use of armed 
force would achieve an Iraqi withdrawal together 
with the other U.N. goals of restoring Kuwait's 
legitimate government, practicing the lives of our 
citizens, and re-establishing security and 
stability in the Persian Gulf region. Consisting 
with the War Power Resolution, I now inform you 
that pursuant to my authority as Commander in 
Chief, I directed U.s. Armed Forces to commence 
combat operations on January 16, 1991, against 
Iraqi forces and military targets in Iraq and 
Kuwait. The Armed Forces of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada are 
participating as well. 72 
In fact, with the passage of the congressional approval, and 
once the U.N. deadline had passed, the war against Iraq 
began. 
Operation Desert Storm and the Liberation of Kuwait 
U.N. Resolution 678 ordered Iraq to leave Kuwait no 
later than January 15, 1991. 
Resolution 678 (1990). Adopted by the Security Council 
at its 2963rd meeting on 29 November 1990. 
The Security Council: 
Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990) of 
2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 29 
72U. S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
102d Cong., 1st sess., 18 January 1991, 1. 
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August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 65 (1990) of 25 
August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of 
16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 674 
(1990) of 29 October 1990 and 677 (1990) of 28 November 
1990. 
Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, 
Iraq refuses to comply with its obligation to implement 
resolution 660 (1990) and the above-mentioned subsequent 
relevant resolutions, in flagrant contempt of the Security 
Council. 
Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the 
charter of the United Nations for the maintenance and 
preservation of international peace and security. 
Determined to secure full compliance with its 
decisions. 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter: 
1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 
(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides 
while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final 
opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so; 
2. Authorizes member states cooperating with the 
government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 
1991, fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, 
the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to 
uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all 
217 
subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international 
peace and security in the area; 
3. Requests all states to provide appropriate support 
for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of 
the present resolution; 
4. Request the states concerned to keep the Security 
Council regularly informed on the progress of actions 
undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present 
resolution; 
5. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 73 
With the passage of the U.N. resolution 678 ordering 
Iraq to leave Kuwait by or before January 15, 1991, no Iraqi 
withdrawal appeared to begin and flurry of diplomatic 
acti vi ties produced no progress. 74 While war became more 
likely, many efforts had been made to find political and 
peaceful solutions to the crisis within the U.s. and abroad. 
In the United States, critics argued that economic 
sanctions should have been given time to work, even if it 
took a year or more. Senator Sam Nunn criticized the 
administration's "rush to war." "The President," Nunn said, 
"must explain why he was in such a hurry." On October 22, 
Saudi Arabia's defense minister, Prince Sultan Ibn Abdul-
Aziz, hinted at a deal with Iraq. Specifically, he said that 
73See U.N. Security Council resolution on Iraq and 
Kuwait, 1990-1991. Available at gopher://gopher.undp.org: 
70/00/undocs/scd/scouncil/s90/32 accessed 9 February 1998. 
74Snow , 187. 
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through considerations of Arab brotherhood, the Arab states 
might give Iraq the uninhabited islands, Warba and Bubiyan, 
that block Iraqi access to the Gulf. On November 8, Egyptian 
President Mubarak called for a delay in any attack on Iraq, 
urging that sanctions be given two or three months to work 
before the allies went to war. Bush rejected all efforts, 
saying that there would be no compromise on the Iraqi 
wi thdrawal from Kuwai t and again comparing Hussein to 
Hitler. 75 Actually, President Bush was going the extra mile 
for war. However, as a final warning from President Bush to 
Saddam Hussein, Secretary of State James Baker in a January 
9th meeting in Geneva, with the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 
Aziz, gave President Bush's letter for Saddam Hussein which 
Aziz refused to accept. This was the first--and probably the 
last--direct high-level contact between the United States 
and Iraq since the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. 
The letter said in part: 
We stand today at the brink of war between Iraq 
and the world. This is a war that began with your 
invasion of Kuwait, this is a war that can be 
ended only by Iraq's full and unconditional 
compliance with U.N. Security Council resolution 
678 .... There can be no reward for aggression. 
Nor there be any negotiation .... However by this 
full compliance, Iraq will gain the opportunity to 
rejoin the international community. More 
immediately, the Iraqi military establishment will 
escape destruction. But unless you withdraw from 
Kuwait completely and without condition, you will 
lose more than Kuwait .... Let me state too that 
the United States will not tolerate the use of 
chemical or biological weapons or the destruction 
75Hilsman, 85-88. 
of Kuwait's oil fields and installations. 
Further, you will be held directly responsible for 
terrorist actions against any member of the 
coalition. 76 
219 
After more than six hours of discussion the meeting carne to 
an end and Secretary of State Baker announced to the press 
that the meeting had failed. 
For the world, despite other peace efforts being made, 
there appeared to be one last chance left. U.N. Secretary-
General Perez de Cuellar went to Baghdad as an effort to 
convince Saddam Hussein to comply with the U.N. resolutions 
and to withdraw from Kuwait, but that mission also failed. 
However, the U. S. Congress has voted the day before to 
support President Bush's plan for mili tary action to free 
Kuwait. On the other hand, Washington had already set the 
precise time for the start of the air war against Iraq: 
January 17, 2:00 a.m., Baghdad time. 77 
In fact, with the passage of the congressional 
resolution, U.S. diplomacy essentially stopped. Even before 
the deadline expired, Bush had decided to declare war. Once 
the U.N. deadline had passed, Bush acted swiftly. On January 
16, approximately 6:55 p.m. EST (about 2:00 a.m. the next 
morning in the Gulf area), the sky over Baghdad carne ablaze 
with Iraqi anti-aircraft fire and the thuds and explosions 
76Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 2, No. 2 (14 
January 1991), 25. 
77Pierre Salinger and Eric Laurent, Secret Dossier, The 
Hiding Agenda Behind the Gulf War (Cali fornia: Penguin 
Books, 1991), 210-11. 
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of American bombs. The air portion of the war had begun. 78 
The allied plan of attack was based on a strict separation 
between two phases, the first is the air assault, and 
second, the land offensive. The air attack had the following 
four objectives: 
• to attain complete a~r superiority over the war 
area; 
• to destroy strategic Iraqi targets; 
• to isolate the Kuwaiti theater of operations and 
prevent the Iraqis from supplying and reinforcing 
their forces there; and 
• to cripple the Republican Guard and other ground 
forces. 
The war started with the destruction of the Iraqi air 
defenses to insure air superiority over Iraq in a systematic 
and continued effort to go after the long list of strategic 
targets such as: 
• the military and civilian command and control system 
serving Saddam Hussein; 
• the laboratories, R&D institutes, production plants 
and storage system of the Iraqi nuclear and chemical 
weapons system and long-range missiles, and 
• many key industries, including power plants. 
As to the isolation of the Kuwaiti theater of operation, 
this entailed the systematic attack of air fields, ports, 
78Snow , 188. 
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highways and bridges (and southern Iraq is saturated with 
bridges, for many of which there are no alternatives). Last 
came the crippling of the Iraqi ground forces, especially 
the elite Republican Guard in that theater. 79 
According to u.s. Air Force reports, over 91,000 tons 
of bombs were dropped, of which only seven percent were 
smart bombs. However, only some 25 percent of the 
conventional (non-guided) bombs hit their target area, while 
90 percent of the smart bombs hit theirs. This very high 
percentage of conventional bombing misses was the outcome of 
a directive given to the attack pilots not to take 
unnecessary risk, even if doing so might resul t in poor 
hi ts. This was to be compensated for by the enormous 
quantity of explosives dropped: 25 percent of hits meant 
more than 20,000 tons of explosives reaching their targets. BO 
There was little doubt that severe damage had been done 
to Iraq's civilian and military infrastructure of five 
weeks' continuous systematic and massive waves of American 
led allied bombing raids. The only Iraqi little significant 
resistance during the air campaign was the scud attack on 
Israel and Saudi Arabia the second day of the war. 
In fact, in an effort to drag Israel into active 
involvement in the war, the Iraqi launched their improved 
79Joseph Alpher, ed., War in the Gulf: Implications for 
Israel (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 31-32. 
BOIbid., 32. 
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version of the Soviet-made scud missile against Israeli 
targets. Saddam's motive was to destroy the coalition in 
which several Arab countries played a major role. However, 
in its desperation to maintain the coali tion, the Bush 
administration launched an extraordinary effort to keep 
Israel out of the war, and not to retaliate against Iraq's 
missile attack. Israel refused to say it would not retaliate 
against Iraq, despite repeated urgings and increasing 
commitment by Washington to the security of Israel. As 
Donald Neff put it: "If there was any winner so far, it was 
Israel, which for the first time in history has finally 
managed to get u.s. troops to help protect it." This has 
been a strategic aim of Israel for decades, but not until 
Bush sent patriot crews to protect Israel from scud attacks 
had any administration been willing to make such a 
cornmitment. 81 For all of that, Israel's position was still 
unknown. Its only concession was that it would decide on the 
timing. According to Neff, much was made of Israel's 
restraint in not launching a preventive attack ~n the first 
place, although this was not uncommon in terms of Tel Aviv's 
usual efforts to increase its support from the Uni ted 
States. It displayed the same restraint in 1973, allowing 
the Egyptians and the Syrians to fire the first shot, after 
extracting promises from Washington that such restraint 
B1Donald Neff, "Bush's War Aims Escalate," Middle East 
International, 25 January 1991, 3. 
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would be rewarded. The reward was $2 billion in immediate 
aid and much more in the months and years ahead. A similar 
claim to the US Treasury can now be expected. It is likely 
to be the biggest raid of the war.82 
The second phase of the war was the ground war. In 
fact, the ground offensive was not really needed to liberate 
Kuwait. After 35 days of massive air attacks, Iraq had 
broken down and announced its readiness to withdraw from 
Kuwait. Iraq realized the devastating significance of the 
American led-allied air superiority over the Iraqi and their 
troops along the Kuwait-Saudi border. Many attempts had been 
made by Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait before the ground war, 
which all had been rejected by the U.S. 
On February 21, 1991, in a meeting between Soviet 
President Mikhail Gorbachev and Tariq Aziz, Iraq agreed to 
complete withdrawal from Kuwait in exchange for a cease-
fire. Had Washington agreed the war could have been ended, 
and won, without engaging land forces. 83 Another attempt had 
been made by the Soviet. On February 22, 1991, Aziz and 
Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh agreed on the basic 
terms of a peace plan to submit to the Security Council now 
consisting of eight points: 




2. The withdrawal to begin the day after the allies 
declare a cease-fire; 
3. The withdrawal to take place over a fixed period to 
be agreed on subsequently; 
4. U . N. sanct ions on Iraq to be 1 i fted when the 
withdrawal is two-thirds completei 
5. When the withdrawal is complete all Security Council 
resolutions to cease to be valid; 
6. All POWs to be released immediately after a cease-
firei 
7. Withdrawal to be monitored by a neutral U.N. force; 
8. Work on the clarification of wording and specific 
details to continue in communication wi th the Securi ty 
Council. 
The u.s. responded by totally ignoring the proposal and 
delivering Iraq an ultimatum--Kuwait to be evacuated within 
24 hours or a full-scale ground offensive would be launched. 
President Gorbachev telephoned Bush and other allied leaders 
appealing for the peace initiative to be given more time, 
but to no avail. 84 There was little doubt, however, that Bush 
would give Saddam Hussein an opportuni ty to save his 
remaining war machines to make sure that Iraq no longer 
militarily capable to be a threat in the region. That was 
clear during the last days of the ground war and the way 
General Schwarzkopf wrote the plan for Desert Storm. 
84Middle East International, 8 March 1991, 7. 
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Therefore, the Bush administration was determined to go the 
extra mile to achieve that goal, despite all efforts to 
avoid the ground war. General Schwarzkopf, in his effort to 
destroy the Iraqi military equipment said: 
By the end of the day I while we'd be able to 
declare Iraq no longer militarily capable of 
threatening its neighbors, there would still be a 
hell of a lot of military equipment moving in the 
Basra pocket. So here's what I propose, I said. 
I want the Air Force to keep bombing those convoys 
backed up at the Euphrates where the bridges are 
blown. I want to continue the ground at tack 
tomorrow, drive to the sea, and totally destroy 
everything in our path. That's the way I wrote 
the plan for Desert Storm, and in one more day 
we'll be done. 85 
With the passing of Bush's ultimatum deadline on 
February 24, 1991, the allies launched a full-scale ground 
offensive against Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The Soviet foreign 
ministry expressed: 
Regret that a most real chance for peaceful 
outcome to the conflict and for the attainment of 
the aims stipulated in the U.N. Security Council 
resolutions, without further human casualties and 
material destruction, has been missed. 86 
On February 26, 1991, Saddam Hussein announced Iraq's 
wi thdrawal from Kuwait, under heavy fire from the allied 
forces, and requests for a cease-fire with the acceptance of 
all the U.N. resolutions. President Bush responded: "This 
changes nothing. The allied assault will continue with 
undiminished intensity. This still fell far short of what is 
85Schwarzkopf, 469. 
86Middle East International, 8 March 1991, 7. 
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necessary for the shooting to stop. ,,87 On February 28, 1991, 
Tariz Aziz told the U.N. Secretary-General that Iraq was 
ready to "comply with resolution 660 and all U.N. 
resolutions on Kuwait." President Bush ordered a cease-fire 
with allied forces in full control of Kuwait and some way 
inside Iraqi territory, and declared Kuwait liberated. 88 
However, President Bush, with the War Powers U.N. 
resolution 678 remains in force, decided to station allied 
troops in southern Iraq until Iraq fully complied with his 
peace terms. On March 3, 1991, he directed General 
Schwarzkopf to endorse his peace terms at his meeting with 
the Iraqi senior officers at the Safwan airbase, now under 
U.S. control in southern Iraq, to be the necessary steps 
towards a permanent cease-fire agreement. 89 
Finally, Iraqi foreign minister Tariz Aziz, in a letter 
to the President of the Council and the U. N. Secretary-
General, declared Iraq's willingness to "fulfill its 
obligation." The Security Council adopted resolution 686 on 
2 March 1991 which in fact endorses President Bush's peace 
terms. 90 
87Ibid., 7. 
S8The Middle East, 8th edition. Also see Noam Chomsky, 
"The U.S. in the Gulf Crisis," in The Gulf War and the New 
World Order, ed. Haim Bresweeth and Niva Yuval-Davis 
(London: Zed Books Ltd.), 13. 
S9See Schwarzkopf, 481-91. 
90Middle East International, 8 March 1991, 7. Also see 
U.N. resolution 686, March 2, 1991. 
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Conclusion 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 evoked a 
strong response from most of the world, especially the 
Uni ted States and its allies. First of all, the U. S. 
initiated U.N. economic sanctions of unprecedented severity, 
and the second was it declared war against Iraq. Both of 
these two responses had broad support. President Bush 
undoubtedly managed to get domestic and international 
support for his stand against Iraq. Twenty-nine countries 
actively participated in the war against Iraq. Nobody, 
however, disputed the fact that most of the burden was 
carried by the United States. 
The war against Iraq could not have been mounted 
without the cooperation of some external factors. The first 
factor was the Soviet Union. From the onset of the crisis, 
Moscow sided firmly with the United States, first in seeking 
a political solution, and then in support of military 
action. Moscow's response to the crisis demonstrated Iraq's 
ignorance of the post-Cold War world. Saddam failed to 
comprehend that what now mattered most to Moscow were its 
domestic concerns. 
The second factor was the cooperation of the Arab 
States. Without Saudi consent for the United States and 
later, other allied forces to operate from Saudi territory, 
the military operation against Iraq would not have been 
possible. Two other major Arab states, Syria and Egypt, had 
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taken an anti-Iraq, pro-coalition stance. The land, sea, and 
sky of the Arab states were available for the U.S. and its 
allies to use in action against Iraq. 
The third factor was the support of the United Nations. 
The United Nations had never reacted to a crisis with such a 
posture of leadership and support as it did during the Gulf 
crisis. To act under the umbrella of formal U.N. Security 
council resolutions made it much easier for the U. S. -led 
coalition to move ahead than would otherwise have been the 
case. All coalition members noted with satisfaction that the 
relevant Security Council resolutions--13 resolutions since 
August 2, 1990 until March 2, 1991--were passed unanimously, 
and that the veto was not used in a single instance. 
The outcome of the war was an absolute victory of the 
U.S.-led coalition and a crushing defeat for Iraq. The fact 
remains that the Gulf war was truly an electronic war. The 
sight of cruise missiles and smart bombs roaming to their 
destination with pinpoint accuracy created a widespread 
impression of uneven match between a high-tech power and a 
poor, ill-equipped and Third World army. While the war 
represented a military victory of an advanced society over a 
developing one, the outcome was by no means a foregone 
conclusion. There was never any doubt that the coalitions 
would prevail, but an Iraqi strategy which imposed high 
battlefield costs on coalition forces and led to a 
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protracted campaign offered Saddam Some prospect of a much 
more favorable cease-fire as well as post-war reputation. 
The victory of a U.S.-led coalition over Iraq was less 
complete than it might otherwise have been. Saddam Hussein 
managed to retain power despite the ravages the war had 
brough t to hi s coun try. Ac t ually , wi th Saddam s till in 
power, President Bush's decision to end the war continued to 
be questioned, by the press and the rival Politicians. Even 
in defeat, Saddam managed to create headaches for the United 
States and the international communi ty by refusing to 
cooperate fully with the weapons inspectors sent to Iraq 
under the terms 0 f the ceas e - fire agreement and U. N. 
Resolution 686. 
CHAPTER VI 
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE U.S. INTERVENTION 
IN THE GULF WAR 
Introduction 
The Bush administration claimed the U.S. fought Iraq 
because Saddam Hussein was a ruthless tyrant who carried out 
an unjust invasion of Kuwait. It is apparent that the U.S. 
intervention in the Middle East had nothing to do with its 
stated aims of opposing tyranny and expansionism. This fact 
is obvious from a study of the recent history of the U.S. 's 
relationship with Iraq. Prior to the invasion of Kuwait, 
Iraq was a close ally of the United States. 1 
The U.S. intervention in the Gulf war was not a sudden 
or abrupt action. It was a well planned and well thought out 
decision on the part of u.S. policy makers, based purely on 
U.S. self-interests. Andre Gunder Frank made the following 
remark regarding the U.S. intervention in the Gulf war: 
The violation of international law through the 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq under 
the Presidency of Saddam Hussein is beyond 
dispute. However, the allegation that the Gulf war 
was to protect the "principle" of world order, 
international law and the charter of the United 
Nations from lawless might-is-right violation is a 
lie. Many similar aggressions and violations of 
lRobert Brenner, "Why is the United States at War with 
Iraq?" New Left Review 185 (1991): 122. 
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both the UN charter and UN resolution have gone 
without any such responses or often even without 
any notice. The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan merited condemnation and opposition, 
albeit of course not by the Security Council but 
certainly no counter invasion of the Soviet Union. 
The Iraqi invasion of Iran received but did not 
merit, defacto political and even military support 
by the same coalition of allies, which then waged 
war against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. 2 
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Some of the very same states who allied themselves in 
a coalition to liberate Kuwait from aggression still 
maintain their military occupation of foreign territories. 
Israel invaded and still occupies the Golan Heights, West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip in violation of U.N. resolution 242. 
Israel also invaded Lebanon and still exercises de facto 
military control over Southern Lebanon. When America invaded 
Panama, no actions were taken and no Security Council 
resolutions were passed or even proposed to protect 
President Bush's new world order from his own violation of 
the sovereignty of Panama. On the contrary, President Bush 
received only endorsements and outright support for his 
violation of international law and human rights in Panama. 3 
There were four key factors which caused the Gulf War. 
The most prominent factor was global oil pricing and 
consumption. The second factor was the security of Israel. 
The third factor was the U.S. plan to secure and maintain a 
permanent military base in the Gulf. And finally, through 
2Andre Gunder Frank, "Third World War: A Political 
Economy of the Gulf War and the New World Order," in Third 
World Quarterly 13, no. 2 (1992): 267-68. 
3Ibid., 268. 
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the U.S. intervention in the Gulf, the United States wanted 
to provide world leadership in the post Cold War scenario 
under the banner of New World Order. This chapter will focus 
on these four key factors and the roles they played in the 
U.S. intervention in the Gulf War. 
Oil Factor 
Oil is obviously the primary issue for U.S. 
intervention in the Gulf war.4 Regarding the dependence of 
the U. S., as well as Japan and other western nations on 
Middle East energy resources, President Bush states: 
Vi tal issues of principle are at stake. Saddam 
Hussein is literally trying to wipe a country off 
the face of the earth. We do not exaggerate when 
we say Saddam Hussein will fail, vital economic 
interests are at risk as well. Iraq itself 
controls some 10 percent of the world's proven oil 
reserves. Iraq plus Kuwait controls twice that. 
An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the 
economic and military power, as well as the 
arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbors-
-neighbors who control the lion's share of the 
world's remaining oil reserves. We cannot permit a 
resource so vi tal to be dominated by one so 
ruthless. And we won't.s 
Other U.S. officials, Secretary of State James Baker 
and Secretary of Defense Richard D. Cheney, share these 
same views regarding the energy issue. Baker's address 
4Brenner, 128. 
5Sherrill Brown Wells, ed., American Foreign Policy: 
Current Documents (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 
1991},505. 
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before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on October 
29, 1990, states: 
Just consider the consequences. If the entire 
world were to be thrust into a deep recession by 
an Iraq stranglehold on Gul f energy resources, 
American industry, farmers, and small businesses 
would be hit especially hard. So would the 
democratic reformers of Eastern Europe. So would 
the other emerging democracies--in Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia. All would suffer profound 
setbacks in their ability to deliver the economic 
growth needed to sustain confidence in the 
democratic process. 6 
Richard Cheney, in his October 30, 1990 address 
before the Pittsburgh World Affairs Council, also referred 
to the importance of Iraq's control over the Gulf and to the 
fact that it owns two-thirds of the world's known reserves 
of oil. 7 
One of the most important commodities in the 
industrial world today, and maybe for years to come, is 
oil and its assured supply at reasonable prices as an 
important element for economic growth and development. 
For the United States, Iraq's control of almost 40 percent 
of the world's oil reserves and the control over OPEC, 
would have given Saddam Hussein dominant power over oil 
pricing, which would be of primary concern in plans for 
economic growth in Western Europe and Japan. Oil was the 
driving force behind U.S. policy in the Gulf. According to 




to this: troops have been sent to retain control of oil in 
the hands of Saudi Arabia, so prices will remain low. 
Friedman said that a cartoon in the Boston Globe had 
it right. The vital interest at stake may be to make the 
world safe for gas guzzlers. The principle the United 
States holds dear is eighteen miles per gallon. 8 In fact, 
oil availability and the price of oil introduced the major 
elements of U.S. interest in the Gulf. Since 1973, when 
Saudi Arabia used an oil boycott to try to force Washington 
to change its policies toward Israel, every American 
President has said that the Gulf is of vital economic and 
strategic interest to the United States and its allies. 
President Reagan, for example, speaking to reporters in the 
White House on May 29, 1987, said: 
I want to speak this afternoon on the vi tal 
interests of the American people, vital interests 
that are at stake in the Persian Gulf area. It 
may be easy for some, after a near record 54-month 
economic recovery, to forget just how critical the 
Persian Gulf is to our national security. But I 
think everyone in this room and everyone hearing 
my voice now can remember the woeful impact of the 
Middle East Oil Crisis of a few years ago, the 
endless, demoralizing gas lines, the shortages, 
the rationing, the escalating energy prices, the 
double-digit inflation, and the enormous 
dislocation that shook our economy to its 
foundations. 9 
8Thomas L. Friedman's remark is cited in Roger Hilsman, 




Listening to American officials speaking publicly about U.S. 
interests in the Gulf, one can quickly understand that oil 
is of the most significance. According to Thomas Friedman, 
these interests can be divided into three broad 
categories, each of which is worthy of scrutiny. The first 
category is the price of oil. A drastic increase in the 
price of oil would almost surely tip all western economies 
into recession. The second is who controls the oi 1. The 
third is the need to uphold the integrity of national 
boundaries so that predatory regional powers will not simply 
begin devouring their neighbors. 10 
It is in America's best interest that control of oil be 
in the hands of countries loyal to u.s. policy. Washington 
would like control to be in Saudi hands because, unlike 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia's leaders have historically been more 
responsive to American interests and staunchly anti-Soviet. 
President Bush cannot say that out loud, though, because it 
would embarrass the Saudi monarchy. 
The final vital interests at stake, u.S. administration 
officials would say, would be the stability of the post-Cold 
War world. If President Hussein gets away with taking over 
Kuwai t by force, then another regional power might be 
lOThomas L. Friedman, "Washington's vi tal Interests," in 
The Gulf War Reader, ed. Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf 
(Times Book: Random House, 1991), 203. 
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tempted to use similar means to advance their interests in 
their corners of the world. 11 
Since the late 1970s, the u.S. has made clear its 
determination to exercise overall influence in the Gulf, 
laying down the parameters for all political forces in the 
region through the so-called Carter doctrine. 12 According to 
Zbigniew Brezezinski, the architect of the doctrine, u.S. 
interests were threefold. First was guardianship of the oil 
industry with all its political, economic and military 
ramifications; Second was keeping the USSR out of the Middle 
East. Third was protecting the moderate states in the 
region, which could be toppled by local upheavals as 
happened in Khomeni I s ascendancy in Iran .13 These three 
interests form a hierarchy of u.S. concerns, at the apex of 
which is oil. Viewed as a purely commercial matter, oil 
interests could fit easily with the liberal objective of 
removing Iraq from Kuwait. 
Regarding the u.S. oil interest in the Gulf, Stephen 
Zunes pointed out that two years after the Gulf war, both 
supporters and detractors acknowledged that despite the 
llIbid., 205. 
12Peter Gowan, "The Gulf War, Iraq and Western 
Liberalism," New Left Review 187 (1991): 17. 
13Zbigniew Brezezinski, "After the Carter Doctrine: Geo-
Strategic Stakes and Turbulent Cross Currents in the Gulf," 
in Cross Currents in the Gulf: Arab, Regional and Global 




Bush administration's rhetoric about international law and 
human rights, the war was essentially over oil.14 It is 
estimated that 97 percent of the world's oil is found 
outside the United States. At least 60 percent of the 
world's oil comes from eight Gulf states. If these probable 
reserves were counted, the total is probably closer to 85 
percent. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait have particularly 
promising unexplored reserves. 15 In the 1980s, the Persian 
Gulf countries remained the principal sources of imported 
oil and are highly likely to retain this preferred status in 
the 1990s. 16 (See Table 9) Regarding U.S. oil interests in 
the Gulf, Peter Gowan wrote: 
Gulf oil provides a very large international 
market for important sectors of advanced 
capitalist industry (construction, engineering, 
military equipment and so forth). This is 
overwhelmingly a state market since the revenues 
are in the hands of the ruling dynasties. 
Therefore, the power that exercises a dominant 
political influence upon the Sheikhdoms in effect 
governs the market. Second, oil revenues become 
great lakes of rentier capital, the flow of which, 
influenced cri tically by political factors I is 
vital for the entire structure of global finance 
capital and Banking interests. And thirdly, oil 
money talks politics directly, through the uses to 
which it is put. 
14Stephen Zunes, "The US-GCC Relationship: Its Rise and 
Potential Fall," Middle East Policy 11, no. 1 (1993): 106. 
15Ibid., 106. 
16Seyom Brown, On the Front Burner: Issues in u.s. 




SHARE OF U.S. OIL CONSUMPTION SUPPLIED BY IMPORTS, 1960-92 
(Millions of Barrels Per Day) 
Year Total Total Percentage Imports from Percentage 
Consumption Imports Imported OPEC Countries Imported 
1960 9.80 1. 82 18.6 1. 31 13.4 
1961 9.98 1.92 19.2 1.29 12.9 
1962 10.40 2.08 20.0 1.27 12.2 
1963 10.74 2.12 19.7 1.28 11. 9 
1964 11.02 2.26 20.5 1. 36 12.3 
1965 11. 51 2.47 21.5 1. 48 12.9 
1966 12.08 2.57 21.3 1. 47 12.2 
1967 12.56 2.54 20.2 1. 26 10.0 
1968 13 .39 2.84 21.2 1. 30 9.1 
1969 14.14 3.17 22.4 1. 34 9.5 
1970 14.70 3.42 23.3 1.34 9.1 
1971 15.21 3.93 25.8 1. 67 11. 0 
1972 16.37 4.74 29.0 2.06 12.6 
1973 17.31 6.26 36.2 2.99 17 .3 
1974 16.65 6.11 36.7 3.28 19.7 
1975 16.32 6.06 37.1 3.60 22.1 
1976 17.46 7.31 41. 9 5.07 29.0 
1977 18.43 8.81 47.8 6.19 33.6 
1978 18.85 8.36 44.4 5.75 30.5 
1979 18.51 8.46 45.7 5.64 30.5 
1980 17.06 6.91 40.5 4.30 25.2 
1981 16.06 6.00 37.4 3.32 20.7 
1982 15.30 5.11 33.4 2.15 14.1 
1983 15.23 5.05 33.2 1.86 12.2 
1984 15.73 5.44 34.6 2.05 13.0 
1985 15.73 5.07 32.2 1. 83 11.6 
1986 16.28 6.22 38.2 2.84 17.4 
1987 16.67 6.68 40.1 3.06 18.4 
1988 17.28 7.40 42.8 3.52 20.4 
1989 17.33 8.06 56.5 4.14 23.9 
1990 16.99 8.02 47.2 4.29 25.3 
1991 16.71 7.63 45.7 4.09 24.5 
Source: Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, Annual 
Energy Review, 1992, in The Middle East, 8th edition 
(Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995) , 144. 
This is the case for instance, right across the 
world especially the Islamic world with Saudi 
money, which cements regime after regime, from 
Pakistan to Morocco. And the passages of that 
money are ultimately controlled by the power which 
defends the Saudis-the USA.17 
239 
The U. S. and the West, generally, would not countenance 
a hostile state monopolizing a region I s oil. For such 
monopoly would constitute a powerful political weapon. IS 
If the regime of Saddam Hussein had controlled the flow of 
much of the Gulf oil, dozens of countries around the world 
would have had a simple choice between two world politico-
economic authorities. On one side is the IMF, the World 
Bank, and official American-controlled institutions 
governing the world economy. On the other side is Baghdad, 
the undoubtedly unofficial but equally efficacious center 
for capital and loans. This division would directly threaten 
u.s. interests. In fact, the u.S. economy would clearly be 
vulnerable if a significant portion of the Middle East oil 
were controlled by another country.19 
Another major u.S. interest is that the control of oil 
supplies to both Japan and the countries of Western Europe 
has always served the u.s. as a crucial political bargaining 
tool in relations with the Middle East countries. Western 





than the United States and would undoubtedly increase their 
independence if their sources were not under the 
protection of the latter. This would be especially true if 
the Middle East were under the control of a regime that is 
not dependent on the U.S. for its protection; for example, 
those of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the small Gulf Ernirates. 2o 
These oil factors--the revenue market, capital, and 
control of the allies supplies--make direct political 
Suzerainty over the region by the United States essential. 
To shore up its own political position in the Gulf and that 
of its favorite regimes like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, it was 
necessary for the U.S. to demonstrate its supremacy over 
Iraq. Regarding U.S.-Saudi relations, Stephen Zunes wrote: 
In the past years the United States has increased 
its oil imports from Saudi Arabia from 165,000 bpd 
to 1.6 billion bpd totaling one quarter of all 
U.S. oil imports while simultaneously dramatically 
increasing arms sales to the kingdom. It appears 
that the proposal of Saudi oil minister Sheikh 
Ahmed Zaki Yamani 20 years ago has corne to 
fruition: the United States would guarantee Saudi 
Security in return for cheap oil. 21 
20Ibid., 22. 
21Zunes , 106. Actually in order to meet the increasing 
western demand for oil, the Saudi announced plans to raise 
their production capacity to 10 million barrel a day by 
1994, bidding to replace the former Soviet Republics as the 
world's largest producer. Soviet production was steadily 
sinking toward the 10 million barrel level. See The Middle 
East, 8th edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly, 1995), 163. 
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In the final analysis it is clear that the u.s. intervention 
in the Persian Gulf was primarily for its oil economic 
interest: 
In fact, neither the United States nor Britain was 
desperate for the Gulf's oil resources at the time 
of the crisis. What they really needed was the 
profits from oil production which tend to flow 
back to American and British economies (by way of) 
treasury securities ... imports of American manufac-
tured goods, construction companies, arms, etc. 22 
Washington's vital interest in the Gulf war was very well 
portrayed by Thomas L. Friedman. He wrote: 
The United States has not sent troops to the Saudi 
desert to preserve democratic principles. The Saudi 
monarchy is a feudal regime that does not even allow 
women to drive cars. Surely it is not American 
policy to make the world safe for feudalism. This is 
about money, about protecting governments loyal to 
America and punishing those that are not, and about 
who will set the price of oil. 23 
The Israel Factor 
Israel has always held a very special position among 
the policy makers of the United States. A number of factors 
account for the depth of Israel's relationship with the 
United States. These include: the U.S. commitment to the 
idea of Jewish statehood in the wake of the Nazi genocide, 
the importance of Israel to the American Jewish community, 
and the role of Israel as a strategic ally. These factors, 
22Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, The Gulf War 




among others, provide solid sustenance for the relationship 
between Israel and the United States. 24 
In the wake of the Nazi genocide, the U.S. government 
was confronted by the urgent need to examine the Jewish 
issues, the fate of the Jewish survivors in Europe, and the 
Jewish determination to establish an independent Jewish 
state in Palestine. However, during the 1930s, the Jewish 
question had been one on the British agenda in the Middle 
East. The British who controlled the area were caught by its 
endorsement in 1917 of the Zionist aim of a Jewish National 
Home (given in the Balfour Declaration of November 1917) and 
its maintenance of strategic and economic interests in the 
Arab world. Britain's desire to be on good terms with the 
oil-producing Arab states and to retain bases in the Arab 
world, with the approach of war in Europe, forced Britain to 
reconcile its pledges to the Jews. In 1939 Britain adopted 
the White Paper Policy, which severely restricted the number 
of Jewish immigrants to Palestine--later under British 
mandate--a policy which strongly condemned and was opposed 
by the Zionist movement. 25 
Because of the terms dictated by the White Paper, the 
Jews switched their main effort to the United States. As 
Peter Calvocoressi has put it: 
24Middle East Policy, Vol. 2, 1993, 147. 
25Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945 (London 
and New York: Longman, 1991), 288. 
After the 1939 White Paper, Zionists switched 
their main effort from Britain to the United 
States, abandoning their hope of achieving their 
aims by persuasion in London in favor of an 
actively anti-British policy to be financed (after 
the war) with American money. During the war, 
political effectiveness of Zionism was greatly 
enhanced in the United States and the Zionist 
cause was embraced by the two most powerful 
Americans of the forties, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and Harry S. Truman. 26 
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The American involvement in Zionism set the United 
States and Britain in opposition to each other. The prime 
American concern was to persuade Britain to admit 100,000 
Jews, who had survived the Nazi genocide, to Palestine as 
generously and quickly as possible. 27 
In 1942, the major world Zionist organizations met in 
New York at the Biltmore Hotel and called for the creation 
of a Jewish state in the entire area of the British mandate 
in Palestine. In 1946, with the extent of the devastation of 
the European Jewry, several Zionist groups engaged in a 
struggle for support in America and Europe for the 
establishment of a Jewish state in the Middle East. Later in 
the year, the Zionists endorsed a form of partition that was 




28Stephen Green, Taking Sides, America's Secret 
Relations with a Militant Israel (New York: William Morrow 
and Company, Inc., 1984), 24. 
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During these critical years, the Truman administration 
increased its support to the Jewish cause. Truman repeatedly 
intervened to assist the Zionist leaders who were working 
for the creation of Israel. According to Stephen Green, 
President Truman pressured Britain to accept more refugees 
in Palestine, supported the original U.N. partition plan, 
appointed an ambassador to Tel Aviv who was strongly 
predisposed to favor Israel against Arabs, and arranged the 
export-import bank loan and a temporary credit, in response 
to a Jewish agency request for the same. As the end of the 
British mandate approached, Truman publicly appealed to the 
Arab nations not to attack the new Jewish state. 29 
The creation of a Jewish homeland in the Middle East as 
a legal and diplomatic entity took place in a remarkably 
short period of time and with strong, warm support from the 
United States. Immediately after David Ben Gurion's 
announcement of the creation of the state of Israel in May 
1948, President Truman extended de facto recognition to the 
Jewish state. 30 After the Ben Gurion declaration and the 
beginning of open hostili ties over Palest ine, the U. S. 
delegation at the U. N. repeatedly took Israel's side in 
disputes over successive armistice line disputes that gave 
the Jewish state larger portions of Arab Palestinian land. 
29Ibid., 26. 
30Eytan Gilboa, American Public Opinion Toward Israel 
and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Lexington: D.C. Heath and 
Company, 1987), 15. 
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In 1949 the Truman State Department began to lobby hard for 
U.N. membership for Israel, which was granted in May of that 
year. 31 
The importance of the American Jewish community is 
another contribution to the relationship between Israel and 
the United States. A strong consensus of concern arose 
between American Jews and their fellow Americans for the 
fate of the Jewish people in the Middle East. This concern 
became a point of U.S. national interest in reaction to the 
Nazi genocide of the Jews in World War II. This factor had 
its influence on the domestic political processes in the 
U.S. and created increasing commitment to the security of 
Israel. 32 Regarding this commitment, Seyom Brown, in his 
analysis of the idea of national interests as the sum of 
domestic interest, states that: 
According to this view, the domestic poli tical 
process provides legitimacy to foreign commitments 
and policies that might otherwise be rejected as 
unwarranted by vital national interests (meaning 
usually geopolitical) imperative. An outstanding 
example is the continued support provided by the 
United States to the security of Israel even in 
the face of serious geopolitical considerations 
that might argue for a decisive tilt toward the 
Arab side in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Were it not for the electoral cult of the Jewish 
community, and its members' influence in various 
interest groups in the life of the country, the 
chances that its moral appeals for continued U.S. 
support of Israeli security would be reduced. 33 
31Green, 26. 
32Cheryl A. Rubenberg, Israel and the American National 
Interest (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 14. 
33Brown, 7-8. 
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Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. policy 
makers realized that a strong Iraq in the Middle East would 
ultimately threaten Israel's security. Because of its 
commitment for the security of Israel, the United States 
quickly intervened in the Gulf war.34 
Israel's role as a strategic ally to the U.S. became 
more certain during the Cold War. The U. S. has always 
traditionally defined its interests in the Middle East in 
terms of the containment of the Soviet expansion. These 
containment policies/doctrines have been considered by the 
U.S. administrations as tools of explanations to the U.S. 
foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. To carry out 
these objectives, the U.S. had to develop a strong, positive 
relationship with Israel as the strategic ally for the 
United States in the region. The idea is that, by arming and 
supporting Israel, the U. S. strategic interest will be 
enhanced. 35 
It is commonly argued that Israel promotes American 
interests in the Middle East by acting as a barrier against 
Soviet penetration, by maintaining regional stability 
through its absolute military superiority, and by ensuring 





without strategic value to the United States. Because of its 
strategic interest, the United States has provided its solid 
commitment to the security of Israel since its emergence in 
1948. Regarding the u.s. commitment to the security of 
Israel, u.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in his 
remarks before the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC) on March 23, 1993, said: 
Since its independence the state of Israel has 
been confronted with war, with terrorism, with 
scud missiles and now with the even deadlier 
threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. No one in the area should have to 
live this way. It is precisely for these reasons 
that the United States is unshakably committed to 
Israel's security. 37 
The Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait represented 
a change in the balance of power in the Gulf region and 
hence in the Middle East as a whole. Certainly as a major 
adversary of Israel, any Iraqi expansionist move would 
threaten American interests. 38 
When the war between Iraq and Iran ended in 1988, Iraq 
emerged as a regional military power with offensive 
capabilities, particularly the weapons of mass destruction. 
Iraq was willing to challenge Israel's hegemony and military 
supremacy in the Middle East, which would represent a change 
in the balance of power in the region. Certainly it was in 
37Remark by Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the 
AIPAC Conference (Washington, D. C.: March 23, 1993) in 
Middle East Policy no. 2 (1993): 147. 
38Ken Matthews, The Gulf Conflict and International 
Relations (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 98. 
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Israel's interest to destroy Iraq's military capabilities 
and weapons of mass destruction. This is the same step the 
United States took in forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait 
and later, under the guide of the U.N.'s resolutions, in 
requiring the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction. To insure Israel's supremacy and to keep its 
securi ty intact, the United States quickly and strongly 
responded to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
Apart from this, Israel protects the U.S. interests in 
the Middle East better than any other country in the region, 
despite U.s. strong relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
More accurately, no other country in the Middle East is 
equally trusted by America. Israel has successfully 
prevented victories by radical nationalist movements in the 
region. It has kept Syria, for many years an ally of the 
former Soviet Union, in check. Israel's frequent wars have 
provided battlefield testing grounds for U.S. arms. Israel 
acted as a conduit for U.S. arms to regimes and movements 
too unpopular in the United States to openly grant direct 
military assistance, such as South Africa, Iran, Guatemala, 
and the Nicaraguan Contras. Israel's military advisers have 
assisted the Contras, the Salvadoran military Junta, and 
foreign occupation forces in Namibia and Western Sahara. 
Their secret services provided the United States with 
intelligence gathering and covert operations. 39 
39Stephen Zunes, "The Roots of U.S. Middle East Policy 
and the Need for Alternatives," in Building Peace in the 
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In addition to all these considerations, Israel is a 
country which was born under the support of the U.S., and to 
which the u.s. is pledge-bound to insure its security. So 
naturally the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was genuinely 
considered by the u.S. as a serious threat to the security 
of Israel. Other than the oil interest, the Israel factor 
also helped the u.s. policy makers to act quickly so that 
the secure and defensible borders of Israel could be 
insured. 40 The security of Israel was improved by weakening 
of Iraq during the Gulf war and the conclusion of peace 
agreements between Israel, the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and Jordan.41 
Securing Permanent u.s. Milita~ Base in the Gulf 
The third important factor for u.S. intervention in the 
Gul f war was to secure a permanent mi li tary base in the 
Gulf. u.S. military involvement in other nations has always 
been defined by the policy makers in the United States for 
the purpose of safeguarding American national interest. 
Defending nations from external, and perhaps internal 
aggression, protecting American economic interests, and 
preserving American influence in the affairs of other 
Middle East: Challenges for State and Civil Society, ed. 
Elise Boulding (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 
179. 
40Ibid., 180. 
41The Middle East, 8th edition (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly, 1995), 100. 
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states, are all reasons why policy makers invest military 
resources abroad and why they might use force to protect 
such interests. 42 The American military bases l.n Western 
Europe and Japan, the military aid to Israel in the Middle 
East, and the military involvement in Central America are a 
few examples of the U.S. military involvement abroad. 43 
American military involvement in an area which holds 
such potential is defined as: (1) an established American 
military presence, defined as a U.S. military base, (2) the 
furnishing of military aid to some states or organization, 
or (3) a prior use of force. 44 Regarding the establishment of 
permanent American military bases abroad, James Meernik 
wrote: 
The first, and perhaps most important indicator of 
U.S. involvement, is the establishment of a 
permanent American military base. Not only does 
such a military presence signify an especially 
close relationship between the host country and 
the United States, it also demonstrates that the 
United States is necessarily involved should any 
aggression against the host country take place. 
This trip-wire function ensures that U.S. 
credibility and interest are always and obviously 
at stake in any matters that threaten the 
stability of the host country or the U.S. 
presence. 45 
42International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 1 (March 
1994): 127. 
43Ibid. 
44James Meernik, "Presidential Decision Making and the 
Political Use of Military Force," International Studies 
Quarterly 38, no. 1 (March 1994): 127. 
45Ibid., 128. 
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America's intentions to establish permanent military 
bases in the Gulf appears to have started long before the 
Gulf war. During the 1970s, the U.S. increased its military 
aid to what it considered moderate Middle Eastern regimes, 
such as the Shah of Iran, in order to strengthen the 
presence of their armed forces and keep the Soviets out of 
the Gulf region. 46 Following a review of Middle East policy 
in 1977, President Carter signed PRM-10 (Presidential Review 
Memo) authorizing American forces to deal with Third World 
problems generally but specifically ci ting the need for 
focusing attention on the Persian Gulf. Carter's Secretary 
of Defense persuaded the U.S. military to adopt a Plan for 
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) under which a 
combined force for the Middle East would be created and a 
desert warfare center opened at Fort Irwin, California. As a 
result, several U.S. military exercises were held. In 1980 
the United States and Egypt staged the first "bright star" 
military exercise in the Egyptian desert. Egypt and Oman 
became host countries for U. S. acti vi ties in the Gul f 
region. 47 
Following the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979, 
and the subsequent anti-American regime there, the United 
States decided to have Saudi Arabia as the stable U. S. 
46Lester H. Brune, America and the Iraqi Crisis, 1990-91 
(California: Regina Books, 1993), 53. 
47Ibid., 53. 
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client in the Gulf area in order to continue its protectors 
policy in the Gulf. President Reagan adopted the Carter 
Doctrine, which had declared the Gulf a "vital" u.s. 
interest. Carter's plans called for a u.s. Rapid Deployment 
Force for the Middle East and, during 1981, increased 
military assistance to Saudi Arabia. The Reagan 
administration also adopted a policy of "strategic 
consensus" with Saudi Arabia. This policy developed a plan 
to create facilities in Saudi Arabia and pre-position u.s. 
equipment "over the horizon" in order to react quickly to 
any Gulf Crisis. Reagan also created the central command for 
the Middle East for the same reason. 48 
Finally, the United States developed "facilities" to be 
used by aircraft and ships belonging to the u.S. as well as 
Saudi Arabia. No American flags flew at these facilities, 
but military exercises were held for their use in a crisis. 
The u.S. Army Corps of Engineers supervised and planned 20 
billion dollars worth of military construction, including 
military cities, in Saudi Arabia. Although the u.S. only 
sold the Saudis material for construction of an 
infrastructure and for non-lethal supplies, these facilities 
enabled them in the fall of 1990 to operate in Desert 
Shield, and later Desert Storm, much more rapidly than would 




The U.S. military presence in the Gulf continued even 
after the war. The location of U.S. military personnel, the 
Air Force, heavy offensive weaponry, and the Navy are 
greater than anyone anticipated. To this day troops are 
still stationed in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. The 
United Arab Emirate (UAE) constitutes the largest liberty 
port for U. S. sailors in the world; the U. S. admiral 
headquarters in Bahrain oversees more than 18,000 sailors. 
All of this has led to the establishment of what is, in 
fact, the beginning of a permanent military presence in the 
Gulf.50 
The Gulf war was the stepping stone that led to a 
military base in the Middle East. On November 8, 1990, 
Pres ident Bush announced a mi I i tary force bui ld-up to 
provide an offensive option, termed Operation Desert Storm, 
to force Iraq out of Kuwait. 51 The Uni ted States deployed 
more than 500,000 troops, 1800 aircraft and approximately 
100 ships, which was the longest U.S. overseas commitment 
since the Vietnam war. 
Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, after 
consul ting with the Saudi King Fahad, U. S. Secretary of 
Defense Dick Cheney in early August 1990, sent American 
troops to Saudi soil to protect the kingdom of Saudi 
50Zunes , "The US-GCC Relationship," 104-05. 
51Richard W. Murphy, "Persian Gulf War," in The 1994 
Grolier Electronic Publishing Inc. 
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Arabia against any further advance by the Iraqi army. 
This deployment was termed Operation Desert Shield. 
Addi tional infantry and heavy weaponry later reinforced 
these original rapid deployment troops, outfi tted wi th 
light, mostly defensive weaponry. 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were the largest donors for 
maintaining u.S. military deployment in the Gulf.52 One of 
the biggest u.S. military deployments in the history of the 
Middle East was certainly the first step towards its 
ultimate objective of establishing a permanent military base 
in the Middle East. The u.S. military presence is deemed so 
permanent that many Saudis now complain that Washington's 
reluctance to topple the Saddam Hussein regime in Baghdad 
reflects Washington's interest in preserving Saudi 
dependence on u.S. protection. 53 
Since the days of the Gulf war, the u.S. has maintained 
a large military base in Saudi Arabia, thus tilting the 
regional balance of power in favor of the U. S. he U. S. 
administration has applied the labels of George F. Kennan's 
strategy and pursuing a policy of dual containment toward 
Iran and Iraq. The essence of the strategy is to isolate and 
sufficiently pressure the regimes in Tehran and Baghdad, 
52Ibid. 
53Richard K. Herrmann, "Regional Security in the Persian 
Gulf: Obstacles and Options" in Powder Key in the Middle 
East: The Struggle for Gulf Security, ed. Geoffrey Kemp and 
Jaric Gross Stein (Maryland: American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, 1995), 363. 
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hoping that such containment will produce either internal 
revolt and a change in regime or a fundamental 
transformation of the regimes from within. 54 The enormous 
military advantage the u.s. enjoys vis-a-vis Iraq and Iran 
and a strong u.s. military base in Saudi Arabia, nearest to 
both Iran and Iraq, helps implement this policy of dual 
contairunent. 
However, the U. S. long-term plan for a permanent 
military base in Saudi Arabia became evident during a 
statement of u.s. Secretary of State, James Baker, while 
testifying in Congress in September, 1990. He sketched a 
possible future collective security organization for the 
Middle East and suggested the u.S. might be able to station 
troops permanently in the region. 55 Fredrick Eilts believes 
that the United States should continue to maintain its small 
Mideast naval force in the Gulf and seek access to Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and other military facilities such as those 
in Bahrein and Oman. 56 In fact, the establishment of a u.S. 
permanent base in the Middle East was not a new idea. 
Robert Tucker, a highly regarded Middle East expert at Johns 
Hopkins University in 1975, envisioned: 
54See Warren Christopher, "Interview," The New York 
Times, 30 March 1993, A-3. 
55Hermann Fredrick Eilts, "The Persian Gulf Crisis: 
Perspectives and Prospects," Middle East Journal 45, no. 1 
(Winter 1991): 21. 
56Ibid., 22. 
As long as Saddam Hussein rules Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia will feel threatened and the free flow of 
reasonably priced oil will be in jeopardy. To 
defend both, the u.s. with or without interna-
tional assistance should consider establishing a 
permanent presence in the Kingdom. 57 
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It is also claimed that such a u.S. presence was supported 
by senior Saudi officials and in large measure, the bill 
for such an operation should be borne by the Saudis, the 
Kuwaitis, and also by Europe and Japan, whose dependence 
on Middle Eastern oil dwarfs that of the U.S.58 Despite the 
fact that a permanent u.s. presence in the Middle East would 
offend much of the Arab world, that Washington would be 
criticized for establishing a colonial protectorate, and 
that they were ignoring future reactions from the Arab 
world, the u.s. established a military base in Saudi Arabia 
(which is funded by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Middle 
Eastern countries). This base was created in order to ensure 
access to oil in the Middle East, to contain both Iran and 
Iraq, and to defend the security of Israel. 59 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
successful U. S. -led military operation against Iraq, the 
United States emerged with unprecedented standing in the 
Gulf. Former national security adviser Zbigview Brezezinski 
described the region as unambiguously an American sphere of 




influence60 which gave the u.s. administration an opportunity 
to create a security system, which would serve u.s. 
interest. 
Since the Gulf war, the u.s. administration has been 
planning to introduce a unipolar security system, under 
which the Uni ted States as the sole super power will 
guarantee the security of its Gulf allies in exchange for 
the Gulf nations' political, financial and infrastructural 
support. 61 Although this type of security system does not 
necessarily require the presence of a large, permanent 
ground force in the region, the United States will need to 
have sufficient military equipment stored and positioned in 
these allied countries so it can build up its forces rapidly 
and move in to pre-empt or repel a threat whenever 
necessary. 62 
It appears that the u.S. intervention in the Persian 
Gulf war can be regarded as one of the reasons for securing 
a permanent military base and building a security system in 
the region in which the u.S. will take responsibility for 
the security of its allies. In return, these allies will 
provide political, financial and infrastructural support, 
60Amin Saikal, "The United States and the Persian Gul f 
Security," World Policy Journal 9, no. 3 (1992): 515-16. 
61Ibid., 516. 
62" Excerpts from "Pentagon's Plan: 
Emergence of a New Rival," New York Times, 
Prevent the Re-
8 March 1992, 14. 
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such as is currently being done by oil rich Arab countries, 
like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
Post Cold War Syndrome: U.S. Quest for World Leadership 
The Pentagon policy planners, in their February 1992 
report, set detailed plans for budgetary planning for the 
rest of the century. In these documents, the Gulf war was 
characterized as a defining event in U.S. global leadership 
and its aftermath as a new international environment. The 
New York Times, in its editorial of March 10, 1992, wrote: 
America retained its position as the one and only 
unrivaled super power we will retain the 
preeminent responsibility for addressing 
those wrongs which threaten not only our 
interests, but those of our allies or friends or 
which could seriously unsettle international 
relations. 53 
In fact, during the post-Cold War period, the main reason 
for being of the United States was to emerge as the sole 
global super power. To achieve this end, the United States 
carried out the Gulf war. This is expressed clearly in two 
repeated themes of President Bush: the New World order and 
the Vietnam syndrome. Both signaled global motivations for 
the war. 
With regards to the Vietnam syndrome, the U.S. had to 
demonstrate that it was no longer just a nuclear-super state 
with feet of clay when it came to fighting a conventional 
53"America Only" editorial, New York Times, 10 March 
1992, A24. 
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war against an enemy. It had to show the will and military 
capacity on the ground as well as in the air to withstand a 
substantial conventional force. In order to achieve this, 
the U.S. first needed to annihilate by air Iraq forces in 
and around Kuwait in order to fight well on the ground with 
an army that had been rebuilt following the Vietnam 
debacle. 64 The outcome, a triumph for all wings of U.S. 
conventional forces, was to make America's main power asset 
and its mili tary capacity once again central to world 
poli tics. 65 In order to achieve the New World order or 
establish U.S. leadership in the world, the Pentagon policy 
makers did not support U. S. acti vi ties as the world's 
policeman, but rather suggested that the American interest 
would determine U.S. involvement in international affairs. 66 
In the post-Cold War era the United States' main 
objectives were: To prevent the re-emergence of a new rival 
in one of the republics of the former Soviet, or in the 
Persian Gulf, namely Iraq or Iran, and To prevent any 
hostile power from dominating a region whose resources 
would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate 
global power. In order to do this, the U.S. had to establish 
and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing 
64Gowan, 22. 
65Ibid. 
66Patrick Tyler, "US Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No 
Rivals Develop: A One Super Power World," New York Times, 8 
March 1992, 1,14. 
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potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater 
role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their 
legitimate interests. 67 
In the Middle East the post-Cold War u.s. objective is 
to remain the predominant outside power in the region and 
preserve access to the region's oil by the U.S., Japan and 
the west. Therefore, "It remains fundamentally important to 
prevent a hegemony or alignment of powers from dominating 
the regions." 68 While rationalizing the unipolar world 
leadership of the U.S., Howard J. Wiarda pointed out: 
One cannot conceive of a united European defense 
policy without the United States; the Russian aid 
program would surely collapse without the United 
States; and in Asia the United States is seen as 
the balancing force keeping China, Japan, and the 
two Koreas away politically from each other's 
throats. The peace process in the Middle East has 
no chance of success without the United States; 
Latin America's development would remain retarded 
wi thout the United States; and humani tarian 
assistance in Africa would surely dry up if the 
United States were not involved; and so on. It is 
clear that both U.S. interests and the world's 
interests demand that we remain a major player in 
that world. 69 
In order to consolidate U.S. world leadership in the post-
Cold War era, Wiarda suggested several things: 
67Enid Hi 11, "The New Wor ld Order and the Gul f War," in 
Ismael and Ismael, 202. 
68Ibid.,203. 
69Howard J. Wiarda, "Conclusion-Restructuring US Policy: 
New Thrusts, New Priorities" in US Foreign Policy and 
Strategic Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Howard J. 
Wiarda (London: Greendwood Press, 1996), 227. 
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1. The United States must continue to be involved in 
global issues and problems. 
The United States cannot ignore the next of the world's 
problem (poverty, drugs, hunger, malnutrition, disease, 
and the environment). Economically too, the U.s. is closely 
interdependent with other nations. 
2. The United States must continue to lead. 
The United States is too powerful. Only the United 
States has multifaceted power (political, economic, 
military, naval) to serve as a world leader. Only the United 
States can hold alliance together, provide sufficient 
stimulus for widespread economic development, deliver large 
scale assistance, and by its example and policies, stimulate 
democracy and human rights. 7o 
3. While the United States must continue to lead, it 
must also seek to increase the effectiveness of 
international organizations and multilateral capabilities. 
In this context, not only the United Nations but such 
other regional organizations, as NATO, European Community, 
the Organization of American States, Organization of African 
Unity, ASEAN as well as new or revived mutual defense 
arrangement for Southeast Asia should be kept in American 
mind. U.S. cooperation with such agencies should not be for 
cooperation's sake alone. Instead these agencies need to be 
strengthened as problem solving mechanisms that help advance 
7orbid., 229. 
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the principles and interests, for which the United States 
and its friends and allies stand. 
4. The Uni ted States must strengthen its domestic 
economic base. 
In order to be strong abroad and to carry out an 
effective foreign policy, America must have to be strong 
at home. Many opinion surveys show that, while the American 
people want to concentrate on the domestic economy, they 
also recognize the global interdependence of today's 
economic forces. 
5. While the United States needs to make a compelling 
case for economic internationalism, it also needs to make 
the case for political and strategic internationalism. 
This statement implies that the U. S. needs to bui ld 
domestic constituencies to help support u.S. international 
policies where U.S. interests are affected. America needs to 
demonstrate for example, why a policy in favor of 
democracy and human rights is not only morally right but 
also advances u.S. interests. In fact, democratic regimes 
are much easier for the U.S. to work with. 
6. While displaying a strong international position, 
the United States needs to set realistic limits as its 
goals. 
The United States needs to bring the goals of her 
foreign policy into line wi th the more restricted means 
available to achieve those goals. 
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7. Lastly, Wiarda suggested that, in order to 
establish world leadership, u.s. foreign policy needs to be 
consistent and coherent. 
Foreign policy need not be 100 percent consistent in 
order to be effective; but it does require some 
consistency and constancy. Sudden or frequent changes of 
direction are upsetting to the allies of the u.S. At the 
same time coherence in foreign policy requires a set of 
clear strategies to reach stated goals. It is not enough to 
set forth some idealistic, often romantic, principles for 
foreign policy. What is also required is a realistic road 
map of how to achieve the goals stated. 
In the final analysis, one very important consequence 
of the u.S. intervention in the Gulf war was the 
establishment of u.S. unipolar leadership over the world. 
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the unipolar 
world system led by the United States came to the surface. 
The u.S. crushing military defeat to Iraq in the Middle East 
consolidated u.s. leadership over the world. Through the 
Gulf war, the U.S. quest for world leadership in the post-
Cold War environment has been partially fulfilled. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The Middle East remains probably the most unstable 
region of all regions of the world. This reality is 
reflected in many potentially explosive conditions, the 
Arab-Israeli conflict--the Middle East problem--; the 
dormant civil war in Lebanon; the Iraq-Iran war; the 
Palestinian intifada (uprising) in the occupied West Bank 
and Gaza; the unrest caused by the revival of POlitical 
Islam; the continued foreign interference in the internal 
affairs of the region; and finally, the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent United States-led war 
against Iraq and its aftermath. 
More importantly, the Middle East region is the most 
important source of energy and is strategically critical for 
world peace and economic stability. It contains some of the 
world's most important waterways, such as the Persian Gulf 
and the Suez Canal, and occupies a central location between 
Europe, Africa, and Asia. 
For many reasons, historical, ideological, economic, 
and diplomatic, Americans have been, in one way or another, 
influenced bY the regional and international consequences of 
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the events in the Middle East. In recent years, the nature 
of United States-Middle East relations have been critically 
highlighted by many events and crises in the region: the 
American hostage crisis in Iran in 1979, the destruction of 
the U.S. Marines headquarters in Lebanon, the Iran-Contra 
affair, the Tanker War during the Iraq-Iran war, the United 
States bombing of Libya, and finally the 1990-1991 Gulf war. 
U.S. engagement in the Middle East has been far from 
smooth. However, the foreign policy of any nation is based 
on real and changing national interests rather than any 
unchangeable abstract principles. There is always a large 
gap between propaganda and actual policy. The United States 
is no exception here, and therefore understanding its real 
policy in the Middle East requires more than a single case 
study. The most important fact about U. S. policy in the 
Middle East is that it tends to pursue a number of 
overlapping, conflicting, or inconsistent economic, 
political, and strategic interests. The mix of U.S. 
interests in the Middle East has changed over time. 
Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the U.S. policy 
in the Middle East was shaped according to the needs and 
requirements of the United States. Prior to World War II, 
official U. S. interests in the Middle East was mainly 
limited to the defense of commercial interests, principally 
oil. The Cold War generated greater strategic significance 
in the Middle East. It created requirements for access to 
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military facilities in the region, alliance formation on the 
part of the United States, and trans fer by Washington of 
military supplies to strategic friends and allies. During 
the period responding to national interests, the United 
States established Israel which marked the beginning of 
extensive U.S. political, economic, and military involvement 
in the Middle East. 
Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. interest demanded 
four major objectives in the Middle East: 
1. Containing Soviet influence in the Middle East, 
2. Assuring uninterrupted flow of the region's oil to 
the West and Japan at low, stable prices and recycling the 
petro-dollars in the interest of the U.S. economy, 
3. Protecting the security of Israel and assuring its 
military superiority in the region, 
4. Ensuring U.S. arms trade in the Middle East. 
However, at a more specific level, U.S. policy 
objectives in the Middle East over the past several decades, 
until the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, may be 
identified as primary and secondary ones. The primary 
concern was to contain Soviet influence in the region. The 
secondary interests of the U. S. in the Middle East may 
include: 
1. Ensuring the free flow of the region's oil to the 
U.S. and to Western Europe and Japan, and petro-dollars to 
the West, 
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2. Defending the security of Israel, and 
3. Preserving the status-quo politics in the Middle 
East as represented by the so-called "moderate" and pro-
American conservative government in the Middle East. 
It should be noted that this list of u.s. interests and 
policy obj ecti ves in the Middle East does not imply a 
hierarchy of significance, or a degree of importance to the 
policy makers in the United States. These interests have 
been treated differently from one administration to another, 
depending on the policy maker and the circumstances of the 
time. However, during the Cold War, there was no doubt 
among the policy makers over whether the United States 
should attempt to limit Soviet influence in the Middle East. 
It was widely accepted within the policy makers that if the 
Soviet gained control over the region's resources, it would 
pose a serious threat to the economic well being of the 
United States and its allies in Western Europe and Japan. 
Therefore, the policy to contain the Soviet was the prime 
objective of the policy makers in the United States during 
the Cold War. 
Since World War II, various u.S. administrations have 
adopted means and ways attempting to oppose Soviet influence 
in the region. Confrontation has been one of the means 
adopted by the Truman administration in 1946 to oppose the 
Russian presence in Iran after the war. In 1973 during the 
October War between the Arabs and Israel, the Nixon 
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administration put United States forces on a high alert 
around the world in reaction to the Soviet attempt to deploy 
Soviet military into Egypt during the war. 
In response to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
President Carter threatened to use "any means necessary, 
including military forces" to avoid any attempt by the 
Soviet to gain control of the Persian Gulf region. During 
the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran war, 
decision to reflag Kuwait 
the Reagan administration's 
oil tankers was primarily 
motivated by its desire both to sustain the flow of the 
region's oil to the West and Japan at a stable price, and to 
exclude the Soviet from the strategically located Persian 
Gulf. 
To widen the containment line in the Middle East, the 
United States, in addition to the confrontation policy, has 
adopted three other means of containment which include: 
alliance buildup, superpower cooperation, and political and 
economic development. However, during the 1990s, with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War 
politics, containment of Soviet influence ceased to be a 
politico-military objective. The post-Cold War environment 
has raised a vital question that, during the Cold War, the 
United States intervened widely in the Third World in 
general and in the Middle East in particular. Now in the 
post-Cold War era, will the United States continue this 
policy? Should it? 
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While the collapse of the Soviet Union removed the 
major cause for u.s. involvement in the Middle East, Iran's 
truculent behavior and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 
provide a more hostile environment to the u.s. interests in 
the region. The invasion and occupation of oil rich Kuwait 
by Iraq on August 2, 1990, set in motion a crisis that would 
remain at the forefront of the international agenda for 
quite some time. This crisis exclusively threatened the u.s. 
interest in the Middle East. 
Responding to the invasion by pulling together an 
international coalition authorized by the United Nations 
Securi ty Council to oppose Iraq from Kuwait, the U. S. 
initiated U.N. economic sanctions of unprecedented severity. 
The second response was the war decision against Iraq. Both 
of these responses had broad support. More importantly, the 
Soviet Union supported u.s. efforts to oppose Iraq, first by 
rejecting the invasion, and second by not using its veto 
power in the Security Council and its support for all U.N. 
resolutions against Iraq. Despite the sharply changed Soviet 
behavior, there was a residual fear that the shift might be 
reversible. American policy makers began to warn in 
general terms of threats to U.S. interests which might be 
posed by increasingly better-armed regional powers 
such as Iraq. Therefore, the U.S. response to the crisis 
was indeed motivated by the fact that U.s. interests 
in the region has been threatened by the invasion of Kuwait, 
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and by the possibility of further Iraqi moves against Saudi 
Arabia which would put u. S. interests in the region in 
serious jeopardy. 
To deter Iraqi 
mili tary forces were 
moves against Saudi 
quickly deployed to 
Arabia, u. S. 
the area. In 
November 1990, a buildup of offensive forces began. Despite 
Bush's claim that the u.S. mission was offensive, and in the 
midst of all diplomatic attempts to prevent a war, President 
Bush was determined to eject Iraq from Kuwait by force. In 
January 1991, the campaign to eject Iraq from Kuwait 
commenced. Following several weeks of systematic and massive 
air attacks, formidable and highly mQbile ground forces 
defeated the Iraqi army on February 28, 1991. 
The key political objectives of ejecting the Iraqi army 
from Kuwait, and restoring the so-called legitimate 
government of Kuwait, were accomplished quickly and with 
remarkably low coalition casualties. Undoubtedly, it was an 
absolute military victory of the U.S.-led coalition and 
crushing defeat for Iraq. 
The fact remains that the Gulf War was truly an 
electronic war. The sight of cruise missiles and smart bombs 
roaming to their destination with pinpoint accuracy created 
a widespread impression of an uneven match with a high tech 
super power--the United States and its European allies--and 
many other countries, including the Arabs, versus a poor 
Third world army. Therefore, it should be indicated that 
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America's victory in the Gulf War was not a unilateral one. 
Success depended heavily upon the cooperation of others, 
whether in the form of support in the Uni ted Nations 
Security Council, especially by the Soviet Union, or by many 
other means like participation in the economic blockade, the 
contribution of troops, and diplomatic support, the 
willingness of Saudi Arabia to allow the use of its 
territory and air bases by the U.S.-led coalition forces, 
the financial pledges from the allied states, especially 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and finally, the division among the 
Arab states regarding the issue. All of these factors 
contributed to the outcome of the Gulf war. While the war 
clearly represented a military victory of an advanced 
country over a developing one, the outcome was by no means a 
foregone conclusion. 
United States interests in the Middle East, as 
elsewhere, are determined on the basis of strategic 
considerations and access to resources and markets. As a 
superpower, the United States has used a variety of means to 
achieve its interests in the Middle East. These means have 
included both peaceful and violent ones. The Gulf war was 
the best example for the use of military forces by the U.S. 
to protect its interests in the region. By defeating Iraq, 
the U.S. has further secured its interests in the Middle 
East. 
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Before u.s. interests in the Middle East can be defined 
as the factors that motivated the u.s. to go to war against 
Iraq in 1990-1991, it should be noted that, according to the 
theory of national interest, the pursuit of national 
interest can be defined as a policy or policies designed to 
promote and protect interests of a particular period of 
time, as contested with differentiated interests of 
indi viduals, groups, or sub-groups, or the interests of 
mankind as a whole. National interest can also be described 
as the perceived needs and desires of a sovereign state in 
relation to other sovereign states which constitute its 
external environment. As national interests of a state are 
reflected both in domestic and external policies, shifts and 
changes in domestic coalitions and in international 
relations may require a redefinition of national interests 
by a nation-state. Political, economic, and technological 
changes also redistribute power both at domestic and 
international levels, which may likewise compel nation-
states to redefine their national interests. 
Indeed, every nation-state's ultimate objective is to 
achieve its national interests. u.s. policy in the Middle 
East was no exception here. It was always motivated by its 
needs and desires to achieve its national interests. 
Obviously the u.s. intervention in the Gulf war indicated 
that it was carried out to serve its national interests. 
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Four basic interests of nation-states and four levels 
of interest have been suggested by Donald E. Nuechterlein 
as national needs which form the underpinning of 
national foreign pOlicy. The four fundamental interests 
are: 
1. Defense interest, 
2. Economic interest, 
3. World order interest, and 
4. Ideological interest (see Chapter II) . 
The order in which these four basic interests have been 
placed does not suggest any priority of one OVer another. 
However, it may be argued that unless a nation-state is able 
to defend its terri tory and ci tizens, ei ther by its own 
defense forces or in alliance with a major power, or both, 
none of the other three interests is likely to matter. 
Identification of the basic national interests involved 
in foreign crisis is only the first step in determining 
foreign policy .. The next step is to assess correctly the 
intensity of that interest on the stakes that the policy 
makers of a country and its leadership believes are 
involved. 
To analyze better the differing degrees of interests 
that a government perceives to be involved in given 
international events, Nuechterlein has categorized four 
degrees of intensities as fOllows: 
1. Survival issues, 
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2. Vital issues, 
3. Major issues, and 
4. Peripheral issues. 
The national-interest matrix, suggested by Nuechterlein 
as a research tool in foreign policy analysis, can be used 
in this study to find out how the Bush administration viewed 
u.s. interests in the Middle East-Persian Gulf-region in 
reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. 
To illustrate how the national interest matrix can be 
used as a research tool, Nuechterlein has explained the Suez 
crisis of 1956. Because of the abrupt nationalization of the 
Suez Canal by President Nasser in 1956, the Eden government 
in Britain decided to use force against Egypt. 
The Eden government decided that Britain's economic 
interests were so endangered by the potential closure of the 
canal that it could not compromise with Nasser. Therefore, 
the British economic interest in the canal was, in Eden's 
view, so great that the issue was a vital one which had to 
be met with force since Nasser refused to negotiate suitable 
guarantees on the use of the canal. 
Similarly, President Bush decided that u.s. economic 
interests were endangered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
and the possibility that Iraq might gain control over Saudi 
Arabia's oil resources. This would give Iraq the opportunity 
to control over one-third of the world's oil reserves, which 
the United States would not allow Saddam Hussein to do and 
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so could not compromise with him. An immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait was demanded and a 
large number of mili tary forces were deployed in Saudi 
Arabia. Therefore, the u.s. economic interest was, in Bush's 
view, so great that the u.s. would use military force if 
Saddam Hussein refused to withdraw from Kuwait. Although, 
like Nasser, Saddam Hussein was seen as a threat to western 
oriented governments in the Middle East and, more 
importantly, to Israel as a challenged regional power (world 
order interest), he was clearly following an anti-democratic 
course at home (ideological interest). Like Eden, President 
Bush probably saw the world-order interest as vital and the 
ideological interest at least as major. He therefore decided 
not to compromise with Saddam Hussein and chose the use of 
force to deal with him. 
The conclusion drawn is that during the 1990-1991 Gulf 
crisis, the United States saw its interest in the Middle 
East as follows: 
1. Economic well-being, vital. 
2. Favorable world order, vital. 
3. Promotion of value (ideological), major. 
4. Defense of homeland, peripheral. 
Therefore, Nuechterlein's national interest matrix can be 
used to explain how the U. S. viewed its interest in the 
1990-1991 Gulf crisis and can conclude that force was a 
likely course of action. 
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It is apparent that the u.s. policy in the Middle East 
in general, and in the 1990-1991 Gulf war in particular, 
continued to be dictated by the theory of national interest. 
As this writing has supported, national interest was the 
driving force behind the u.s. intervention in the Gulf. 
Therefore, the war decision was dominated by the following 
factors, which were also considered as the major U. S. 
interest in the region. These factors were: 
1. The oil factor. In a real sense the war was 
essentially over oil. About 60 percent of the world's oil 
comes from eight Gulf states, more than 15 times what the 
United States produces; indeed if the probable reserves are 
counted, the total percentage is closer to 85 percent. If 
the regime of Saddam Hussein had controlled the flow of the 
Gulf oil, or controlled more of a share in OPEC, which meant 
control the price of oil, this would directly threaten the 
u.s. interests. The u.s. economy would clearly be vulnerable 
if a significant portion of the Middle East oil were 
controlled by an unfriendly regime, and the petro-dollars 
investment in the United States will be severely damaged. 
Another maj or U. S. interest is that the control of oil 
supplies to both Japan and the countries of Western Europe 
has always served the u.s. at a crucial political level in 
relations with the Middle East countries. So, to secure the 
free access to Middle Eastern oil, the United States had to 
become directly involved in the war. 
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2. To secure the existence of Israel, the political and 
strategic ally of the United States. Politically, Israel 
emerged at the direct sponsorship of the United States. 
Apart from the ethnic bondage of American Jews with Israeli 
Jewish community, Washington lS highly sympathetic to the 
Israeli cause. Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the 
emergence of Iraq as a regional military power, the U.S. 
policy maker and the American Israeli supporters, understood 
that a strong Iraq in the Middle East would ultimately 
challenge the Israeli military superiority in the region and 
threaten Israel's security. So naturally to protect the 
security of Israel, the United States moved to destroy the 
Iraqi military power and quickly intervened in the Gulf War. 
The U.S. perceives a moral, political and strategic 
obligation to keep the security of Israel intact. 
3. The third important factor behind the U.S. 
intervention in the Gulf was to establish a permanent 
military base in the Gulf region, which was the long term 
goal of the United States for ensuring the so-called 
collective security in the region. The U.S. policy planners 
spent much time and money to establish a permanent military 
base in the region, especially in Saudi Arabia. The orders 
were to protect the U.s. interest, namely oil, in the region 
in case of a Soviet threat or any other regional threat, 
like the case of Iraq, so that the free flow of oil can be 
ensured. The u.s. administration had also been planning to 
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introduce a unipolar security system, under which the United 
States as the only superpower, would ensure the security of 
its Gulf allies in exchange of their political, financial 
and infrastructural support. The Gulf War gave the United 
States the opportunity to create and maintain a permanent 
military base in the Gulf, further securing its interest in 
the reg~on. 
4. The fourth factor for U.s. intervention in the Gulf 
War was the aspiration of the United States to emerge as the 
sole, global superpower. In the post-Cold War era, the first 
objective of the United States was to prevent the 
re-emergence of a new rival and to prevent any hostile power 
from dominating a region where resources could, under 
consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global 
power. 
The post-Cold War U.S. objectives in the Middle East 
are: to remain the predominant outside power in the region, 
and to preserve U.s. and western access to the region's oil. 
To consolidate U.s. world leadership in the post-Cold War 
era, the Gulf War was carried out to this end. 
Actually, the United States has traditionally defined 
its national interest in the Middle East in terms of the 
containment of Soviet expansion. The containment doctrine 
has been pursued as a means of accomplishing the following: 
• preventing a shift in the global balance of power, 
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• ensuring the security and western freedom of access 
to the region's oil supplies, 
• assuring access to the region's markets for American 
manufactured goods, 
• securing the environment for American investment 
opportunities, and 
• assuring the continued flow of petro-dollars 
investment into the United States market. 
To realize the objectives of containment, the United 
States had to develop strong, positive relationships with 
the favored Arab states of the Middle East. The United 
States also had to promote the stability of a region where 
war and instabili ty invited the Soviet, threatened the 
security of the free flow of the region's oil, and 
endangered American commercial interests. 
It is commonly argued that Israel promotes American 
interests in the Middle East by acting as a barrier against 
Soviet penetration; maintaining regional stability through 
its military superiority, and by ensuring the survival of 
pro-American Arab regimes. However, the linkage of Israel 
with the definition of American national interest in the 
Middle East have made the Arabs susceptible to the Soviet 
influence. Support for Israel, after all, has given the 
Soviet Union the opportunity to intrude itself deeply into 
the Middle East. It has put at risk U. S. access to oil 
resources of the Persian Gulf. The best example for this was 
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the 1973 Arab oil embargo. In direct response to the U.S. 
alliance with Israel and to Israeli aggression, several Arab 
states turned toward Moscow for arms and forged alliances 
with the Soviet to maximize their own security. The U.S.-
Israeli relationship, in and of itself, has impeded the 
efforts of the United States to further the stability of 
pro-American governments throughout the Middle East. This 
relationship has led to a hostile environment concerning 
American interests in the region, which in the end, led to 
direct involvement and military intervention by the United 
States to protect its national interest in an unstable 
Middle East. 
In the final analysis, despite its widely increased 
military presence and success in the region, the result is a 
relatively unfavorable U.S. economic and political influence 
in the Middle East. The Cold War ideology, which saw the 
Middle East in terms of the East-West gains and the Soviet 
threat, no longer exists and need to be replaced by a more 
productive policy. As the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the departure of communism were necessary for political and 
economic freedom to be developed in Eastern Europe, 
imperialism, along with its client states in the Middle 
East, must be ended for more poli tical and economic 
development, more political freedom and true democracy in 
which the United States can playa major role, as it does in 
Eastern Europe and elsewhere. The United States did not send 
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American troops to the Middle East to defend freedom and 
democracy. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, after all, are feudal 
monarchies. In fact, the war was about oil, about who would 
set the price of oil, and about protecting governments loyal 
to the Uni ted States and punishing those who are not. 
Indeed, a majority of Arabs would welcome a United States 
presence if the U.S. treated Arab countries the same way it 
does to Israel and other Eastern European cOuntries, that 
i 5 , by encour ag i ng economi c and po lit i cal freedom and 
independence. In 50 dOing, the United States will have Won 
not only the Gulf war, but also the trust and confidence of 
the Arab people. 
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